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ABSTRACT 
Since the establishment of the first Islamic bank twenty-five years ago, the 
concept of Islamic banking has gained world-wide acceptance. The main feature that 
distinguishes Islamic banking from conventional banking is the prohibition of interest, 
or "riba". 
The choice of Turkey was made for several reasons. Firstly, although Turkey has 
a large and overwhelmingly Muslim population, it is also a secular state. In many ways 
the problems experienced by the Islamic banks in Turkey are similar to those faced by 
Islamic banks in non-Islamic countries. Secondly, since 1980, the Turkish economic 
and financial sector has undergone rapid change, with the entry of many conventional 
banks. Turkey therefore offers an example of how Islamic banks can survive and 
prosper in a very competitive financial environment. Thirdly, due to Turkey's 
strategically important position between the Middle East and Europe and increasing 
trade and political ties with both areas, the potential for further expansion in the field of 
Islamic banking in Turkey is enormous. 
In the introductory chapter, the economy of Turkey from the founding of the 
Republic to the present day was examined. Chapter 2 dealt with the activities and 
functions of the Central Bank. The conventional banks and other financial institutions 
were discussed in Chapter 3. Reasons for the prohibition of interest in Islam, together 
with a short account of the origins of banking in the Islamic world and the emergence 
of Islamic banking were covered in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the position of Islam and 
the establishment of Islamic banks in Turkey were discussed, followed by details of the 
types of Islamic investment, accounts and services available to the committed Muslim. 
Finally, the concluding chapter examined the performance of the Islamic banks and 
assessed their role within the Turkish financial system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Turkey, with its vast and strategically placed land mass acts as a bridge between 
Europe and the Middle East. Its geographical position, between communist Soviet 
Union, "fundamentalist" Iran, war-tom Iraq and Syria to the East and the economically 
and technically advanced capitalist countries to the West appears to ensure that Turkey 
suffers from a permanent crisis of identity. Its geopolitical importance continues to be a 
mixed blessing. In economic matters, Turkey benefits far more from trade and tourism 
with countries in the West, but in social, cultural and religious terms Turkey probably 
has more in common with its Muslim neighbours in the East. Turkey endeavours to 
strike a balance in its dealings with both blocs. 
Since the founding of the Republic in Turkey in 1923, Turkey's economic, social 
and political life has undergone vast change. The main aim of Mustafa Kemal, better 
known both in Turkey and abroad as Kemal Atatlirk, was to create, from the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, a new country and society patterned directly on 
the countries and societies of Western Europe. 
There is general agreement that secularism was, and still is, the most significant 
and also the most controversial aspect of the doctrine of Atatlirk. The Turks had 
converted to Islam by the time they began establishing their political sovereignty in 
parts of Anatolia during the tenth century. Throughout the next nine centuries, Islam 
was the primary guiding force in social development and all aspects of life were 
influenced and regulated by Islamic tenets, precepts and law. 
From 1925 to the mid-1940s, the government attempted to suppress all public 
manifestations and observances of religion that the secularist minority believed hindered 
the development of a modem state. Since the late 1940s, successive governments have 
made concessions to popular demand. However, even in 1988, the position of religion 
in society is no less problematic than at the beginning of the reforms. 
Despite attempts to suppress religion, Islam has continued at the very root of life 
and culture but secularism has remained Turkey's official ideology, as it has for 
sixty-five years. The present government has encouraged an "Islamic revival" but it 
appears that religious sentiment among the masses had never weakened but rather that 
public religious practices had declined. 
Turkey now takes an active part in Islamic organisations such as the Islamic 
Development Bank and the Organisation of Islamic Countries. In recent years it has 
strengthened political ties with most Middle Eastern countries. The revival of Islam 
alarms western-oriented Turks, as well as the armed forces, who see themselves as the 
guardians of Kemalist reforms. Although the secularists fear the creeping influence of 
religion, their worries seem somewhat exaggerated given that the religious vote in the 
1987 general election accounted for less than 10 per cent of the total vote. However, a 
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serious divide on the question of secularism versus religion at the national level 
continues to exist and it will remain central to Turkish life for some time. 
Although the present government contains a notable proportion of people with 
strongly Islamic backgrounds , the country continues to pursue a very pro-Western 
policy orientation. Turkey's long history of involvement in the politics of Europe, and 
thereby the West, has often been stormy, characterised by confrontation, antagonism 
and mutual mistrust, primarily because of the religious divide between Christianity and 
Islam. In spite of these past historical differences, Turkey today plays an important role 
in Western institutions such as NATO, OECD, the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. It is also a member of the Council of Europe and has applied for full 
membership of the EEC. This contact with Western industrial societies has helped 
Turkey's industrialisation process and has been the main source for the improvement in 
its human rights record and for its adoption of increasingly liberal values. 
Following several decades of basically inward orientation of policies, in early 
1980 Turkey adopted a development strategy that has entailed moving towards an 
outward orientation and giving an increased role to market forces. The immediate task 
of the government is to turn Turkey, by the 1990s, into an important trading nation 
with a modern infrastructure and an efficient bureaucracy. Despite the great economic 
progress that has been achieved since 1980, Turkey still faces the problems of most 
developing countries such as rapid population growth, urbanisation and socio-cultural 
transformation. Inevitably, attempts at social, cultural and economic modernisation 
have often collided with conservative forces and attitudes, and in some ways Turkey is 
now experiencing the problems of clashes between old and new, tradition and change, 
reaction and progress, resembling those of the early years of the Republic. 
Despite its secular constitution, in 1983 the Turkish authorities passed legislation 
to permit the establishment of fman~ial institutions which operate in conformity with the 
principles and doctrines of Islam and which are commonly known as Islamic banks. 
Until the arrival of Islamic banking, the entire banking system in Turkey, and in all 
other Muslim countries, was based on the Western banking system which was 
inconsistent with Islamic law due mainly to the the disapproval of interest, or "riba", in 
Islam. 
The main aims of the Islamic banks, the first of which was set-up twenty-five 
years ago, are to provide a fair return to investors and to offer social services to the 
Muslim community, or "umma". In an Islamic system of finance, risks are borne by 
both the investor and the financier, on a profit-sharing system which replaces the need 
for interest. 
This thesis focuses on the establishment of Islamic banks in Turkey which is dealt 
with in the context of the Turkish financial and economic system as a whole. It is 
necessary to include the non-Islamic institutions because in Turkey a dual financial 
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system operates, and the riba based banks occupy by far the dominant position. 
Since 1980, the financial sector has been opened up to both private Turkish and 
foreign banks and free market policies have generally been pursued. It is against this 
increasingly liberal political and economic background that the performance of the 
Islamic banks is evaluated. 
The thesis will show that Islamic banking has succeeded in Turkey in spite of 
opposition from both secularists and conventional banking and financial institutions. 
Indeed, not only has it survived, but it is also gaining further strength and momentum. 
3 
CHAPTER! 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the economic development of Turkey from the 
early 1930s to the present time. It aims to show how the various regimes, whether 
authoritarian, liberal, right or left, have tackled economic and industrial development 
throughout the period. The chapter is, therefore, divided into clearly defined sections, 
each one covering one or two decades. 
The early regime believed that the promotion of state and heavy industry would 
lead to rapid industrialisation. Later regimes considered import substitution policies and 
rigorous planning to be the answer, while the present government believes that 
economic and industrial development lies in free-market policies and the private sector. 
Certainly, the policies of state intervention which neglected small business, were never 
too successful. 
The structural reforms begun in 1980 have had a major impact on the economy. 
This section is more detailed than others and is supported by tables. As the Islamic 
banks were only established recently in Turkey, it is in the context of the current 
economic scene that their activities, detailed in subsequent chapters, must be evaluated. 
1930-1950 : State industrial development 
Turkey achieved independence in the 1920s without possessing a strong native 
class of entrepreneurs and industrial producers. Trade, commerce, and manufacturing 
had been carried out by the minorities in the Ottoman Empire, and many of the more 
active elements left Turkey in the 1920s. As the prestige of industrial and commercial 
occupations was low, the most able elements of the Turkish population chose 
governmental or professional careers. I 
During the first decade of the Republic, Atarurk concentrated on consolidating 
political control and enacting reforms. He held no strong doctrinaire positions on the 
way the economy should develop, and was thus restrained in his economic initiatives. 
It was the lack of private capital, compounded by international economic factors 
arising from the world economic depression, that led to the abandonment of a liberal 
economic strategy in favour of "etatism" in the 1930s. The Turkish term for etatism is 
"devletcilik", which means "statehood", or in a derived sense a policy of state control. 
Atati.irk and his aides rejected any attempt to identify etatism with socialism, and 
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stressed the special nature of Turkish etatism. 2 There was a feeling that political 
independence had to be complemented by economic protectionism and self-sufficiency. 
It was a form of state capitalism centred on the creation of government-run 
manufacturing enterprises. By adopting a policy of etatism, the government had 
assumed the task of financing development, of creating a basic financial structure and 
of establishing and operating industrial enterprises. 
In the government's economic programme, industry was accorded the main role. 
By means of industrialisation, the government hoped to achieve economic 
independence and approximate the level of economic and industrial development of 
Western Europe. 
It was under the policy of etatism that Turkey's first five-year industrialisation 
plan was initiated ( 1934-1938). The main aim of the plan was to establish a number of 
industrial plants in an effort to reduce Turkey's need for imported goods using 
domestic raw materials. The finance, construction and management of these plants was 
the responsibility of state agencies. The main industries affected were those 
manufacturing textiles, paper, glass, cement and sugar. The majority of the new plants 
were established in the backward regions of central and eastern Anatolia and, with the 
exception of an iron and steel mill, most of the development was realised within the 
plan. The Soviet Union, which had helped to draft the plan, provided a loan of$ 8 
million gold towards the cost of its implementation.3 
The government established two new development banks in the 1930s to control 
the expanding state sector. The first of these was Si.imerbank which was set up in 1933 
to supervise the operation of the factories formerly run by the Bank for Industry and 
Mining, and which included most of the new plants established under the five-year 
plan. The second state agency, Etibank, was established in 1935, and had 
responsibility for the mining industry. Together with the Ziraat Bankasi (Agricultural 
Bank), founded in 1888, these two banks were collectively known as State Economic 
Enterprises (SEEs).4 Although in theory the SEEs were supposed to operate with a 
high degree of autonomy and to strive for profits, in practice they were inefficient and 
bureaucratic and subject to the demands of political patronage. The state revenue and 
items such as deposits, savings and loans, raised by the state and private banks, served 
as the main sources of capital. 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, it was emphasised by the government that there 
was no bias against private enterprises, and that etatism encouraged private initiative. 
However, the very nature of etatism meant that the state had an increased role in 
industrial development. The state also had easier access to capital and tended to own the 
largest and most modern plants. In 1936 and 1937 special laws were passed to ensure 
increased government control over private enterprises and to regulate the prices of their 
products. This control was mainly to prevent private firms from competing with 
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government undertakings. This policy of government discrimination against private 
enterprise could certainly not have been expected to lead to greater efficiency. It is 
important to note, however, that with the exception of foreign-owned railways and 
coal-mines, there was no important nationalisation of private industries. 
During the Second World War, the government took greater control of the private 
as well as the state sector of the economy with the result that the state sector increased 
its share of industrial output at the expense of that of the private industrialists. The war 
severely curtailed the development plans of the second five-year plan and the only 
important new plant established under this plan was the iron and steel mill at Karablik, 
which had actually been provided for in the first plan.5 The construction of the steel mill 
at Karabiik was criticised by opponents of etatism who believed that the decision to 
establish it had been taken for political rather than commercial reasons and they even 
argued as to whether Turkey should have established a steel industry at all at that stage 
of its development. 
The war caused high inflation and a shortage of those goods which would 
normally have been imported and a flourishing black market developed. As a result of 
wartime profiteering the merchant class was able to expand its capital accumulation. In 
effect, the private capital which was lacking in the 1920s and 1930s was now available, 
and with this came a new class of entrepreneurs and technocrats. This social change 
was perhaps etatism's greatest gain. 
The policy of etatism has been criticised by both Turkish and foreign observers 
for its concentration on industrial development at the expense of agriculture. But, by its 
very nature, etatism meant a veering towards industrialisation, the purpose of which 
was to increase industrial production and reduce the dependence on imports, as well as 
to increase the proportion of industrial workers in the labour force and industry's share 
in the national product. In the period up to the end of the war, little aid had been given 
to the farmer, and it was only in the post-war years, when the leaders needed political 
support, that they began to take agricultural development seriously. 
The etatist policy had helped to equip Turkey with basic industries in the 1930s, 
but the development was uneven and incomplete, and the Turks were unable to break 
their dependence on imports to operate their newly established industries. 
Although some may claim that etatism failed because it ignored free-market 
principles, others claim it failed because the policy was too capitalist. It would appear, 
however, that at the time the policy of etatism was necessary in order to remedy the 
industrial and economic backwardness of Turkey in the early 1930s. The eventual 
demise of etatism came at the end of the war with the availability of private capital and 
the influx of foreign aid. Following the war, the United States became Turkey's biggest 
source of aid and this assistance acted as a significant boost to the Turkish economy. It 
helped to influence the evolution of economic policy away from etatism towards the 
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adoption in the 19 50s of more liberal and capitalist economic policies. 
1950-1960:Agricultural development and emergence of private enterprise 
The Democrat Party came to power in 1950 following the election victory which 
saw Turkey move from a single-party to a multi-party democratic regime. In economic 
matters the new regime believed that private enterprise was the key to economic 
growth. However, the relative importance of the value of the state and private sectors in 
industrial development continued to remain a major area of policy. 
After 1950 there were proposals for the denationalisation of some SEEs but in 
fact few industrial concerns were privatised. The unwillingness of private industry to 
take over the operations of the SEEs stemmed from the fact that most of private 
industry was dominated by individual entrepreneurs or partnerships and these people 
were unaccustomed to managing the relatively large state sector plants, and preferred to 
invest their capital in something they could personally control rather than have to 
cooperate with the bureaucrats of the state holding companies. With the exception of the 
SEEs in the textile industry, which were generally profitable, most other state owned 
companies were making losses and as such there was no incentive for any private 
sector entrepreneur to take over the operations of these enterprises. One important 
denationalisation scheme concerned the oil industry.6 Legislation was passed in 1954 to 
permit private firms, both Turkish and foreign, to compete in production and 
distribution. 
The transport sector also benefited from Democrat policies. Previous 
administrations had concentrated on expanding the railway network at the expense of 
road construction. The 1950s witnessed a reversal of this trend and during the decade a 
large road construction programme was initiated. As most road transport was privately 
operated, this signified an important shift in favour of private enterprise. 
There was a rapid expansion of the number of private and state firms in the 
1950s. By 1952, private investment in the manufacturing industry was greater than that 
of the state sector and by the second half of the decade, when the new plants had 
become fully operational, the value added in manufacturing industry by private firms 
exceeded that of the state sector. However, contrary to the original objectives of the 
Democrats, after 1954 the state had once again become the dominant investor. 
The first four years of the decade saw an increase in both agricultural 
production and economic activity which, coupled with the free availability of foreign 
exchange for imports, relatively low inflation and government encouragement, led to a 
rise in investment by private businessmen and helped to generate a sharp increase in 
industrial output. However, after 1954 this picture altered radically. There was a 
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decrease in agricultural production, high inflation and a shortage of foreign exchange 
for the import of raw materials and new equipment on which industry depended. As the 
government did not want to see a slowdown in economic growth, it used the state 
sector to make up the shortfall in private investment. The government thus abandoned 
its commitment in favour of private enterprise in an attempt to maintain the appearance 
of increasing prosperity and in doing so the state found itself investing an increasing 
share of national income for a lower return. 
Most of the defects of the planning and management of the SEEs during the 
etatism period continued into the 1950s. There were three main defects. The first was a 
system of pricing unrelated to costs, and as a consequence this led to inflationary deficit 
financing. The prices of most SEE products were fixed at a low level so as to reduce 
costs for the consumers. The second defect was to set up new industries for purely 
political reasons without consideration of any locational advantages or needs of the 
market. The main aim of the Democrats was to win votes and factories were often built 
in politically sensitive areas irrespective of production costs or level of demand for the 
products. The third defect was continued government interference and bureaucracy in 
the day-to-day operations of the plants. These defects, together with the fact that the 
state accounted for a greater part of new investment in the latter part of the decade, 
meant that the Turkish industry became less efficient as the 1950s progressed.? 
Private firms also suffered. They were often too small for maximum efficiency 
and faced problems of under-capitalisation and unplanned expansion. The private 
entrepreneurs over-expanded with no regard to the absorptive capacity of the market or 
the availability of imported raw materials and by the late 1950s the textile industry, in 
which the private sector had invested heavily, was experiencing over capacity. An 
overvalued lira prevented the profitable export of commodities. 
Towards the mid-1950s, shortages of petroleum and other imported goods 
required for the operation of the economy led to a slowdown in industrial development. 
By the end of 1957 Turkey's foreign debt had reached more than one billion dollars, or 
about three times the 1957 export earnings, and both the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and Western creditor nations were no longer willing to offer aid without 
economic reforms. 8 In fact it had mainly been the availability of foreign aid which had 
allowed the government to run a persistent deficit in its visible trade balance throughout 
the 1950s. Finally, in 1958, the government was forced to accept a deep devaluation, 
tax reforms, a decrease in spending and an increase in the prices of the SEE products. 
Following these measures Turkey was able to reschedule its debts and obtain fresh 
credits. Although imports resumed, they were insufficient to meet the demands of 
industry and so industrial production fell. This fall was accompanied by rampant 
speculation, corruption and black marketeering.These economic conditions caused 
discontent in the army and among the urban population and eventually led to a military 
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coup in May 1960. 
In conclusion, it can be said that at the end of the decade Turkish industry had a 
bigger physical base than it had at the start of the decade. Agriculture, in particular, had 
greatly benefited from an increase in resources and from the construction of roads 
which led to easier communications. The rural population which had gained little in the 
pre-war years witnessed a vast improvement in their lives. The Democrats were also 
able to utilise the idle capital and initiative of the private entrepreneurs as demonstrated 
by the rise in value added in manufacturing industry in the early 1950s. 
There were also negative aspects of the Democrats' rule. The regime had failed 
to bring about any improvement in the structure and efficiency of industry. Although 
the private and state sectors had expanded, growth was erratic and uncoordinated, 
without regard to long-range planning. The visible defects of the state sector at the 
beginning of the decade were still evident at the end. The artificially high level of the 
Turkish lira and heavy import duties helped to foster the growth of a protectionist 
import substitution regime based mainly on quasi-governmental enterprise. 
1960-1980 : Import substitution era 
During the 1950s the Democratic Party governments were heavily criticised for 
their opposition to any sort of economic planning and it was not until1960 that this 
approach was reversed and a coherent industrialisation programme was undertaken 
which sought to establish the heavy industrial base needed.9 Accordingly, the principle 
of planning was written into the Constitution and a State Planning Organisation was 
established, the main function of which was to draw up five-year economic plans.lO 
The framework of the five-year plans was based on import substitution policies 
although some export incentives were introduced in the early 1960s. There were several 
objectives of the five-year plans. The first aim was to achieve a high and sustained 
growth of national income, and the target of the first and second plans was a GNP 
growth rate of 7 per cent a year. The second objective was the elimination of the severe 
balance of payments difficulties which Turkey had experienced during the late 1950s. 
The creation of additional employment has been the third objective of the five-year 
plans. Finally, all plans had the achievement of greater social justice as one of their 
aims. A main area of dispute between the politicians and planners was the extent to 
which the plans should direct the investments of the private sector, and the relative roles 
of public and private enterprise in the development process. 
The politicians saw the creation of an integrated industrial base as essential to 
economic independence and as such the industrial sector expanded rapidly. The 
government believed that self-sufficiency in the production of iron and steel was 
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necessary for economic independence and accordingly two iron and steel complexes 
were constructed between 1960-1980 despite there being insufficient demand to 
warrant their construction. 
By the 1960s Turkey was benefiting from the infrastructure investments which 
had been funded by foreign assistance in the 1950s. 
Although the development plans stressed the state role in heavy industry, 
private industry played an important part in the production of textiles, non-metallic 
minerals and machinery. The increase in the output of private industry since the 
mid-1960s was accompanied by changes in its structure, as employment and output 
have become concentrated in larger and more capital-intensive firms. The government 
encouraged private industrial development by offering tax rebates and whole or partial 
exemption of customs duties for imported equipment.ll 
In the 1960s a number of efforts were made to reform the SEEs, but new 
legislation failed to bring about any significant changes in their efficiency, and most of 
the defects of the SEEs in the 1950s, such as unrealistic pricing and planning, deficit 
financing, political interference and bureaucracy, continued into the 1970s.The SEEs 
recorded an annual net profit in most of the years between 1960 and 1974 but in 1975 
the state sector finances worsened due to oil price increases and rising wage 
demands. The result was that the formerly profitable enterprises began to show losses 
and thus became a serious drain on public funds. The resort to deficit financing was a 
major source of inflationary pressure. 
In the 1970s the rate of investment in Turkish industry rose sharply but the 
production costs of products was such that exports grew only slowly in this period. 
The protection and favourable conditions in the domestic market discouraged efficiency 
and economies of scale that would have helped exports. The Turks were encouraged to 
develop their internal market independent of the world economy by the belief that 
international assistance would close the growing gap between imports and exports.12 
Although the government passed laws to encourage foreign investment from the 
private sector, there was only a relatively small capital inflow. Foreign investors were 
generally unwilling to invest due to bureaucracy and inertia, fears about the repatriation 
of capital and profits and a rigidly controlled currency which did not reflect the high 
inflation rates. 
The quadrupling of world oil prices in 1973 adversely affected economic 
growth and left Turkey facing mounting deficits in its balance of payments, simply in 
its attempt to meet the foreign exchange needs for essential energy imports. The 
remittances from Turkish workers abroad, which form a crucial part of the current 
account balance, also peaked in 197 4 as the demand for surplus labour in Europe was 
reversed. The world recession caused a decline in Turkey's exports, while unrealistic 
exchange rates for Turkish currency encouraged imports, thus worsening the balance of 
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payments deficits. The policy of continued government subsidies, financed through 
Central Bank borrowing, cushioned domestic consumers from many of the price rises 
in the world market, and led to hyperinflation. The control of inflation was perhaps the 
major challenge which faced the economy in the 1970s. Inflation was caused mainly by 
excessive public sector spending and money creation by the Central Bank and by heavy 
military expenditure. 
The deficit in the balance of payments was initially met by the drawing down of 
official reserves and short term borrowing from international private lenders, but as the 
domestic economic situation worsened the source of such funds dried up. These 
developments led to a steep decline in imports in 1978 which led to shortages in basic 
commodities and a decrease in the use of industrial capital. The government secured 
IMF stabilisation loans in 1978 and 1979 and in return agreed to devalue the currency, 
reduce the budget deficit, restrain Central Bank lending and even increase the prices of 
public sector products. The government also agreed to implement tax reforms and 
subsidy reductions but it failed to carry out the more difficult aspects of the 
commitment. 
Although GNP growth declined, the economic situation stabilised. However, 
the current account deficit worsened in 1979 after more oil price rises and there was a 
rise in both the import bill and in the average rate of inflation, which had risen from 16 
per cent in 197 6 to 107 per cent by the end of 1979. 
The austerity policies hit investment and private consumption very hard, and 
this, together with increased political instability, led ultimately to the military coup in 
September 1980. 
During the period 1960-1980 the Turkish economy underwent major structural 
changes. Agriculture fell as a percentage of GDP from 42 per cent in 1960 to 23 per 
cent in 1980, while that of industry rose from 16 per cent to 25 per cent in the same 
period. Turkey's trading relations also changed. In 1965 agricultural products made up 
76 per cent of total exports, but by 1980 this share had fallen to 60 per cent. In the 
same period the exports share of manufactures rose from 20 per cent to 35 per cent.13 
'fhe 1980s : Economic liberalisation 
In early 1980, the head of the State Planning Organisation, Turgut Ozal, was 
made responsible for designing a programme to liberalise the structure of the Turkish 
economy, dismantle the system of subsidies, maintain a realistic exchange rate, reduce 
budget deficits and stimulate exports through streamlining administrative procedures 
and providing wide-ranging incentives.14 The economic strategy was aimed at reducing 
the influence of the State on the economy and gradually moving towards a 
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market-determined regime of resource allocation. Even after the military coup in 
September 1980, the generals kept Ozal in charge of economic policy. 
There were several features of the stabilisation programme. Perhaps the main 
feature of the package was the introduction of realistic interest-rate and exchange-rate 
policies. There was also to be tighter control over the money supply and credit and 
most state sector price subsidies and price control boards were to be abolished. 
Legislation was passed to reform the tax system and measures were introduced to 
encourage foreign investment, which up to 1980 had been negligible. 
The results of the stabilisation effort were rapid. By the end of 1980, the 
inflation rate had fallen, exports and remittances had increased and the current account 
deficit had declined. However, the stabilisation measures mainly benefited the larger 
concerns and many smaller firms still had idle or under-utilised capacity. 
The stabilisation programme was given fresh impetus in November 1983 when 
elections returned to power a government with a strong market-oriented liberal 
platform. This government, known as the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party), is led 
by Turgut Ozal and supports free enterprise, modern Islamic traditionalism and 
economic liberalisation.15 
This government introduced further economic reforms at the end of 1983. It 
attempted to tackle the low productivity and inefficiency of the state sector industries by 
administrative reform of the SEEs. State subsidies, price controls and protective tariff 
barriers were reduced. The government made export incentives more selective and 
partly liberalised the import both of raw materials and of some consumer goods. The 
import of luxury goods was allowed, although they were subject to heavy surcharges. 
The revenue earned from this source was allocated to low-cost housing.16 Public 
spending programmes were reviewed in order to reduce the budget deficit and keep 
monetary growth under greater control. Most foreign currency controls were removed 
and restrictions on capital transactions were eased. These measures were viewed as 
important steps towards the convertibility of the lira. Ozal believed that by opening 
Turkey up to world market forces the resulting foreign competition would lead to the 
production of higher quality goods and lower prices. It was also hoped that the rise of 
exports would sharply reduce the balance of payments deficit. 
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1985-89) was developed in 1984 and reiterates the 
guiding principles of the economic programme developed in January 1980. It states that 
economic activity will take place in a competitive environment with encouragement 
being given to private sector development. The plan also stresses the importance of 
policies designed to increase exports, reduce the current account deficit and improve 
international creditworthiness. The Fifth Plan envisages a fall in unemployment and an 
average real rate of GNP growth of 6. 3 per cent over the five year period.17 
In early 1986, most of the remaining quantitative controls on imports were 
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removed, but protection is still provided through customs duties and surcharges. 
Further measures to increase foreign direct investment have been introduced and four 
customs-free industrial zones have been established on the Mediterranean at Mersin, 
Antalya, Nemrut (izmir) and Yumurtalik (Adana). 
Public and private sector industry 
Turkey's industrial profile has been influenced by the etatist policies followed 
from the 1930s and industrialisation has followed an explicit governmental decision. 
The SEEs still play a considerable role in the economy and a high proportion of 
manufacturing industry remains under state control. The SEEs were partly reorganised 
in May 1983. Those that provided essential public services became known as Public 
Economic Corporations and were allowed to fix their own prices under government 
control. Other institutions, which were operated in competition with the private sector, 
were allowed greater freedom in pricing and production decisions. This reorganisation 
was an attempt to make the state organisations more efficient and to reduce the drain on 
the national treasury. 
Since 1980, the government has followed a policy of cutting subsidies and 
reducing overmanning in the SEEs, and in recent years the SEEs have made operating 
profits largely due to the freedom to fix their own prices. The improved financial 
position of the SEEs means that the government can begin implementation of its 
privatisation programme. Besides generating revenue for the economy, the government 
believes that privatisation will also make the economy more responsive to market 
forces, increase industrial efficiency and promote real growth. The public will 
obviously only purchase shares in the better managed and profitable concerns. 
However, the sale of bonds in the Bosphorus bridge in 1984 was heavily 
oversubscribed, as was the government's sale of 22 per cent of its 40 per cent share in 
the telecommunications equipment company, Teleta$, in March 1988. This would 
appear to indicate that a privatisation policy would be both popular and successful. 
Preparations are now being made to privatise other SEEs, but the authorities admit that 
many of the SEEs will need to be financially restructured as a prerequisite to successful 
privatisation. 
In the private sector, most businesses are concentrated around istanbul. 
Holding companies, often controlled by families, dominate big business. Many 
concerns have begun to export only since 1980, preferring instead to concentrate on the 
domestic market. IS Private sector manufacturing has continued to grow steadily since 
the 1980s and seems set to continue to do so. The private sector is becoming much 
more diversified with the food-processing and textile industry now less important than 
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in the 1970s. Although foreign private investment in Turkey in the early 1980s was not 
great, it seems possible that following (hal's re-election in 1987 the flow of capital into 
the country may increase considerably. To date, most of the foreign investment has 
been in the profitable banking and tourism sectors. 
The import substitution policies between 1964 and 1980 left Turkey with 
overcapacity in many sectors, with most firms concentrating solely on the home 
market. However, in recent years, Turkey's manufacturing base has expanded and 
diversified. In 1987 it grew at 10.1 per cent and was the fastest growing sector of the 
economy. This growth reflected the high rates of growth in the rest of the economy. 
The government is now actively engaged in promoting economic development 
in the less developed areas of central and eastern Anatolia. To emphasise its 
commitment to the east, the government is involved in the ambitious south-east Anatolia 
Project (GAP - Gtineydogu Anadolu Projesi). The GAP consists of 13 projects, seven 
on the Euphrates and six on the Tigris rivers. The project covers 42.6 per cent of the 
country's area and 25 per cent of its population and includes the construction of 22 
dams, 19 hydroelectric power-plants and 26 irrigation units. Once completed, it seems 
that the project will have a far-reaching beneficial impact on Turkey's irrigation 
facilities, agriculture and energy supply. 
On the whole, economic reform measures introduced so far have led to greater 
private initiative and better functioning markets and an improving balance of payments, 
and have made economic policy implementation more effective. However, problems 
still remain and economic debate now concentrates on the persistence of high inflation, 
unemployment and the increasing disparity between the incomes and living standards of 
the owners and managers of private industry on the one hand and the majority of 
workers in the public and private sectors on the other. 
The twin problems of unemployment and inflation 
The high rate of unemployment in Turkey seems set to continue and remain a 
problem for the foreseeable future. There are now few opportunities to export labour 
and indeed there are pressures to send overseas workers home from Europe and the 
Middle East. The reduction in unemployment is a hard task due to high population 
growth and a large increase in the active population.Although the government estimated 
that the rate of unemployment fell from 16.7 per cent of the civilian labour force in 
1985 to 15.6 per cent in 1986, the first decline in a decade, it appears from preliminary 
statistics that unemployment rose slightly in 1987. Employment in the services sector, 
industry and construction benefited most from the strength in economic activity and it 
was only in the agricultural sector, which still employs the largest number of workers, 
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that employment decreased slightly, continuing a long established trend.19 
Inflation has probably been the most serious problem the Turkish economy has 
had to deal with since 1980. The sources of Turkish inflation seem to be a high budget 
deficit to finance repayment of foreign debts and public sector investment, and the 
increased cost of imports due to the depreciation of the lira. Inflation has also been 
fuelled by price rises by state enterprises which the Treasury no longer subsidises, as 
well as by inefficient private producers attempting to maintain profit margins. The rate 
of inflation rose in 1987 due mainly to increases in wages, food prices and the 
continued depreciation of the lira in foreign exchange markets. The policy of managed 
floating of the currency to maintain export competitiveness limits the effect of 
stabilising influences on domestic prices through the exchange rate mechanism. Table 
1.1 indicates that, according to the wholesale price index of the State Institute of 
Statistics (SIS), the inflation rate rose to 32.0 per cent in 1987 compared to 29.6 per 
cent in 1986. In the same period the SIS consumer price index rose to 38.9 per cent 
from 34.6 per cent . Other indices published by the Treasury and the istanbul Chamber 
of Commerce showed even faster wholesale and consumer price rises. Towards the end 
of 1987, there was a dramatic escalation in inflation, which has had an impact on 1988. 
Most economists believe that the annual rate of inflation will be around 65 per cent in 
1988. It would appear that only a marked tightening in fiscal and monetary policy could 
lead to a substantial decrease in the rate of inflation. 
Exports and imports 
The promotion of exports and the liberalisation of imports and capital flows are 
the key elements of the structural adjustment programme adopted in 1980.20 The 
Turkish lira was devalued and regularly adjusted to ensure sustained external 
competitiveness. The switch from domestic to external markets entailed extra costs for 
entrepreneurs and certain tax rebates and subsidies were introduced to assist exporters. 
However, in February 1985, Turkey signed the GATT convention on export subsidies 
and agreed to phase out all export subsidies by the end of 1989. Exports are now 
promoted through more market-oriented mechanisms, such as a competitive exchange 
rate and investment incentives. 
It was, therefore, only after 1980 that foreign trade began to play a greater role 
in the economy, but even today foreign trade accounts for a smaller proportion of GNP 
than for most countries in a similar stage of economic development. Since 1980, there 
has been a change towards predominantly industrial exports, in contrast with the 
situation prior to 1980 when the majority of exports were agricultural. In 1987 the 
agricultural export share was 18.2 per cent, down from a figure of 57.5 per cent in 
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Table 1.1 
Prices 
Percentage change over previous year 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Wholesale price indices 
(1963 = 100) 
General index 1 107.2 36.8 25.2 30.6 52.0 40.0 26.7 39.0 
General index 2 27.0 30.5 50.3 43.2 29.6 32.0 
(1981 = 100) 
Agriculture 24.5 31.2 57.5 37.4 25.3 29.7 
Mining 49.3 20.5 41.2 63.9 6.0 35.7 
Manufacturing 26.5 31.2 46.6 41.9 32.6 33.6 
Energy 45.7 25.7 75.3 97.6 35.6 23.4 
Consumer price indicates 2 
(1978-79 = 100) 
National index 34.1 31.4 48.4 45.0 34.6 38.9 
Source: 1 The Evaluation Department of the Undersecretariant of Treasury 
and Foreign Trade 
2 State Institute of Statistics 
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1980. By contrast, the export share of manufactured goods was 79.1 per cent in 1987, 
compared with a figure of 36.0 per cent in 1980. Although the external competitiveness 
of Turkish goods has greatly improved in recent years due to a gradual depreciation of 
the exchange rate, there is still a need to improve the quality and range of merchandise 
exports. 
The growth in exports has been primarily in textiles, steel, leather goods, 
chemicals and petrochemicals. Although Turkey now has a highly diversified industrial 
base, textiles still account for 26.6 per cent of total exports. 
The structural reform programme has shown significant results in stimulating 
exports. Table 1.2 shows that, in 1987, exports totalled $ 10,190 million, some 36.7 
per cent higher than in the previous year. Despite the rise in imports of$ 3,058 million 
to $ 14,163 million, export earnings covered 71.9 per cent of import expenses as 
against 67.1 per cent in 1986. The OECD countries accounted for 63.2 per cent of 
Turkey's exports in 1987, a proportion which has risen steadily since 1982. By 
contrast, the Islamic countries accounted for only 30.3 per cent of exports, a figure 
which has declined in recent years due primarily to the fall in the oil revenues of the 
OPEC countries and the dwindling foreign exchange reserves of Iran and Iraq, the two 
most important trading partners of Turkey in the Middle East. 
Some Turkish exports are subject to trade restrictions. The Multifibre 
Arrangement places restrictions on Turkish textile exports to the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the United States and there are also quantitative restrictions on 
certain agriculural exports to the EEC. 
The import structure has also changed since 1980 and although most goods may 
now be imported freely and are subject to only tariffs, around 100 items still require an 
import licence. Table 1.3 indicates that, in 1987, a total of 63.8 per cent of Turkey's 
imports were from OECD countries and 22.2 per cent from the Islamic countries, 
mainly petroleum products . 
The foreign trade deficit in 1987 rose from$ 3,648 million in 1986 to$ 3,973 
million. However, the increase was offset by increased tourist receipts and remittances, 
and the current account deficit declined from $ 1,518 million in 1986 to $ 987 million in 
1987. As a percentage of GNP the current account deficit fell from 2.6 per cent in 1986 
to 1.5 per cent in 1987. 
A continued good export performance is necessary for Turkey to be able to 
service its foreign debts. Despite the fall in oil prices, it appears that the current account 
and trade balance will continue to remain in deficit for the immediate future. Turkey 
cannot now escape the impact of world trade and the shift towards export orientation is 
likely to be permanent. Turkey is now closely linked to the global economic structure 
and the expected entry of Turkey into the EEC in the 1990s can only lead to an increase 
in the volume of trade. 
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Table 1.2 
Geographic Distribution of Exportsa 
$ million % of total 
1987 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
OECD countries 6444 57.7 48.1 44.5 48.2 52.4 51.6 57.6 63.2 
EEC countries 4868 42.7 31.9 30.5 35.1 38.3 39.4 43.8 47.8 
of which: 
France 500 5.6 4.6 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.7 4.0 4.9 
Italy 851 7.5 5.2 5.7 7.4 7.0 6.3 7.8 8.4 
United Kingdom 541 3.6 3.1 3.3 4.3 3.7 6.8 4.5 5.3 
West Germany 2184 20.7 13.7 12.3 14.6 17.9 17.5 19.4 21.4 
Other OECD countries 1576 15.0 16.2 13.9 13.1 14.1 12.2 13.8 15.5 
of which: 
Japan 156 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.5 
Switzerland 356 4.3 5.6 5.6 5.0 5.0 1.6 2.2 3.5 
United States 713 4.3 5.7 4.4 4.1 5.2 6.4 7.4 7.0 
CMEA (Comecom) 334 16.9 7.0 5.6 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.3 
of which: 
Soviet Union 169 5.8 4.1 2.2 1.1 2.0 2.4 1.9 1.7 
Islamic countries 3088 22.3 41.1 45.0 41.1 42.0 42.8 34.9 30.3 
of which: 
Iran 440 2.9 5.0 13.8 19.0 10.5 13.6 7.6 4.3 
Iraq 945 4.6 11.9 10.6 5.6 13.1 12.1 7.4 9.3 
Libya 141 2.1 9.4 4.1 3.2 2.0 0.7 1.8 1.4 
Saudi Arabia 408 1.5 4.0 6.2 6.3 5.3 5.4 4.8 4.0 
Other Countries 324 3.1 3.8 4.9 6.4 1.6 1.4 3.3 3.2 
TOTAL 10190 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a Excluding transit trade 
Source: State Institute of Statistics 
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Table 1.3 
Geographic Distribution of Importsa 
$ million % of total 
1987 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
OECD countries 9032 45.3 47.9 50.1 48.5 51.7 56.1 65.9 63.8 
EEC countries 5666 28.7 28.2 25.6 28.1 27.6 31.3 41.2 40.0 
of which: 
France 608 4.8 4.5 3.0 2.4 2.3 4.5. 4.9 4.3 
Italy 1076 3.8 4.2 4.7 5.5 5.8 5.8 7.8 7.6 
United Kingdom 697 4.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.1 4.1 4.7 4.9 
West Germany 2109 10.6 10.5 11.4 11.4 10.9 12.1 16.0 14.9 
Other OECD countries 3366 16.6 19.7 19.2 20.4 24.0 24.8 24.7 23.8 
of which: 
Japan 860 1.4 2.3 4.0 3.8 3.8 4.5 6.2 6.1 
Switzerland 365 4.4 6.0 3.5 2.9 2.2 1.6 2.6 2.6 
United States 1366 5.6 6.6 9.2 7.5 10.0 10.1 10.6 9.6 
CMEA (Comecon) 968 10.5 9.4 4.8 8.7 8.8 5.7 7.8 6.8 
of which: 
Soviet Union 307 2.3 1.8 1.2 2.6 2.9 1.9 3.2 2.2 
Islamic countries 3143 40.7 39.2 41.9 36.7 36.2 33.0 19.2 22.2 
of which: 
Iran 948 10.1 5.8 8.5 13.2 14.4 11.2 2.0 6.7 
Iraq 1154 15.6 17.5 16.0 10.3 8.8 10.·0 6.9 8.1 
Libya 305 9.8 8.8 10.4 8.6 6.1 5.5 2.6 2.2 
Saudi Arabia 168 1.3 4.6 5.4 2.9 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.2 
Other countries 1020 3.5 3.5 3.2 6.1 3.3 5.2 7.1 7.2 
TOTAL 14163 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a Excluding transit trade 
Source: State Institute of Statistics 
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The twin benefits of remittances and tourism 
In contrast to the foreign trade deficit, Turkey earned a surplus on the services 
and transfer account, mainly due to remittances by Turkish workers abroad and 
tourism. 
In the past, tourism has not been a great money earner for Turkey due to limited 
facilities and an unfavourable political climate.This is now changing and tourism is 
expected to be a major growth area for the economy over the next few years. Many new 
investments are planned and a large number of hotels are under construction along the 
Aegean and Mediterranean coasts. The government is also undertaking basic 
infrastructural developments in the coastal region and since 1982 has provided major 
incentives for the tourism industry, such as the right to cheaper utilities. Most tourists 
come from European countries, but the government also wishes to encourage Middle 
Eastern visitors. Receipts from tourism in 1987 were$ 1,476 million, a rise of 55 per 
cent over the 1986 figure, and 1988 figures are expected to be substantially higher. 
Net earnings from tourism by Turkey are much less than those of most other 
countries in the Mediterranean and, barring any unforeseen political crisis, it seems 
certain that the number of tourists will increase in the coming years, and that tourism 
will become a valuable source of foreign exchange and employment. 
Workers' remittances have been another major source of foreign exchange since 
the 1960s. In 1987, workers' remittances increased by 24 per cent to$ 2,102 million, 
compared to a 4.5 per cent decrease in 1986. The increase can be attributed partly to the 
depreciation of the dollar in international markets which has exaggerated the remittances 
recorded in dollars. The figures may, however, be misleading because many Turkish 
workers living abroad are now opening foreign exchange accounts in Turkish banks 
which is recorded in the short term capital account of the balance of payments rather 
than in the transfers account.21 Some funds are also deposited in special accounts with 
the Dresdner Bank, to which the Turkish Central Bank has access. The export of labour 
to both Europe and the Middle East has played an important part in the economic 
development of Turkey. The remittances have helped reduce the visible trade deficit and 
have boosted national income. Emigration has also helped to reduce domestic 
unemployment. However, contrary to early expectations, most returning migrants did 
not invest their savings to set up a business or purchase agricultural machinery, which 
would have benefited the economy, and instead invested in housing and land.22 
Debt, aid and GNP 
The major burden on the current account arises from interest payments on 
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external debt which amounted to $ 2,507 million in 1987, an increase of$ 37 4 million 
over the 1986 figure. Debt has been rising steadily for many years and at the end of 
1987 stood at $ 38,304 million,23 which represented 57 per cent of GDP, well up from 
the 29 per cent equivalence in 1980. Meanwhile, the debt service ratio rose from 21 per 
cent in 1981 to 31 per cent in 1987. The ending of debt relief in 1985 and large rises in 
both interest and principal due since 1985 account for this leap. The largest category of 
debt is that of medium and long term government to government debt incurred during 
the 1960s and 1970s to finance public sector investments. The government is trying to 
lessen its dependence on external borrowing and is endeavouring to increase direct 
foreign investment by liberalising and simplifying controls and legislation and by 
concentrating authority for foreign investment decisions in the Foreign Investment 
Department of the State Planning Office. 
The budget deficit rose in 1987 to TL 2,460 billion from TL 1,406 billion in 
1986, and the budget deficit to GDP ratio rose to 4.3 per cent in 1987 from 3.6 per cent 
in 1986. This reflected overspending during the election year, the heavy burden of debt 
servicing and continued high levels of state infrastructural investment. 24 The bulk of the 
deficit was covered by domestic borrowing. The budget deficit to GDP ratio is expected 
to decline to 2.8 per cent in 1988. 
Turkey still relies on project credits, foreign aid and direct foreign investment 
for its economic development. The United States is the largest donor country and for 
the year 1987-88 it pledged$ 525 million, most of it for military purposes.25 
In 1987, real GNP growth was 7.4 per cent, compared to GNP growth of 8.0 
per cent in 1986, as shown in Table 1.4. The industrial and services sectors, which 
grew at 9.7 per cent and 8.2 per cent respectively, recorded the highest growth rates, 
and the agricultural sector, which grew at 1.8 per cent, the lowest. In 1988, GNP is 
expected to slow down further to around 6 per cent, due mainly to a tightening of fiscal 
and monetary policy. Since the introduction of an economic stabilisation programme in 
1980, GNP growth has averaged 4.6 per cent a year, but despite this relatively buoyant 
economic growth, GNP per head at$ 1,279 in 1987 is the lowest in the OECD area. 
Following the balance of payments crisis at the end of the 1970s and near 
collapse of the economy, the Turkish authorities made a radical departure from the past 
and turned to market forces to influence resource allocation. Positive real interest rates 
were introduced, subsidies to the SEEs were drastically cut and the lira was devalued 
and floated to improve international competitiveness. The authorities were successful in 
stimulating the exports of goods and services and, recently, in attracting foreign 
investors and in developing a tourism industry. The structural policy changes which 
freed the economy from excessive controls and allowed private initiative have had 
beneficial effects on the economy and GNP growth has been relatively high. However, 
a particular problem for the policy-makers is the persistance of inflation which although 
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Table 1.4 
Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GOP) 1987 
GNP at Current Percentage volume As percentage 
Sector Prices change over of GOP 
TL billion previous year 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 9310 1.8 16.1 
Industry 18754 9.7 32.5 
Construction 2374 6.7 4.1 
Services 27328 8.2 47.3 
N 
N 
---
GOP 57766 7.3 100.0 
Net income from abroad 91 
---
GNP 57857 7.4 
---
Source: Akbank "Turkish Economy" Monthly Economic Indicators 
State Institute of Statistics 
less than the triple digit figures of 1980 remains at a high level. 
Overall, it would appear that the stabilisation and adjustment policies have been 
successful in modernising and developing the economy and in raising living standards, 
and, with the recent re-election of the government, it seems certain that the free-market 
policies will·continue well into the next decade. 
Conclusion 
Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey's economic life has been 
vastly transformed. At the beginning of the 1920s, Turkey had little mechanised 
industry and agricultural activities accounted for almost half of national income and 
employed over three-quarters of the working population. Today, non-agricultural 
activities account for more than 80 per cent of national income and employ about 45 per 
cent of the working population. 
The etatist policies developed in the 1930s assumed that economic development 
depended on industrialisation, and that industrialisation required extensive state 
holdings. These state interventionist policies continued until 1980, despite changes in 
internal and external conditions. 
In the 1950s, the Democrat Party placed greater emphasis on agriculture, which 
had been neglected by the previous regime. The Democrats had originally intended to 
sell off the SEEs, but instead they used the public sector industries for political 
purposes and to maintain the appearance of economic growth once the economic 
downturn began in the mid 1950s. Indeed, the SEEs were prone to political interference 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Since the Second World War, the Turkish economy has suffered from periodic 
but damaging foreign trade deficits. This is in marked contrast to the period 1930-1947 
when visible trade was in surplus for every year except 1938, achieved mainly by the 
conserving of foreign exchange for the import of industrial inputs, at the expense of 
agricultural development. Following the war, imports began to outpace exports and this 
finally culminated in a severe balance of payments crisis in 1958. This cycle of 
expansion and crisis was repeated again in the 1970s, and on both occasions the IMF 
and Western creditor nations forced Turkey to agree to economic reforms in return for 
further financial assistance. 
From the early 1960s, national economic and social development planning has 
been a feature of the Turkish economy. The constitution requires the submission of 
Five Year Plans and Annual Programmes to Parliament. The proposals contained in the 
plans have often been too ambitious and it has been the desire to fulfil the targets of the 
Plans that has led to periodic economic crises. 
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It has been only in the 1980s that the government has abandoned the import 
substitution policies and has proposed turning over the SEEs to the private sector. Most 
import controls have been withdrawn and Turkish industry is now relatively 
unprotected against international competition. The long term development prospects for 
Turkey appear favourable. The country has important minerals, and a large agricultural 
potential and, since 1930, has acquired a modern and diversified industrial base. Given 
reasonably favourable external conditions, there seems no reason why its national 
income should not continue to grow at around 6 per cent a year, its long term historical 
. growth rate since the 1930s. 
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THE CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY 
Kn trod an ctn om 
In Turkey, the banking system dominates the entire financial sector. The total 
consolidated assets of all the banks, which includes the Central Bank, the deposit 
money banks and investment and development banks, at the end of 1987 amounted to 
TL 43,000 billion, or almost 75 per cent of GNP of that year. 
This chapter deals with the role of the Central Bank in regulating and monitoring 
the financial sector, and focuses on the changes introduced by the Central Bank in the 
fields of interest rates, reserves, foreign exchange and monetary aggregates since 1980, 
the year the Turkish authorities designed a structural reform programme. 
Since 1980, the Turkish banking system has been going through a period of 
major change and the Central Bank now plays a greater and more important role in the 
design and implementation of Turkish monetary policy. Most of its efforts are 
concentrated on removing or simplifying the vast array of rules and regulations in force 
prior to 1980 in order to create a more efficient and modem financial sector. 
IFomrndations and functions of the Centran lBank 
Tiirkiye Cumhliriyet Merkez Bankasi, or the Central Bank of Turkey, was 
established under Law number 1715 of 11 June 1930, and began operations on 3 
October 1931.1 The issue of Turkish currency, which had previously been divided 
between the State Treasury and the Ottoman Bank, became the sole privilege of the 
Central Bank. The bank's nominal capital was fixed at TL 15 billion and its head office 
was established at Ankara. Four branches of the bank were opened in the main cities of 
the country: istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, and Samsun. Its manager 2 was appointed by the 
government, and the board of directors was elected by the shareholders. 
The functions and operations of the Central Bank are governed by a series of 
laws and regulations, with Law number 1211 giving the Bank authority to "regulate 
monetary and credit policy according to the government's development plans, stabilise 
the value of the lira, regulate the volume of currency, and lend money to the 
government, commercial banks and cooperatives." The bank also issues currency, sets 
reserve requirements for conventional and Islamic banks, specifies liquidity ratios, and 
fixes a daily rate of exchange for most major foreign currencies. The Central Bank 
engages in rediscount lending and since 1986 has organised an interbank money market 
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and introduced the sale of treasury bills. The interbank market is now the major vehicle 
through which the Central Bank adjusts bank reserves.3 It acts as the lender of last 
resort and in February 1987 began conducting open-market operations in order to 
influence the short term supply of liquidity to the economy. Open-market operations 
will also encourage the development of the capital market. It is envisaged that the 
Central Bank will eventually set up a foreign exchange interbank market which could 
then lead to full convertibility of the currency. The bank is also obliged to fund selective 
credit programmes and to finance the budget deficits of the public administration and of 
some State Economic Enterprises. 
Besides acting as banker to the government, the Central Bank provides a full 
range of banking services to the public, similar to those offered by other commercial 
banks. It now has 24 branches in Turkey and overseas representative offices in 
Frankfurt, London, New York, Rotterdam and Zurich. 
The size of the Central Bank within the fmancial sector is comparatively large and 
it continues to grow at a fairly rapid pace, mainly due to the high level of reserves 
which deposit money banks are required to maintain with the Bank. The Central Bank's 
deposits rose by 74 per cent to TL 2,371 billion in 1987, up from TL 1,1760 billion at 
the end of 1986. Credits extended by the Bank in 1987 totalled TL 3,438 billion, 
compared with TL 1,828 billion in 1986. It reported a profit of TL 22.7 billion in 1987, 
up by 109 per cent over the 1986level. At the end of 1987, foreign currency reserves 
and gold holdings at the Central Bank amounted to $ 3,254 million, compared to $ 
2,605 million in 1986. 
Traditionally, the Bank shares responsibility for monetary and credit policy with 
other government institutions. In order to co-ordinate economic and financial policy a 
Money and Credit Committee was established in January 1980. It was abolished in 
1982, but formed again in December 1983. The Deputy Prime Minister chairs the 
committee, which is made up of senior officials at the Ministries of Trade and Industry, 
Agriculture, Finance and Customs, the State Planning Organisation and the Office of 
the Undersecretary for the Treasury and Foreign Trade.4 The Central Bank is 
represented on the committee by its governor. 
In May 1986, the Central Bank Act was amended to define the responsibilities of 
the Bank more closely in the monetary and credit fields and the Bank has been given 
greater powers to move from its traditional role of engaging in lending to one of 
supervision and regulation.5 
Since 1986, the Bank has required all commercial banks to adopt unified 
accounting and financial reporting methods, and to submit regular financial statements 
to enable the Bank to monitor such things as capital, assets and liquidity of the 
individual banks. The Central Bank, together with the Undersecretariat of the Treasury 
and Foreign Trade, supervises the operations of the Islamic banks, or finance houses, 
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and these establishments are subject to different regulations and reporting methods. 
All banks are now required to submit annually to the Central Bank independently 
audited balance sheets which now makes it more difficult for the banks to conceal the 
true volume of their "non-performing loans" and bad debts. 
The aim of the measures and reforms introduced since 1980 has been to 
strengthen the role of the Central Bank as the guardian of monetary stability and help 
make monetary policies more effective. 
Liquidity and reserve requirements 
The control of the banking system's total reserves allows the Central Bank to 
regulate the money supply in accordance with the established monetary policy and to 
provide funds to the government sector. 
Both the commercial banks and the finance houses are required to hold a fixed 
percentage of their deposits in the form of legal reserves, which the Bank regularly 
adjusts. 
Liquidity reserves are held in the form of cash and interest-earning government 
bonds. The latest Central Bank adjustment occurred in September 1988 when the ratio 
of liquidity reserves to total deposits held in commercial banks was raised from 27 per 
cent to 30 per cent. Of this amount, only 5 per cent needs to be kept as cash. Prior to 
1983, the ratio had depended on the size of the bank. The liquidity ratio is a convenient 
device to create a captive demand for government securities by deposit money banks. 
At the end of August 1988, the yield on treasury bills and government bonds was 
around 65 per cent and represented an attractive and safe return for the banks. The 
liquidity reserves for the finance houses differ from those of the commercial banks. The 
finance houses are required to keep 10 per cent of the value of their current accounts in 
cash. 
Required reserves consist of deposits which banks have to maintain in the 
Central Bank. Traditionally, these had been calculated on the basis of monthly average 
levels of deposits, adjusted for special exemptions in order to encourage bank lending 
to priority sectors. The different required reserve ratios were unified at 25 per cent in 
1983 and are regularly adjusted. At present, the ratio stands at 14 per cent. Since 1980, 
the rate of interest paid by the Central Bank on these reserves was steadily decreased 
and all interest payments were abolished in December 1985. For the finance houses, a 
total of 10 per cent of all funds collected in current accounts and 1 per cent of funds 
accumulated in profit and loss sharing (deposit) accounts must be deposited with the 
Central Bank. 
Although no interest is paid by the Central Bank on lira reserves, the 
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conventional banks, but not the finance houses, do receive interest on their foreign 
currency reserves. These interest rates closely reflect those prevailing in the 
Euromarket. 
There are perhaps a number of reasons for the different reserve requirements of 
the conventional banks and the finance houses. Firstly, the Central Bank appears to 
take the view that the way the finance houses are structured and operate makes them far 
less likely to go bankrupt than the conventional deposit taking banks. Secondly, if the 
Central Bank were to impose the reserve requirements of the conventional banks on the 
fmance houses, it would be seen as unjust by these establishments because for religious 
reasons they cannot hold, or deal in, interest-bearing instruments, and thus their 
reserves would lie idle and earn no return. Thirdly, the finance houses have only 
recently been set up in Turkey and control only a small percentage of the banking 
sector. The imposition of high reserve ratios could therefore adversely affect their 
growth and development at a time when the Central Bank is keen to encourage 
competition and diversification within the banking sector. 
In the past, banks have been able to abstain from meeting their obligations 
concerning reserve requirements and detection of non-observance could be delayed 
through late reporting. Although the Central Bank has strengthened its supervision, it is 
still concerned about the banks that delay their reserve deposits or whose required 
reserve deposits are incomplete. In March 1988, the Central Bank issued a decree 
stating that banks will be subject to a penalty rate equal to twice the short term discount 
rate of Central Bank credits. The penalty rate is therefore 108 per cent and is levied on 
the deficiency. 
The system of required reserves has made it possible to mobilise, at a 
comparatively low cost for the Central Bank, a substantial proportion of the financial 
resources collected by deposit money banks, and to a far lesser extent those of the 
finance houses, for the financing of budgetary deficits, public enterprises, and selective 
credits. 
The Central Bank clearly believes that the high liquidity and reserve requirements 
are necessary for the control of inflation, but for the conventional banks the decrease in 
liquidity has led to a sharp decline in the availability of funds for lending, and certain 
banks have been forced to restrict credit to their customers which could lead to an 
economic slowdown. However, with inflation at very high levels the Central Bank will 
not, it appears, lower liquidity and reserve ratios in the near future. 
][ntell'est nntes and foreign exchange policies 
Since 1980, major changes have occurred in the areas of foreign exchange and 
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interest rates. The monetary authorities have removed many of the foreign exchange 
restrictions and interest rate differentials and given an increased role to market forces. 
Throughout the 1970s, nominal interest rates were fixed by the authorities at low 
levels in order to stimulate investment as well as minimise the cost of servicing the 
domestic public debt.6 Towards the end of the decade, inflation increased rapidly and 
interest rates became negative in real terms. This led to a sharp decline in the volume of 
bank deposits as funds were withdrawn from the banking system and channelled into 
real assets, foreign exchange and unregulated financial markets which caused serious 
distortions in resource allocation and had adverse effects on economic growth. 
The setting free of the interest rates in July 1980 was a decisive step in Turkey's 
policy to allow market forces to play a greater role in resource allocation.7 However, 
following deregulation, the banks avoided a sharp rise in nominal rates by a 
"gentlemen's agreement" which fixed rates at a uniform level with the effect that real 
interest rates remained negative. As a result of competitive pressures from private banks 
and moneylenders and the scarcity of funds owing to a tight monetary policy, the larger 
banks were obliged to increase their deposit rates and with decelerating inflation, real 
interest rates became positive in 1981. This helped to reduce the importance of the 
unofficial money market into which funds had poured in search of interest rates which 
were well in excess of 100 per cent. 
In early 1983, fixed interest rates were reintroduced, with the nine major banks 
fixing rates. The banks lowered time deposit rates, and as inflation rose real interest 
rates became negative once again and the volume of deposits declined in real terms. 
The reluctance of the large banks to raise interest rates to positive real levels led 
the government, in December 1983, to authorise the Central Bank to fix (maximum) 
deposit rates and to review rates regularly. The Bank did, however, permit an initial 
degree of freedom when it decreed that rates to borrowers should be competitive. 
Official policy was aimed at maintaining positive real interest rates to promote savings 
and to discourage excessive consumer spending. 
The Central Bank continued to fix deposit rates until July 1987 when it freed one 
year deposit rates. The setting free of this rate led to the outbreak of competition for 
such deposits among the conventional banks and as a result the rate rose rapidly. It was 
in an effort to halt this increase that the Central Bank imposed a ceiling of 65 per cent 
on one year deposits in February 1988. At the same time it raised rates on demand and 
other time deposits as well as its own rediscount rates. Although these measures were 
taken in an attempt to decrease the volume of currency in circulation and hence reduce 
spiralling inflation they also marked a retreat from the partialliberalisation of deposit 
rates taken in July 1987. The Central Bank, by raising deposit rates, wished to maintain 
higher real returns on assets in lira with respect to the real rates in the international 
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money markets to prevent excessive depreciation of the currency and currency 
substitution for the lira. However, with the August 1988 consumer price index of the 
State Institute of Statistics indicating annual inflation of 78.4 per cent, real interest rates 
are once again showing negative returns. The continued existence of interest rates 
below the inflation rate will hinder the growth of domestic savings and have adverse 
effects on resource allocation. 
All interest rates on lira deposits are subject to taxes. The depositor has to pay a 
10 per cent withholding tax and an extra 4 per cent of this tax has to be paid to the 
Defence Industry Support Fund. These taxes influence effective interest rates and 
distort the interest rates' function as indicators of the scarcity of capital. The returns of 
the profit ·and loss sharing lira accounts of the finance houses are also subject to the 
same withholding tax and Defence Industry Support Fund levy. 
The deposit taking banks are free to set their own rates for foreign currency 
deposits and considerable competition has resulted here. Interest rates in the interbank 
market and in the secondary market for government securities are also freely 
determined. 
Until July 1984, when Decree 30 was introduced by the Ozal government, there 
was an extremely tight foreign exchange regime in Turkey dating back to the 1930s. 
This was linked to a restrictive and protectionist foreign trade. This decree, which 
largely replaces the law of 1930 on the Protection of the Value of Turkish Currency, 
integrates all regulations relating to foreign exchange transactions ,including those 
dealing with exports and foreign investment. 
The first major change in the foreign exchange policy occurred in January 1980 
when the Turkish lira was devalued by 33 per cent against the dollar to stand at TL 70 
per dollar and this was followed by periodic small exchange adjustments until May 
1981, when the adjustments became daily. This policy marked a change from that 
pursued in the 1970s when adjustments were made at irregular intervals and in large 
steps. A complex system of multiple rates, which had encouraged the growth of a 
currency black market, was also gradually phased out by mid-1981. The Turkish 
authorities thus succeeded in demystifying the exchange rate which has been one of the 
major political taboos of the past 8 
As Tables 2.1 and 2.1.1 indicate, the lira has been devalued by about a third 
against the US dollar every year since 1980. The regular revision of exchange rates has 
resulted in stabilising the real effective exchange rate and has thus removed a major 
uncertainty for Turkish exporters.Over recent years, the real exchange rate, against 
which competitiveness can be more easily measured, has shown an average annual 
depreciation of 10 per cent. As long as inflation is more rapid in Turkey than in its 
major trading partners, it will be necessary to continue with the policy of making 
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Table 2.1 
Exchange rates 
Annual Average Turkish Lira Exchang~ Rates 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Dollar 31.08 76.04 111.22 162.55 225.46 366.68 521.98 674.51 857.17 
Deutsche Mark 16.96 41.83 49.21 66.99 88.30 128.85 177.30 310.62 476.89 
Sterling 65.94 176.88 225.54 284.54 342.02 489.99 676.64 989.51 1404.82 
Yen (100) 14.18 33.54 50.43 65.26 94.93 154.38 218.82 400.26 592.62 
Source: Derived from IMF International Financial Statistics 
Ul 
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Table 2.1.1 
End of Year Turkish Lira Exchange Rat.es 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
-- -- -- -- -- --
-- --
--
Dollar 35.35 90.15 133.62 186.75 282.80 444.74 567.86 757.79 1020.90 
Deutsche Mark 20.42 46.02 59.26 78.58 103.83 141.28 234.37 390.45 645.53 
Sterling 78.62 215.00 254.95 301.51 410.23 514.34 833.27 1117.36 1910.61 
Yen (100) 14.75 44.41 60.76 79.47 82.11 177.12 287.71 476.30 826.64 
Source: Derived from IMF International Financial Statistics 
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adjustments in exchange rates in line with the inflation differential. There is now 
increased reliance on the exchange rate as against export subsidies and import 
protection.9 
In January 1984, the exchange and payments system was liberalised in several 
important respects: domestic commercial banks were allowed to engage in foreign 
exchange operations with certain limits in proportion to their foreign exchange 
liabilities; the surrender requirement was reduced on export earnings and eliminated on 
invisibles; foreign exchange deposits, yielding market interest rates, could be opened 
and used without limits; and restrictions on foreign travel and investment from abroad 
were eased and simplified.10 
The Central Bank abolished the freedom of commercial banks to fix their own 
buying and selling rates for foreign currency and devalued the currency by 5 per cent 
against the US dollar in March 1986. The Bank did this to try to prevent speculation 
against the Turkish lira which had occurred after some banks had offered very high 
premiums over the Central Bank rates in order to attract funds. The margin of 
commercial banks for buying and selling foreign currency was fixed at 1 per cent either 
side of the Central Bank rate but later that year the Central Bank announced that the 
selling rates of commercial banks should not exceed the selling rates determined and 
announced daily by the Bank. The banks were free to fix their own buying rates , 
provided that they did not exceed the Central Bank selling rates. 
In August 1988, the Central Bank sent directives to banks and other financial 
establishments detailing the new exchange rate system by which official rates will be 
determined. The directives state that banks and private financial institutions ~ill be free 
to fix rates independent of the Central Bank for transactions of more than $ 50,000. For 
smaller sums, the financial establishments will be free to buy and sell within 0.5 per 
cent of the official daily rate. This new procedure is seen by many as a significant step 
towards convertibility of the lira. 
Despite the imposition in 1984 of a 3 per cent surcharge on bank borrowing in 
foreign currency, foreign exchange transactions are still subject to lower levies and 
commission rates than lira transactions. This has led to the substitution of the lira by 
foreign currency, even for domestic fmancing. Foreign currency deposits earn attractive 
interest rates but since February 1988 have been subject to a 5 per cent withholding tax 
and this is expected to make these deposits less attractive in 1988. The easing of most 
foreign currency regulations has resulted in a huge inflow of foreign currency into 
Turkey and, particularly, into the banks. At the end of 1987, the lira value of all foreign 
currency deposits at the Central Bank and at deposit taking banks stood at TL 6,268.5 
billion, an increase of 136.5 per cent over the 1986 figure. 
The conventional banks and finance houses are mandated to sell a proportion of 
their foreign exchange reserves to the Central Bank. The ratio was increased from 15 
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per cent to 25 per cent in early 1988. The foreign exchange is required by the Central 
Bank for foreign debt interest payments. 
At the beginning of 1988, Turkey experienced a foreign exchange shortage 
which was caused mainly by the high levels of foreign debt servicing at the end of 
1987. As a result the unofficial foreign exchange market, known as "tahtakale", 
developed again and rates were 15 to 20 per cent higher than the official exchange rates. 
The Central Bank was able to increase the supply of foreign exchange for debt 
servicing by reducing importers' access to foreign exchange and stipulating that 
exporters should repatriate their export earnings more quickly. 
In an effort to shore up the lira's rate against foreign currencies, the Central Bank 
also began buying lira from the markets which had the effect of reducing domestic 
credit and raising interbank interest rates. The increase on lira deposit rates was aimed 
at stopping the run on the lira. These measures have succeeded in reducing the 
differential between the black market and official rates to around 2 per cent at the end 
of August. 
The Central Bank will continue to implement a flexible exchange rate policy in 
1988 in accordance with the government's policy of encouraging exports and 
increasing foreign exchange receipts. The government has indicated that it would 
eventually like to see the establishment of a foreign money market, freely determined 
exchange rates and full convertibility for the lira, but such things are unlikely while the 
lira continues to depreciate against the major currencies. 
The reimposition of maximum time deposit rates by the Central Bank is seen as a 
temporary measure and the hope is that interest rate ceilings can be lifted once a degree 
of stability returns to the financial markets. The monetary authorities are now 
implementing tighter monetary policies to control domestic demand and to reduce 
inflation and it is therefore likely that real interest rates will shortly become positive 
again. 
Rediscounts and advances 
The widespread use of selective credit policies is one of the most important 
features of the Turkish financial system. Selective credits are provided to agriculture, 
artisans and tradesmen, exports, housing, tourism, and certain types of investment and 
regional development. 
The bulk of the credits are provided by the Central Bank through the provision of 
low interest rates on credits and rediscounts, often channelled through specialised 
institutions like Ziraat Bankas1, Eximbankll, Halk Bankas1 (Peoples Bank), Turizm 
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Bankas1 and others. Table 2.2 shows that in 1987 the total value of Central Bank's 
rediscounts and advances amounted to TL 3,438. 7 billion, an increase of 88.1 per cent 
over the 1986 figure. 
The process of rediscounting allows the Central Bank to influence monetary 
policy. The Central Bank determines the rediscount interest rates and the type of 
acceptable collateral. The latest Central Bank rediscount rates are shown in Table 2.3. 
Although the Central Bank still remains the principal source of short term fmance 
for the Treasury, some State enterprises and the large agricultural sector, in recent years 
various policy changes have been implemented to reduce the reliance of deposit taking 
banks on Central Bank refinancing. The availability of preferential credits as well as the 
degree of subsidisation of their interest rates has been lowered, which is revealed by the 
share of bank credit refinanced at the Central Bank which has fallen from nearly 28 per 
cent at the end of 1980 to around 11 per cent at the end of 1987. 
The Central Bank advances funds on behalf of the State to Ziraat Bankasi to 
finance agricultural support purchases. These debts should be self-liquidating, but it 
does sometimes happen that the ultimate borrowers, such as the agricultural sales 
co-operatives, have been unable to repay their debts, mainly due to mismanagement. 
Over the years, fairly large sums of such claims have accumulated which were 
periodically consolidated to the state at a nominal interest charge and over very long 
periods. In effect, such a procedure can be likened to deficit financing of a government 
subsidy through monetary expansion, because Ziraat Bankas1 usually refinances such 
operations at the Central Bank. 12 Since 1986, the Central Bank has accepted the 
agricultural rediscount credit demands of other banks besides Ziraat Bankas1. At the end 
of 1987, agricultural credits represented about 13 per cent of all Central Bank credits. 
Some exports are eligible for preferential credits. Exporters can obtain export 
credits from the banks to finance the production, purchase, storage, packaging and 
transportation of goods for exports. The borrowers who receive short term export 
credits benefit from lower interest rates as against non-preferential credits and 
exemption from certain financial transaction taxes. The Central Bank rediscount rate for 
export credits is set at 35 per cent. The Bank believes it is necessary to offer preferential 
credits to encourage new exports of industrial goods and to offset the bias against 
exports resulting from the protection of industries which rely mainly or exclusively on 
the domestic market. However, in recent years the volume of export credits has 
decreased and in 1985 Turkey signed the GATT subsidy code and agreed to phase out 
all subsidies on exports by the end of 1989.13 
The bulk of Central Bank credits are for the Treasury and the public enterprises 
and account for 65.5 per cent of all credits. Besides direct credits, the State Economic 
Enterprises have benefited from budgetary transfers based on funds provided by the 
Central Bank to the Treasury. In Turkey, the financing of budget deficits through 
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Table 2.2 
Central Bank Credits 
(TL billion) 
1980 1981 1982 
--
Public Sector 412.8 540.5 566.7 
Treasury 188.7 261.9 266.2 
Public enterprises 224.1 278.6 300.5 
Private Sector 242.4 385.0 343.8 
--TOTAL 655.2 925.5 910.5 
--
Source: Akbank "Turkish Economy" Statistics, July 1988 
Central Bank of Turkey Annual Reports 
1983 
631.1 
338.6 
292.5 
603.0 
1,234.1 
1984 
565.3 
528.3 
37.0 
314.6 
879.9 
1985 1986 1987 
--
916.7 1,303.0 2,270.4 
794.5 1 ,051. 5 1406.6 
122.2 251.5 863.8 
382.9 525.0 1,168.3 
1,299.6 1,828.0 3,438.7 
Table 2.3 
Central Bank Rediscount Rates 
Effective from 24 June, 1988 
Short - term loans 
General 
Special (Agricultural loans extended by Ziraat 
Bankasj and loans extended by Halk 
Bankas1 to small industrialists, artisans, 
tradesmen and tradesmen associations) 
54 
40 
Export credits 35 
Medium- term loans (with Incentive Certificates) 
General 60 
Investment loans: 
with Export Guaranty 40 
without Export Guaranty 45 
Loans extended to manufacterers - suppliers of 50 
investment goods 
Advances against bonds 75 
Source: Ti..irkiye I~ Bankas1 "Economic letter" July 1988 
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monetary expansion is partly legalised through the provision that 15 per cent of budget 
appreciations can be met by short term (but, in fact permanent) advances from the 
Central Bank.14 The share of credits to public enterprises in the total credits of the 
Central Bank was 23.4 per cent in 1987 which was less than the figure of 34.2 per cent 
in 1980, but still represented an important factor in the expansion of the money supply. 
The loans of the Central Bank to the banking system, which in 1987 represented 
34.5 per cent of all Central Bank credits, reflect mainly the operation of selective credit 
policies. These loans are used for the fmancing of agriculture, medium term credits and 
export credits. 
The system of cheap Central Bank selective credits creates conflict with the 
objectives of monetary policy and reduces competition among fmancial institutions and 
efforts have been made since 1980 to lessen the reliance on this method of inflationary 
financing. Although reforms have been made to the system of selective credits and 
allocation of financial resources has been improved, further reforms are still necessary, 
and in particular the Central Bank needs to reduce the dependence of the system of 
selective credits on its own rediscounts. 
Monetary policy 
Following the introduction of the economic restructuring programme of 1980, 
monetary policy began to play an important role in the fight against inflation, which in 
Turkey continues to be a major problem and an obstacle to balanced growth. The two 
principal operational instruments were quantitative limits on Central Bank credit and 
interest rates on bank deposits. 
High real interest rates were fixed to encourage deposits and to discourage 
excessive credit demand. The monetary authorities have, in recent years, set targets for 
the expansion of money supply and Central Bank credit, although monetary limits have 
not always been adhered to for a variety of reasons such as variations in foreign 
exchange inflows, larger than planned budget deficits and, in the early part of the 
decade, lender of last resort support to commercial banks in difficulties. Political 
considerations also continue to play an important part. 
The volume of financial resources of the banking system is determined by the 
stock of money and by other net domestic and foreign liabilities of the system.15 
Among these influences, the money supply has been the most important 
Table 2.4 indicates that during the period 1980 to 1987 the money supply figure 
M1, which consists of currency in circulation, demand savings and demand commercial 
deposits, and deposits with the Central Bank, increased at an annual rate of 44.8 per 
cent. The figure M2, which is a broader definition of the money supply and includes 
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Table 2.4 
Money Supply 
( TL b DU on ) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
--
-- -- --
M1 704.0 972.0 1, 341.9 11941.0 
% change 58.4 38.1 38.1 44.6 
M2 881.9 11637.2 2,554.1 31288.4 
% change 67.1 85.6 56.0 28.7 
M2X 
% change 
Source: IMF 1 International Financial Statistics 
Central Bank of Turkey 
,":_4 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
--
-- -- -
21252.7 31208.7 51016.6 81237.5 
16.1 42.4 56.3 64.2 
51179.0 81145.5 111644.0 181437.8 
57.5 57.3 42.9 58.3 
51696.6 91299.3 141236.5 241035.9 
63.2 53.1 68.8 
time deposits and certificates of deposits, rose at 56.7 per cent over the same period. 
In 1986, the Central Bank introduced the policy approach of targeting a monetary 
aggregate. M2 was selected to be kept on a growth path during the year with the growth 
being derived from projections for real income growth, inflation and interest rates. As a 
result of the considerable expansion in the foreign exchange operations of the 
conventional banks in recent years the authorities have introduced the monetary 
aggregate M2X (M2 plus foreign exchange deposits) and this may be a better aggregate 
for monetary targeting purposes than M2. 
In April 1986, the Central Bank set up an interbank market where commercial 
banks can invest excess reserves for short periods. Overnight transactions as well as 
transactions maturing at seven days, two, three and four weeks are made in the 
interbank market. However, most transactions are for overnight and seven day trading 
of funds. Interest rates, which are freely determined, vary considerably and offer the 
Central Bank an indication about the tightness of bank liquidity. At the end of August 
1988, the interbank interest rates were around 63 per cent, compared to average rates of 
between 40 to 45 per cent in January. The average daily volume of trading in the 
interbank market in August was around TL 380 billion. 
The establishment of an interbank market was a necessary preliminary step in the 
implementation of open-market operations which began in February 1987 and which 
will eventually become the instrument to control reserves. 
During 1987, monetary targets were greatly exceeded as the government 
permitted increases in demand and credit for electioneering purposes. The aggregate M1 
increased by 64.2 per cent over the 1986 figure, and M2 rose at a slightly lower rate of 
58.3 per cent over the same period. These figures also represented higher private sector 
savings deposits after the partial liberalisation of deposit rates in July 1987. The 
authorities are endeavouring to curb the high growth rates in money supply by the 
abolition of certain rediscounts and by increases in the reserve and liquidity requirement 
ratios. 
Overall, the monetary authorities have generally succeeded in improving 
monetary and economic targeting, although there are still periodic liquidity shortages 
and difficulties in adhering to specific targets. The introduction of an interbank market 
and open-market operations should, however, contribute to a more efficient use of 
financial resources in the banking system. 
Conclusion 
Prior to 1980, money management had been based on a rigid and complex 
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system of administratively set interest rates and quantitative controls on Central Bank 
rediscounts and multiple reserve requirements. In recent years, the adoption of a 
realistic exchange-rate policy and a reduction in the huge subsidies to State industries 
are indications that greater emphasis is now placed on market forces in the allocation of 
reserves. 
Substantial progress has been made in respect of making monetary instruments 
more effective. The Central Bank has strengthened supervision of the conventional 
banks, introduced a unified required reserve ratio, opened an interbank market and 
established a secondary market for government securities through which it can conduct 
open-market operations to regulate bank liquidity. 
The Central Bank now plays a greater role in the determination and 
implementation of monetary policy, and it is likely that further reforms will be 
introduced in an effort to achieve greater liberalisation within the financial sector. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE TURKISH FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Introduction 
The major domestic money market in Turkey is the commercial banking system. 
Since 1980, this sector has undergone a rapid transformation as a result of 
changes introduced by the government which have generally led to greater 
liberalisation, an increase in the number of banks and diversification of the market. The 
banks are now much more geared-up for the needs of an export-orientated economy. 
The opening up of the economy and the banking sector has also encouraged the flow of 
foreign capital into the country which has helped to promote economic growth in 
Turkey, and aided development. 
This chapter provides a brief survey of the establishment of banking in Turkey 
and discusses developments since 1980 in the banking sector and in the recently opened 
capital markets. It considers the changing status, growth and profitability of the 
· commercial banks, and assesses how the commercial banking system is responding to 
the problems of increasing bad debts, shortages of funds and growing competition. The 
final sector of the chapter focuses on the capital markets with particular emphasis on the 
Capital Market Board and the istanbul Stock Exchange. 
The text is supported by tables, and in an effort to make this information easier to 
read, comparisons have often been made between only three years - 1980, the start of 
the Ozal reforms, and 1986 and 1987. The intervening years have only been included 
when it was felt that such information and statistics were helpful in understanding the 
actions or measures of the Government, Treasury and Central Bank. 
The developments that have occurred in the Turkish financial sector since 1980 
have important implications for the Islamic banks which are required to operate side by 
side with the conventional riba based banks. Therefore, the information contained in 
this chapter is necessary in order to understand the position and role of the Islamic 
banks within the Turkish financial sector. 
Establishment and classification of banks in Turkey 
Banking in Turkey began in the nineteenth century with the establishment of 
Bank-1 Osmani Sahane ( Imperial Ottoman Bank) in 1856. It was founded by the 
British with a capital of$ 500,000. However, the British soon became dissatisfied at 
the restrictions placed on the bank by the Ottomans and most of its shares were sold to 
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the French. The Ottoman Bank, as it is known today, came into being in 1863. This 
bank, together with the State Treasury, was responsible for the issue of Turkish 
currency until the founding of the Central Bank of Turkey in 1930. 
Other smaller banks were set up during the Ottoman period, the most notable of 
which was Ziraat Bankas1, founded in 1888 and today Turkey's largest bank. This 
bank was established to assist agriculture and continues to be the major supplier of 
funds to the agricultural sector. 
In 1924, Turkey's first important private and domestically owned bank, Tiirkiye 
h Bankasi (the Business Bank) was set up with an initial paid-up capital of TL 
250,000.1 Another bank, Tiirkiye Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasi (Bank for Industry and 
Mining) was established in 1925. Both banks provided capital for long term industrial 
development. 
During the 1930s, two new development banks were set up to fmance and control 
the expanding state industrial sector.2 The first of these, Siimerbank, was set up in 
1933 and took over the textile factories formerly run by the Bank for Industry and 
Mining. A second development bank, Etibank, was established in 1935 and had 
primary responsibility for the mining industry. Today, Stimerbank has 44 bank 
branches and continues to provide loans for the textile sector. It also operates textile 
factories and ready-to-wear clothing stores. Etibank, with 128 bank branches, 
continues to provide loans for the mining sector and for its own affiliates. 
Following the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the number of state owned 
banks increased and the banking sector further expanded with the establishment of 
private banks, both domestic and foreign. At the end of 1987, there were 56 banks 
operating in Turkey, compared to only 40 at the end of 1980. These banks can be 
categorised as follows: 
National Commercial Banks 
State owned 
Private (including joint ventures) 
Foreign Banks 
Development and Investment Banks 
Public 
Private 
Source:"Banks in Turkey, 1987" 
Banks Association of Turkey, Ankara 
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9 
24 
4 
2 
33 
17 
6 
Banks in Turkey are subject to the Banks Act which was contained in Decree 
number 28 dated 31 August 1979, Decree number 70 dated 22 July 1983 and Law 
number 3182 of 27 April 1985. This Act, which is regularly amended, contains 100 
articles detailing all aspects concerning the formation and operations of the commercial, 
development and investment banks. 
To form a bank in Turkey, permission from the Council of Ministers is required. 
Each bank must have a paid-up capital of at least TL 5 billion, which for the foreign 
banks must be paid in foreign currency. Further branches require additional capital 
increases, but the foreign banks, with the exception of the Ottoman Bank, are restricted 
to a maximum of six branches. 
Of the 33 commercial banks, 9 are state owned and 24 are in private hands. Most 
of the state owned banks are based in the capital, Ankara, while the majority of the 
Turkish private banks (and all of the foreign banks) have their headquarters in istanbul. 
The state banks were established to provide credits to certain sectors of the 
economy, for example, Ziraat Bankasi assists in agricultural development and Halk 
Bankas1 specialises in credits to small industrialists, artisans and tradesmen. 
The four largest banks in Turkey, in terms of equity and liabilities, are the state 
owned Ziraat Bankasi, Tiirkiye is Bankas1 which is twenty-five per cent state owned 
but considers itself to be a private bank, and the private banks, Yap1 ve Kredi Bankas1 
and Akbank. Together they control about 60 per cent of all banking transactions. 
Most of the large private banks are linked to industrial groups although the 
banking law of 1933 aimed to discourage this. 3 The Cukurova group has the largest 
stake in the banking sector, owning Yap1 ve Kredi Bankas1, Pamukbank and 
Uluslararast Endtistri ve Ticaret Bankasi. The most profitable bank in Turkey, Akbank, 
is owned by the Sabanci group. Another large industrial group, K~. established a joint 
venture with American Express in 1986. 
There are a number of private banks, such as iktisat Bankas1, TUrk Ekonomi 
Bankasi and Finansbank, that act like Western merchant banks and which concentrate 
on trade financing and loans to concepts new in Turkey like mergers and acquisitions, 
equity and capital market activities, government bond trading and corporate 
syndications. 
The state owned banks and some of the private banks have equity stakes in major 
Turkish corporations and companies. At the end of 1987, Tlirkiye is Bankas1, for 
example, had equity participations in around 60 companies valued at more than TL 200 
billion. 
All the state banks and the larger private banks have branches throughout Turkey 
and some have opened branches overseas and have established international 
reputations. The total number of branches in Turkey of the national, foreign and 
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development and investment banks at the end of 1987 was 6,427, compared to a figure 
of only 5,966 at the end of 1980.4 
The majority of the foreign banks arrived in Turkey after 1980. The government 
gave the banks incentives to open branches in Turkey, believing that an 
outward-oriented strategy would not be successful unless the financial sector was 
opened up to foreign competition. In 1980, there were only 4 foreign banks operating 
in the country, but that figure has increased substantially in recent years. At the end of 
1987, 17 foreign banks had branches in Turkey, and a further 11 had representative 
offices. The foreign banks can be divided into three main groups: Western commercial 
banks, Middle Eastern banks and joint ventures.5 
The Council of Ministers has recently approved the applications of six more 
foreign banks wishing to open branches in Turkey and more applications are pending. 
This would appear to indicate that Turkey is seen as an increasingly profitable, stable 
and liberal economic environment in which to conduct international banking operations. 
In addition to the commercial banks, there are six investment and development 
banks in Turkey. Of these, four are state owned and two are private. The largest and 
most important is Eximbank, which was established in 1964. Its main function is to 
allocate Treasury funds to finance investments in the public sector. It also provides 
exporters with short and medium term, pre and post shipment credits. Ti.irkiye 
Kalkmma Bankas16 (Development Bank) was founded in 1976 to handle loans to 
workers' companies set up by returning workers from abroad.7 The oldest of the 
investment and development banks is iller Bankas1 which provides loans for investment 
in the lesser developed provinces of Turkey. For the tourism sector, Turizm Bankas1 
provides loans at reasonable rates of interest but, so far, its funds have been too limited 
to enable it to carry out a major role in this sector. 
The private development banks receive most of their resources from foreign loans 
provided by such bodies as the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and other 
official financial institutions, and use these funds essentially to provide medium and 
long term loans to private enterprise. 
Deposits and! credits 
Table 3.1 shows that the deposits of the commercial, development and investment 
banks& rose by 58.8 per cent in 1986 and 52.7 per cent in 1987 and reached a level of 
TL 24,163.2 billion at the end of 1987. 
The market share of deposits held at the Turkish commercial banks and the 
foreign banks has not changed significantly since 1980, and the Turkish banks still 
account for over 96 per cent of all deposits, as indicated in Table 3.2. There has, 
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Table 3.1 
1980 
Savings deposits 383.1 
Time (including 
Certificates 
Total Deposits (by type) at the Commercial, 
Development and Investment Banks 
(TL billion) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
-- -- --
901.1 1508.6 1932.4 3255.8 
1985 1986 1987 
-- --
5212.9 6540.2. 8321.3 
of Deposit) 186.6 677.6 1234.4 1333.6 2819.2 4608.0 5650.7 6809.2 
Demand 196.5 223.5 274.2 598.8 436.6 604.9 889.5 1512.1 
Government deposits 287.0 469.8 660.1 819.7 571.0 886.4 1325.3 2237.3 
Commercial deposits 84.1 157.4 220.3 365.3 1169.3 1911.7 3192.3 5179.0 
Interbank deposits 56.9 111.8 220.5 257.9 363.3 780.2 1654.3 2035.9 
Other deposits 2.7 8.0 5.3 11.5 15.0 22.6 523.2 791.6 
-- --
813.8 1648.1 2614.8 3386.8 5374.4 8813.8 13235.3 18565.1 
--Foreign exchange deposits 517.6 1153.8 2592.5 5598.1 
TOTAL DEPOSITS 5892,0 9967.6 15827.8 24163.2 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey Annual Reports 
~-
'00 
Table 3.2 
1980 
National Commercial Banks 
Banks with public capital 274.5 
Banks with private capital 517.9 
Foreign Commercial Banks 
Development and Investment Banks 
Banks with public capital 2.4 
Banks with private capital -
Distribution of Deposits and Credits at the 
Commercial, Development and Investment Banks 
(TL billion) 
Deposits 
1986 1987 
792.4 15262.2 23276.2 
6510.9 10007.0 
8751.3 13269.2 
19.0 564.0 885.5 
2.4 1.6 1.5 
1.6 1.5 
- -
---
813.8 15827.8 24163:2 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey Annual Reports 
Credits 
-
1980 1986 1987 
781.3 9725.6 15924.7 
426.7 4960.2 9006.9 
354.6 4765.4 6917.8 
17.4 300.0 472.2 
144.5 1491.6 2312.7 
101.9 1093.4 1768.2 
42.6 398.2 544.5 
---
943.2 11517.2 18709.6 
however, been a considerable increase, mainly at the expense of the private sector 
banks, in the volume of deposits held at the public sector banks. The share of deposits 
held in these banks has risen from 33.7 per cent in 1980 to 41.4 per cent in 1987, 
against a decrease for the private banks from 63.6 per cent to 54.9 per cent over the 
same period. This increase appears mainly as the result of the concentration of public 
sector funds in public sector banks. The government continues to conduct most of its 
financial transactions through these banks on which it has traditionally relied, but this 
preference now seems somewhat paradoxical given the supposed bias of the 
government in favour of private enterprise. The foreign banks increased their share of 
deposits from 2.3 per cent in 1980 to 3.6 per cent in 1987. All deposit money banks are 
obliged to buy insurance coverage for savings deposits from the Savings Deposits 
Insurance Fund, established under Central Bank supervision. The details of this fund 
are contained in Articles 65-69 of the Banks Act. 
The increased attraction of short and medium term treasury bills for banks as 
revenue earning assets is reflected in the growth of their share in bank deposits from 
8.6 per cent in 1980 to 49.7 per cent in 1987, as shown in Table 3.8. 
In Table 3.1, it can be seen that the total credits of the commercial banking sector 
expanded by 77 per cent in 1986 and 62.5 per cent in 1987, and at the end of the year 
stood at TL 18,709.6 billion. Article 38 of the Banking Law stipulates that the total 
value of credits extended by the commercial banks must not exceed twenty times the 
bank's capital and reserves, and that a bank must not lend more than 10 per cent of its 
own resources to any one client unless the credits are to be used in financing 
investments in sectors and regions indicated in the Annual Programmes of the 
Development Plan. 
The incentives to the banks for granting medium and long term credits have 
included preferential rediscount rates and interest rate subsidies paid by the "Resource 
Utilisation and Support Fund", established by the Central Bank in 1984 to replace the 
"Differential Interest Rate Rebate Fund". Its resources are a surcharge on bank lending, 
interest charged by the Central Bank on credits to State Economic Enterprises and 
interest penalties paid by banks to the Central Bank. 
The share of bank credit refinanced by discounting bills at the Central Bank has 
fallen substantially since 1980 and now stands at only a few percentage points. This 
reflects the more restricted access to the discount window as well as the consolidation 
of non-performing loans by the Central Bank to the agricultural sector and to state 
enterprises. 
During 1987, the market share of credits offered by the Turkish commercial 
banks rose slightly over the 1986 figure and stood at 85.1 per cent. However, this 
increase was accounted for by greatly increased state sector bank lending, and lending 
by the private and foreign banks actually fell. This decrease appears to have been the 
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result of both a shortage of funds and a desire on behalf of the non-state banks to 
control and reduce credit risk. 
Besides the local currency deposits and credits, the banks in Turkey have recently 
expanded their foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities significantly 
following increased liberalisation of international capital transactions and the easing of 
most foreign exchange restrictions which has led to a substantial inflow of funds from 
Turkish workers abroad. Foreign exchange deposits outside the Central Bank rose 
from TL 2,592.5 billion in 1986 to TL 5,598.1 billion in 1987 and represented 23.2 
per cent of local currency deposits. The foreign exchange credits of the banks 
accounted for about 18 per cent of total credits at the end of 1987, compared to only 1 
per cent at the end of 1983. This figure has risen sharply due to Turkey's increased 
volume of international trade which has led the commercial banks to place greater 
emphasis on credits for trade finance and less emphasis on loans for investment. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Central Bank fixes, and regularly 
adjusts, the (maximum) interest rates to depositors. Table 3.3 shows that, since early 
September 1988, the interest rates for demand, one month, three months, six months 
and one year deposits have been 10, 35, 42, 51 and 64 per cent respectively. In a 
further effort to attract funds, Turkish workers abroad are offered an extra four 
percentage points on Turkish lira deposits. However, it appears that most workers 
prefer to keep their earnings and savings in more stable foreign currency denominated 
accounts which maintain their value. 
The commercial banks are allowed to set their own rates for borrowers and a 
certain amountof competition has broken out. As Table 3.4 shows, interest rates for 
credits are presently at around 75 per cent but the true figures are closer to 120 per cent 
when taxes and surcharges are included. However, most reputable concerns can obtain 
lower rates and there are still various incentive rates, which can be as low as 35 per 
cent, such a those given by the Eximbank to exporters. Nevertheless, the private 
industrial sector has been particularly hard hit by these rates and the high cost of funds 
is a major brake on investment. Despite this, interest rates are likely to remain high in 
Turkey for the foreseeable future. 
Interest rates on government securities are higher than on bank deposits and in 
recent months an increasing volume of savings have been directed into these holdings 
and away from the commercial banks, which consequently now find themselves with 
reduced deposits to lend. This problem has been highlighted by increased turnover and 
higher rates in the interbank money markets. 
In an attempt to remedy this situation, the government has proposed a forced 
savings scheme to raise the savings rate of wage earners.9 Once this scheme is fully 
implemented, it is expected to raise TL 350 billion annually. According to the 
proposals, the wages and salaries of most workers will be subject to 2 per cent savings 
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Table 3.3 
Gross Interest Rates for Time Depositsa 
Validity Demand One Three Six 
date month months months 
1. 3.80. 3.0 8.0 12.0 
1. 7.80. 5.0 15.0 
1. 1.81. 5.0 32.0 
1. 2.81. 5.0 42.0 
1. 7.81. 5.0 45.0 50.0 
1. 1.83. 20.0 40.0 
1. 7.83. 20.0 35.0 
19.12.83. 5.0 49.0 47.0 
1. 3.84. 5.0 43.0 49.0 47.0 
14. 5.84. 5.0 35. '() 52.0 48.0 
11. 8.84. 5.0 35.0 53.0 52.0 
1. 7.85. 5.0 35.0 48.0 52.0 
1. 8.85. 5.0 35.0 45.0 50.0 
1. 3.86. 5.0 35.0 44.0 48.0 
1. 5.86. 11.6 35.0· 42.0 45.0 
7. 6.86. 10.0 30.0 40.0 45.0 
30.10.86. 10.0 29.0 36.0 41.0 
31.12.86. 10.0 28.0 35.0 39.0 
9. 2.87. 10.0 28.0 35.0 38.0 
3. 7.87. 10.0 28.0 35.0 38.0 
4. 2.88. 36.0 40.0 45.0 52.0 
1. 7.88. 30.0 40.0 45.0 52.0 
6. 8.88. 25.0 35.0 42.0 51.0 
12. 9.88. 10.0 35.0 42.0 51.0 
a Ceiling rates determined by the Central Bank 
Source: Akbank "Turkish Economy" Monthly Economic Indicators 
Central Bank of Turkey Annual Reports 
TUrkiye Is Bankas1 Monthly Economic letters 
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One 
year 
20.0-24.0 
33.0-36.0 
40.0 
50.0 
50.0 
45.0 
40.0 
45.0 
45.0 
45.0 
45.0 
56.0 
55.0 
55.0 
52.0 
52.0 
48.0 
45.0 
43.0 
Free 
65.0 
65.0 
64.0 
64.0 
Table 3.4 
Validity 
Date 
l. 5.79. 
l. 3.80. 
l. 7.80. 
1.10.80. 
1. 2.81. 
1. 7.83. 
19.12.83. 
14. 5.84. 
1.10.86. 
9. 2.88. 
12. 9.88. 
Source: 
Deposit Bank Rates for Credits 
Short Medium Long 
term term term 
19.0 20.0 20.0 
21.0 22.0 22.0 
31.0 33.0 36.0 
31.0 33.0 36.0 
36.0 38.0 41.0 
32.0 34.0 34.0 
50.0 52.0 52.0 
53.5 52.0 52.0 
50.0 52.0 52.0 
77.0 79.0 79.0 
72.0 74.0 74.0 
Akbank "Turkish Economy" Monthly Economic Indicators 
Central Bank of Turkey Annual Reports 
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which will be matched by a 3 per cent contribution from the government and 
employers. 
Banking sector performances and prospects 
Table 3.5 indicates that in 1987 the combined net profits of the commercial, 
development and investment banks amounted to TL 899.4 billion, an increase of 96.2 
per cent over the 1986 figure. The percentage growth was most marked in the case of 
the Turkish commercial banks who together accounted for over 86 per cent of all 
banks' profits. 
The foreign commercial banks, which control only around 3 per cent of the 
banking market made a profit of TL 51.7 billion in 1987, or 5.7 per cent of the total 
banks' profits. This market share figure was slightly down on that of 1986 and 
reflected the higher cost of funds and greater interbank competition. 
Ak:bank, a Turkish private bank, recorded a profit of TL 167.9 billion and was 
the most profitable of all banks operating in Turkey. The most profitable state bank was 
Valaflar Bankas1 and the most profitable "foreign" bank was Osmanh Bankas1. They 
reported profits of TL 81.3 billion and TL 17.8 billion respectively. Citibank, which 
made a profit of TL 5.6 billion in 1987 was the most profitable of the foreign banks 
with a limited number of branches. 
The low cost of funds in the 1970s led to a rapid expansion of the branch network 
and by 1980 most banks were under-capitalised and inward looking. In recent years, 
the Central Bank has forced the commercial banks to increase their capital in line with 
the volume of their transactions and their size. The combined equity of all the banks 
increased by 81.4 per cent in 1987 and at the end of the year stood at TL 4,151.8 
billion, as shown in Table 3.6. The largest percentage increases were recorded by the 
private banking sector. Table 3.6.1 indicates that the capital to assets ratio, which 
provides a measure of the bank's ability to generate additional capital funds stood at 9.6 
per cent in 1987, up from 8.8 per cent in 1986. By international standards, this figure 
was relatively high. Indeed, the average ratio of capital to assets of the world's "Top 
500" banks was only 3.85 per cent in 1987.10 Two Turkish banks, Ziraat Bankas1 and 
Tiirkiye is Bankasi also appeared in the "Top 500" table according to assets size. The 
former was ranked at 348 and the latter at 443. 
In Table 3.7 it can be seen that in 1987 the assets of the banks grew by 65.1 per 
cent over the 1986 figure and at the end of the year stood at TL 43,033.6 billion. The 
older local commercial banks, state or private, are still less efficient than their foreign 
competitors, as indicated in Table 3.7.1. In 1987, the Turkish state and private banks 
had returns on their assets of 1.6 per cent and 2.5 per cent respectively, compared to a 
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Table 3.5 
Net Profits at the 
Commercial, Development and Investment Banks 
(TL billion) 
1980 1986 
National Commercial Banks 16.5 386.2 
Banks with public capital 9.0 142.0 309.4 
Banks with private capital 7.5 244.2 471.7 
Foreign Commercial Banks 1.2 29.9 
Development and Investment Banks 0.5 42.4 
Banks with public capital 0.5 39.5 57.7 
1987 
781.1 
51.7 
66.6 
Banks with private capital 
-
2.9 8.9 
18.2 458.5 899.4 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey Annual Reports 
_,. 
Commercial, Development and Investment Banks 
Table 3.6 
Capital (TL billion) 
1980 1986 
128.1 1733.3 National Commercial Banks 
Banks with public capital 
Banks with private capital 
108.3 1109.8 
Foreign Commercial Banks 
Development and Investment Banks 
Banks with public capital 
Banks with private capital 
Table 3.6.1 
National Commercial Banks 
Banks with public capital 
Banks with private capital 
Foreign Commercial Banks 
Development and Investment Banks 
Banks with public capital 
Banks with private capital 
19.8 
1.2 
5.8 
5.8 
135.1 
Capital Ratio 
1980 
8.6 
14.3 
2.7 
2.6 
15.1 
15.1 
8.5 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey Annual Reports 
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623.5 
75.1 
480.2 
446.9 
33.3 
2288.6 
1986 
7.6 
9.7 
5.4 
7.8 
22.3 
27.7 
6.2 
8.8 
1987 
3286.0 
1913.2 
1372.8 
98.0 
767.8 
717.7 
50.1 
4151.8 
1987 
8.6 
9.9 
7.3 
7.6 
21.1 
25.4 
6.2 
9.6 
.. : ·~ .... 
Commercial, Development and Investment Banks 
Table 3.7 
Assets (TL billion) 
1987 
National Commercial Banks 1493.9 22942.2 38101.4 
Banks with public capt tal 758.2 11440.5 19235.8 
Banks wi th'priv~te capital 735.7 11501.7 18865.6 
Foreign Commercial Banks 47.8 967.2 1295.9 
Development and Investment Banks 38.7 2150.7 3636.3 
Banks with public capital 38.7 1615.9 2830.0 
Banks with private capital 534.8 806.3 
----
1580.4 26060.1 43033.6 
Table 3.7.1 
Return on Assets 
~ ~ 1987 
National Commercial Banks 1.1 1.7 2.0 
Banks with public capital 1.2 1.2 1.6 
Banks with private capital 1.0 2.1 2.5 
Foreign Commercial Banks 2.5 3.1 4.0 
Development and Investment Banks 1.3 2.0 1.8 
Banks with public capital 1.3 2.4 2.0 
Banks with private capital 0.5 1.1 
1.2 1.8 2.1 
Source: Banks Association or Turkey Annual Reports 
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4.0 per cent return by the foreign banks. There are several reasons for these disparities. 
The foreign banks have generally provided efficient services to customers using the 
latest technology and have been able to choose to do business with only the most 
successful or export-oriented firms. In comparison, most of the Turkish banks have 
been obliged to work mainly with local companies trying to adapt themselves to the 
new economic policies. They have suffered from a lack of modern technology, 
over-manning and a bureaucratic and conservative management. 
Unti11980, the legal regulations on interest rates that were in force gave the banks 
the possibility of maintaining high costs of operation. The absence of any interest rate 
competition and the substantial margin between deposit and lending interest rates made 
the business of attracting deposits very profitable. The banks resorted to non-price 
competition, in the form of heavy advertising, luxury office building, the opening of 
many branches and overstaffing. The expansion of the bank network led initially to 
increases in deposits but this later led to diminishing marginal productivity, and returns 
which were below the costs of overbranching. 
All this, Of course, resulted in very high operating costs. It has only been in 
recent years, with the arrival of foreign banks that competition between the financial 
institutions has broken out which has led to the state and private sector banks reducing 
costs and increasing efficiency. As a result, the return on assets has increased for the 
private banks, but for the state sector banks the return on assets has remained virtually 
unchanged since 1980. Although competition often reduces margins, in the case of the 
private sector banks in Turkey it appears that the rise in the return on assets has been 
due mainly to a reduction in staffing costs and increased efficiency as a result of 
modern technology. This is borne out by a look at the net profits per employee figures: 
in 1986, this stood at TL 398,945 at the state owned Ziraat Bankas1 and at TL 
1,610,273 at the private sector Tiirkiye is Bankas1, figures which had risen to TL 
620,616 and TL 2,912,502 respectively in 1987. The former bank increased the 
number of its employees by 2,337 in 1987, the latter reduced its number by 492. 
Excluding Finansbank, which opened in 1987, the overall number of staff at the private 
sector Turkish banks increased by 1,151, or 1.8 per cent, to 65,991, but at the state 
owned banks the figure increased by 4,423, or 6.0 per cent, to 78,390 during 1987. It 
would appear, therefore, that the state sector banks are relying on higher staff numbers 
to conduct their increased business, while the private sector banks are making greater 
use of computers and data-processing facilities. The government would obviously like 
the state sector banks to increase their profitability and efficiency and to match the 
returns of the private sector banks. It believes that this can only be achieved through 
privatisation and, accordingly, it has recently announced that SUmerbank will be the 
first state bank to be sold off and hopes that the sale will take place in 1989. 
In the early 1980s, the Turkish commercial banks had tended to focus their 
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activities on the needs of the domestic market while the foreign banks concentrated on 
providing trade finance. However, as funds have now become more expensive, the 
Turkish banks have started to move away from their traditional areas of activity and 
towards trade finance and government bond sales to make money. The foreign banks 
are also moving away from a heavy reliance on trade finance towards investment 
banking. The government has, however, indicated that it would like to see the foreign 
banks channel their operations to serve domestic sectors like housing, industry and 
commerce. Although the foreign banks have no natural base to work from, they do 
seem to have been successful in finding niche opportunities to which they can apply 
their expertise. 
Despite the fact that Turkish commercial banks have become more efficient since 
1980, old-fashioned attitudes and operating methods still remain. For example, in retail 
banking personal loans are seldom given, cheque cards rarely issued or used and 
automatic teller machines hardly in evidence. In short, the large Turkish banks still have 
a long way to go before they can match European operating costs and standards. The 
smaller or more specialised banks can compete on almost equal terms with the foreign 
banks, and as such their market share is increasing. 
The problem of non-performing loans and bad debts 
Up to 1980, the main problems of the Turkish banking system had been 
insufficiency of competition, narrow specialisation of some of the most important state 
sector banks and the high costs of intermediation of the banks. 11 Although these 
problems have now largely disappeared other problems remain, such as those of bank 
reporting and bad debts. 
The accounts of many state banks still do not reveal the true picture of their 
activities. In an attempt to improve bank reporting, the Central Bank has, since 1987, 
required banks to adopt a unified reporting and disclosure format and has issued a clear 
definition of bad loans to prevent banks from concealing their figures for bad debts and 
non-performing loans. 
The current most pressing problem is that of bad debts. In the past few years, 
several Turkish banks have been taken over by the Treasury after becoming insolvent 
and their assets disposed of through state banks. It seems that these banks had such 
large amounts of bad debts in their portfolios that the government had no real option 
other than to rescue these institutions. 
Until recently, many Turkish banks had low capitalisation and were thus 
vulnerable in a crisis, and had traditional links with either the State or large private 
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business interests which strongly influenced the composition of their loan portfolios. 
Estimates of the level of bad debts prevalent in the Turkish banking sector vary widely, 
but it is estimated that 20 to 30 per cent of total bank lending is non-performing. High 
and rising interest rates, which reflect inflation, have exacerbated the bad debt problem 
and caused uncertainty for the borrowers. Interest rates will only fall once inflation is 
brought under control and is fixed on a downward trend. Most banks made provision 
for bad and doubtful debts in 1987. The amount set aside for provisions increased 
substantially from TL 125.3 billion in 1986 to TL 427.0 billion in 1987. The rise was 
most marked in the case of the Turkish state owned banks which increased their 1987 
provisions more than five-fold over those of 1986, to TL 317.1 billion. The provisions 
made by foreign banks decreased in 1987 and accounted for less than 1 per cent of the 
total banking provisions. In 1987, the total provisions for bad and doubtful debts 
amounted to 2.28 per cent of total loans, up from 1.09 per cent in 1986. 
The Banking Law also deals with bad debts and non-performing loans. Article 32 
requires the commercial banks to set aside 5 per cent of their annual net profits as 
"contingency reserves" until its total equals the amount of paid-up capital which can 
only be used to offset the bank's losses. 
The bad debt problem forced a number of rationalisations among the Turkish 
banks in 1987. The large proportion of non-performing loans in the books of the state 
banks, Anadolu Bankas1 and Denizcilik Bankas1, and the private banks, imar Bankas1 
and Tiirkiye bgretmenler Bankast (Tobank), were brought under government 
supervision according to Article 64 of the Banking Law. This article deals with the 
measures for the rehabilitation of banks in financial trouble. Denizcilik Bankas1, which 
is the smallest state bank in terms of assets, also had the unenviable distinction of being 
the only state bank to have recorded a loss in 1987. 
The banks have themselves criticised the government for their high level of bad 
debts which they believe results from the many insolvencies in industry and the lack of 
an efficient bankruptcy process which has allowed companies to continue trading whilst 
technically insolvent. However, the banks themselves must take some of the blame. In 
the past, they have been willing to lend money freely, and without sufficient enquiries 
being made into a borrower's status and business activities. 
The government introduced new measures to tackle the massive problem of 
non-performing loans in June 1988. The Central Bank will implement the provisions 
which will shorten mandatory recovery periods from 27 months to 24 months and 
require banks to make provisions of 15 per cent of the loan, a figure which rises to 50 
per cent after one year and to 100 per cent after two years. 
The banks will now have to make more provisions for bad debts and 
non-performing loans and it therefore seems likely that further rationalisation will occur 
within the banking sector in the next few years. 
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Other Turkish financial institutions 
Although more than 80 per cent of all financial transactions carried out in Turkey 
occur within the banking system, there are other recently established financial 
institutions whose activities complement those of the banks. 
In the early 1980s, one major shortcoming in mobilising domestic savings in 
Turkey was the fact that the capital market was not well developed. Traditionally, the 
State Economic Enterprises looked to the government for their financial resources, 
while the private sector relied mainly on self-financing or on its special links with 
private banks. 
The lack of a functioning capital market and a modern banking sector had limited 
the effectiveness of Central Bank monetary policy and its use of interest rate and 
reserve ratio requirement instruments. No capital market can exist without a freely 
functioning money market which allows supply and demand to set interest rates.12 
In 1981, a capital market law was adopted which led to the establishment of the 
Capital Market Board in early 1982. The main objective of the law is to provide greater 
security to savers who buy shares and bonds and to encourage them to participate in the 
equity of companies or to contribute to their long term financing by subscribing 
bonds.13 The board issues regulations for institutions marketing bonds and other 
financial instruments. The bond market is now closely supervised in order to avoid a 
repeat of the financial crisis of 1982 when several bond dealers in the unorganised 
market went bankrupt. This market, in which interest rates of more than 100 per cent 
were paid to savers, had sprung up following the economic liberalisation measures of 
1980. 
Unti11983, government bond issues had tended to be limited and the absence of 
attractive interest rates led to little demand. Most of the government bonds were bought 
by the commercial banks as they could be counted as part of their reserves. Table 3.8 
indicates that in recent years the amount of government bonds and treasury bills issued 
has greatly increased. In 1987, the volume amounted to TL 6,330 billion, compared to 
a figure of only TL 60 billion in 1980. The share of treasury bills, which have 
maturities of under one year, was larger than that of government bonds, which are 
longer term investments. There are several reasons for this large increase in the demand 
by both individual and institutional investors for government securities. These 
securities are free of default risk and are tax exempt and can be held against liquidity 
requirements of commercial banks and as collateral at the Central Bank for interbank 
operations.I4 The yields on government securities are also higher than those on time 
deposits and are thus seen as a profitable alternative investment by savers. Interest rates 
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Table 3.8 
Capital Market -Securities Issued 
(TL million) 
~ 1981 ~ 1983 1984 
Public Sector 75,800 135,000 
Government bonds 50,000 70,000 69,730s 
Treasury b! lis 10,000 65,000 
-
State Investment 
Bank bonds 15,000 
Real Estate Bank 
bonds 800 
-
5,000 
Certificat.es of 
revenue partnership 
- - -
Private Sector 39,926 41,288 
Bonds b 18,011 15,981 13,245 Equities 21,915 25,307 109,523 
Others 
- - -
115,726 176,288 
a T\. 9730m bonds issued for special purposes 
b Quoted on the Stock Exchange 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey Annual Reports 
74,730 200,343 558,638 
190,343 195,484 
-
353,154 
10,000 
-
10,000 
122,768 52,400 75,600 
17,500 11,800 
34,900 63,800 
- -
----
197,498 252,743 634,238 
----
~ ~ ~ 
1,990,086 3,250,947 6,989,633 
656,757 1,242,861 2,518,026 
1,193,329 1,788,806 3,811,607 
140,000 220,000 660,000 
133,100 274,000 682,500 
36,200 110,900 317,500 
96,400 101,900 187,200 
500 61,2,00 177,800 
2,123,186 3,524,947 7,672,133 
·~ 
are determined through weekly auctions of these securities. 
In 1986, new short term money market instruments were introduced by the 
Capital Market Board. Development and investment banks were given permission to 
raise short, term funds by selling bank bills and bank guaranteed bills. Joint stock 
companies, excluding deposit money banks, were also allowed to issue commercial 
papers with maturities ranging from three months to one year, subject to permission of 
the Capital Market Board.15 
Private sector companies have begun to show an increasing interest in capital 
market instruments and in 1986 both the number of companies issuing bonds and the 
volume of bonds has increased significantly. As the interest rate (including taxes) on 
bank loans is in excess of 100 per cent, privately owned companies in need of money 
can increase their capital and sell part of their newly issued shares or bonds to the 
public and obtain loans directly, at a rate much lower than that offered by the banks. 
However, only the more efficient and well-managed companies are in a position to 
fulfil the stringent requirements set by the Capital Market Board to be able to issue such 
securities. During 1987, the Capital Market Board authorised 303 companies to issue 
securities worth TL 682.5 billion compared to TL 27 4.0 billion by 240 companies in 
1986, as shown in Table 3.8. 
Maximum interest rates on private sector bonds are fixed by the Central Bank, 
and the interest rates' ceiling is determined by the one year savings time deposits rate 
multiplied by a coefficient not exceeding 1.3,16 which, since August 1988, has been 
83.2 per cent. Bonds can be sold below face value and the Central Bank permits daily 
adjustments in bond prices. This has led to the establishment of a secondary market, 
but trading in this market remains limited. The amount of bonds issued by private 
sector companies in 1987 reached TL 318 billion, a significant increase from TL 111 
billion in 1986. The main motivation for this was the high level of interest rates on bank 
loans. In order to enable small savers to buy private bonds, the Capital Market Board 
stipulated, in January 1987, that 20 per cent of bonds issued by companies should be in 
denominations of TL 500,000 or less. Most bond issues took place during the first half 
of 1987 when private sector bonds were more attractive instruments for investment than 
bank deposits. 
Despite the increase in the number of securities issued by the private sector in 
recent years, the public sector remains the major fund raiser in the capital markets. Its 
share of the capital market in 1987 was 91.1 per cent. 
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the capital markets is the slow 
development of the equity market. In Turkey, where experience of the fmancial markets 
is limited, it appears that for the typical investor the yield of an investment is more 
appealing than capital appreciation. With high interest rates bonds are more preferred 
instruments than equities. 
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The istanbul Stock Exchange opened at the beginning of 1986 after the rules 
governing its establishment and operations had been published in the Official Gazette 
on 18 December 1985. The Stock Exchange consists of four separate markets. Trading 
of the most actively traded stocks takes place in the Senior Market while other listed 
stocks are traded in the Second Market. In 1986, the stocks of forty companies were 
traded in the Senior Market. The list of equities traded in this market is reviewed 
periodically and amended when necessary. Bonds which are listed with the exchange 
are traded in the official market and public sector securities are traded in the unlisted 
market. At the end of 1986, the stock market had forty-seven members who were 
authorised to trade. 
The fact that established family held companies are reluctant to go public has 
hampered the development of the equity market. Most of the larger companies quoted 
on the Stock Exchange are closely held by family groups and the supply of shares 
which can be traded on the Stock Exchange is very limited. However, in 1987, there 
was a significant increase in the volume of new equity issues which rose to TL 187 
billion from TL 102 billion in 1986. The total market value of the companies quoted on 
the Stock Exchange at the end of 1987 was recorded at TL 3 trillion 181 billion. To 
date, turnover on the exchange has been slow, averaging around 3 per cent of the 
market's capitalisation.!? In December 1987, the volume of equities traded in the market 
was TL 943 billion. IS 
The government would like to see the stock market grow, realising that a healthy 
stock market is essential if its privatisation plans are to be successful. In early 1987, it 
introduced a measure to allow for the proportional reduction of corporation and 
dividend tax paid by private firms which float shares to the public. 
In recent years, the authorities have introduced "revenue sharing certificates" on 
earnings from the Bosphorus bridge and Keban dam at rates more attractive than those 
offered on bank deposits. The proceeds of these sales were channelled to the Public 
Participation Fund, an off-budget fund to speed up the construction of development 
projects, particularly in the energy field. 19 These revenue sharing certificates have 
proved popular with savers who, for religious reasons, wish to avoid fixed interest 
payments. The certificates have the added advantage, from the investor's point of view, 
of not identifying the holder.20 Such savers may also now purchase Profit and Loss 
Sharing Certificates from companies and the special finance houses. 
The government is also planning to encourage individuals to sell gold in exchange 
for certificates, as it is generally agreed that this capital is needed in the economy. 
However, as many people hold gold as a hedge against inflation and economic 
instability, they may be reluctant to participate in such a scheme. It has also been 
suggested that inflation linked instruments should be introduced in a country still 
experiencing inflation rates in excess of 70 per cent. 
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Although the paper market accounts for less than 5 per cent of total bank lending, 
its importance is growing. The sale of treasury bills in 1984 has been an important 
factor in the growth of the capital market and has also helped to reduce the heavy 
reliance of the Treasury on the Central Bank for funds. 
It appears that most Turkish firms whose financial structure has been adversely 
affected by high inflation, wish to see a better functioning capital market in order to 
reduce their dependence on bank borrowing with high interest costs. In most cases, 
their equity base has been eroded by high inflation and needs to be rebuilt through new 
share issues. 
A small number of brokerage firms dominate the money markets and some bodies 
such as foreign banks, which are eager to market bonds, are at present restrained from 
doing so.21 The government, through the Capital Market Board, is expected to 
introduce greater competition within the capital markets and hopes that, as accounts of 
companies and banks are brought up to international standards and new financial 
instruments are introduced, more use will be made of the capital markets which will 
then begin to play a greater role in the financial sector. · 
Conclusion 
The last few years have seen the transformation of the Turkish banking scene. 
Prior to 1980, the Turkish banks were insular, inefficient and uncompetitive, but the 
opening up of the economy has changed this. The foreign banks have brought 
competition and innovation and have played an important role in familiarising the 
outside world about Turkey and its economic conditions. Turkish banks have expanded 
abroad and the Government, the Central Bank and the Treasury appear determined to 
bring the Turkish banking sector up to European standards ready for a possible entry 
into the EEC in the next decade. 
Greater competition in the banking sector has led to sizeable increases in Turkish 
banks' capital, an accelerated trend to reduce costs and investment in modern 
infrastructure to provide a similar range and quality of service as that of the foreign 
banks. However, the problem of bad debts still remains and greater provisions and 
better bank disclosure will have to be made. 
Although money and capital markets have been established, they still play a 
relatively minor role within the financial sector, and further developments and 
incentives are required to ensure their success. The introduction of new saving and 
investment tools and the emergence of new financial sub-sectors like leasing, are seen 
as important developments in the banking sector. The lack of significant stock market 
activity and the emphasis on fixed return securities has implications for the Islamic 
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banks, as will be shown in later chapters. 
Overall, the increased liberalisation of the sector and simplification of the maze of 
regulations surrounding banking .operations should lead to the development of more 
sophisticated public and private financial institutions and help to ensure the long term 
success of Turkey's economic reforms. 
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CJHIAJP>'flER ~ 
EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
][ntroductim1l 
In this chapter, the most distinguishing aspect of Islamic banking, the prohibition 
on receiving or paying interest, is presented first, followed by sections on trade and the 
development of conventional banking techniques in the Islamic world. The final section 
gives a brief history of the evolution and growth of Islamic banking. 
There are two main aims of this chapter. The first aim is to explain the meaning of 
the word "riba" and to give reasons for its prohibition in Islam. This section is 
supported by references from the Quran. The second aim is to show, by looking at 
(some) references to trade and commerce in the Quran and, briefly, the Traditions, that 
commercial activity, whether local or international, has always been important in the 
lives of the Muslims. 
This chapter will show that banking activities in the Islamic world have always 
been closely linked to matters of trade and that this relationship remains in evidence 
today, in the activities of the recently established Islamic banks and financial 
institutions. 
][slamic views on interest 
Throughout recorded history, the institution of interest has been a potent source 
of dissension everywhere. Until very recently, for instance, the Western world was 
sharply divided over the moral and economic merits of interest. I The prohibition of 
usury has a parallel in almost every religious ethic in the world. 
It is necessary to make a distinction between interest and usury. The fourth 
edition of the Oxford English Dictionary defines interest as " money paid for the use of 
money lent, or the forbearance of a debt, according to a fixed ratio", and usury as" the 
fact or practice of lending money at interest; the practice of charging excessive or illegal 
rates of interest for money on loan". In modern day usage, the word "usury" has come 
to mean an exorbitant or illegal rate of interest. 
The Islamic term "riba" is usually translated into English as "usury" or "interest". 
The word "riba" literally means "increase", "addition" or "gain", but in general it refers 
to any unjustified increase in capital for which no compensation is given. 
For many, riba refers only to the prohibited payment or receipt of interest on loan 
of money. But riba has a greater scope than this, and may invalidate any transaction 
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which involves the exchange of two or more countervalues provided certain conditions 
are met. These conditions vary among the law schools and change according to whether 
the exchange is to take place immediately or at a later date. 
The prohibition of usury has aroused controversy in Islamic literature among both 
Muslims and non-Muslims. The first area of controversy is whether the "riba" 
abolished in Islamic teachings is equivalent to the "interest" as known in non-Islamic 
economies. Other areas of controversy are connected with the types of "riba" not 
stipulated in the Quran and only mentioned in the Traditions.2 
The Quran defines clearly the meaning of riba. It says that a lender only has the 
right to the return of the principal sum, and therefore usury is the difference between 
the amount borrowed and the amount returned: 
You may return your principal, suffering no loss and causing loss to 
none.3 
Some believe that all forms of usury are forbidden, while others distinguish 
between usurious interest, which is to be condemned, and participation in the profits of 
the business, which is permitted. 
In recent years, there has been an attempt by a small majority of writers to justify 
the charging of interest. This group holds the view that the Quranic prohibition of riba 
was intended to refer only to the taking of exorbitant interest, and believes that modest 
interest charges are allowed in areas such as the finance of trade, government 
inducement to encourage savings and for loans made to finance productive investments. 
In early Islam, barter, money exchange and certain kinds of sale were all subject 
to riba and many jurists were concerned with how to prevent economic and commercial 
exchange being invalidated by the element of usury. To the jurists, the prohibition of 
riba was linked with the specific Quranic prohibition of gambling and with other illegal 
practices such as bribery, corruption and the misappropriation of the property of 
orphans. Riba therefore came to mean the illegality of all forms of gain or profit which 
were unearned as well as trading practices which were inequitable. 
The wide-ranging interpretation of the Quranic prohibition of riba has been 
followed for centuries by the consensus of Muslims and has therefore become a 
binding rule of law. Although the consensus is over the broad interpretation of the 
prohibition, within each school of law, and among scholars, there are divergent views 
on riba, and this has made the riba issue one of the most debated in Islamic law. 
In a prosperous commercial city like Mecca in the Prophet's day, the taking of 
interest appears to have been commonplace. The Meccans were involved in the import, 
export and transit of goods, and it appears that the merchants and traders were 
unwilling to leave their capital unproductive while awaiting the departure or arrival of 
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caravans. Therefore they involved themselves in loans for interest and speculative 
transactions. It was against this background that the Quran proscribed the charging of 
interest for the loan of money. 
The prohibition of usury in the Quran refers to only loan agreements, but this was 
later extended by several Prophetic Traditions to the exchange of currencies and certain 
commodities. The Quran denounces the practice of riba on four occasions, and 
distinguishes it from gains on trade. The most explicit and emphatic denunciation of 
riba occurs in the following verse: 
Those that live on usury shall rise up before Allah like men whom 
Satan has demented by his touch; for they claim that usury is like 
trading.4 But Allah has permitted trading and forbidden usury.s 
In this verse, although both usury and trade generate an "increase" in capital, the 
increase generated by trading is permissible, while that generated by usury is not. 6 The 
main difference between the two transactions is in the risk factor, and in the deemed 
balance between risk and gains in the allocation of both to the parties concerned. In 
trading, both parties share risks and gains, while in riba transactions, it is only one 
party, the borrower, who takes any risk. In addition, the seller recognises a one-time 
gain from the transaction, because once the exchange has taken place the transaction is 
over, whereas, in the case of a money loan, the creditor does not cease to demand 
interest as long as the principal is not returned. Furthermore, the amount of interest 
owed keeps on climbing with the passage of time, and if interest is compounded it will 
be the source of gain to the lender on top of his basic gain from the loan. 7 
There are several economic and moral reasons for the prohibition of riba in Islam. 
One economic reason arises from the principle of justice, which in business deals 
means the fairness of dividing both gains and losses among the parties. Islam wishes to 
establish justice between the financier and the entrepreneur. The taking of riba corrupts 
the recipient because it is a reward without any productive effort. The accumulation of 
wealth through hard work and personal activity is encouraged whereas the 
accumulation of wealth arising from riba is regarded as selfish. Another economic 
reason why riba is prohibited in Islam relates to the practice of treating "time " as 
having a price which is thus seen as a reward for deferring consumption or waiting, but 
time is neither a commodity of exchange nor exchangeable wealth. Riba, if offered as 
an incentive to saving, may result in under-consumption and could adversely affect 
economic development, and this is a further reason for its prohibition. 
The moral motive for the prohibition of riba revolves on the principle of not 
exploiting the poor through charging them interest on borrowed money. In Islam, 
where all believers are brothers and therefore ought to help one another financially as 
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well as in other ways, riba is viewed as regressive because it penalises those in need. 
The impact of interest on those who are in need of funds for urgent personal and 
social purposes is no doubt serious, and the satisfaction of this need requires sacrifice 
and integrity on the part of the lender. 8 Indeed, closely related to the concept of interest 
is the transfer of wealth through the institutions of Zakat and Sadakat. The institution of 
Zakat is a compulsory religious tax which is levied annually at the rate of 2.5 per cent 
of the total value of a person's wealth, but on certain items, such as income derived 
from agricultural production and mining activities, a higher rate is payable.Sadakat is a 
voluntary charitable contribution. Both Zakat and Sadakat are used to transfer wealth 
from the rich to the poor to fulfil one of the basic principles of Islam, the mutual 
sharing of wealth between people. Those people who have incurred debt out of need 
and are unable to repay can be assisted by the Zakat fund. 
In the following verse from the Quran, the taking of usury is contrasted with the 
obligation to pay Zakat, the latter being seen as a much more preferable thing to do: 
That which you seek to increase by usury will not be blessed by 
Allah; but the alms which you give for His sake shall be repaid to 
you many times over.9 
Despite the differing views about what constitutes riba, there seems to be general 
agreement that receipt or payment of interest is forbidden by the Quran and the Islamic 
teachings. This prohibition places heavy social and economic responsibility on the 
Islamic state or financial institution which must endeavour to ensure that all 
transactions, whether in the Islamic world or with the non-Islamic countries, comply 
with this ban. 
Quranic references to trade and commerce 
The Quran itself deals with both commercial and financial matters, and provides 
an important source of information on commercial law and practice in Mecca. It 
contains general injunctions to honour agreements and to deal fairly in all areas of trade 
and commerce. 
In one of the earliest suras, there is a call for the Quraysh tribe, to which 
Muhammed belonged, to recognise the goodness of God for the prosperity of their 
caravans: 
For the protection of Quraysh: their protection in their summer and 
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winter journeyings. Therefore let them worship the Lord of this 
House who fed them in the days of famine and shielded them from 
all perils.lO 
But even in this early period, the Prophet warned against the evils which were 
beginning to be associated with trade. No form of sin is more fiercely attacked than that 
of unfair dealing: 
Woe to the unjust who, when others measure for them , ·exact in 
full, but when they measure or weigh for others, defraud them! 11 
Although it is more than once mentioned in the Quran that trade is the most 
interesting of all pursuits, it warns against the temptation to neglect religion in favour of 
trade: 
His praise is sung by men whom neither trade nor profit can divert 
from remembering Him.I2 
When you are summoned to Friday prayers hasten to the 
remembrance of Allah and cease your trading ... when the prayers are 
ended, disperse and go in quest of Allah's bounty ... Yet no sooner 
do they see some merchandise or merriment than they flock to it 
eagerly ... Say: "That which Allah has in store is far better than any 
merchandise or merriment. "13 
The trade routes are referred to in the Quran: 
Between them (the gardens) and the cities that We have blessed, We 
placed roadside hamlets so that they could journey to and fro in 
measured stages.14 
There are also references to the animals, the ships and the aspects of nature which 
all assist the trader with his commercial activities: 
He created the beasts ... which carry your burdens to far-off lands.15 
He has subjected you to the ocean ... behold the ships ploughing their 
course through it.16 
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He set... upon the earth ... rivers, roads and landmarks, so that you 
may be rightly guided. By the stars, too, are men directed.17 
The Prophet expressly permitted trading during the pilgrimage but emphasised 
that the family and goods are not to be preferred to God and His Prophet: 
Say: "If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your 
tribes, the prope.rty you have acquired, the merchandise you fear 
may not be sold, and the house you love, are dearer to you than 
Allah, His apostle and His cause, then wait until Allah shall fulfil 
His decree. Allah does not guide the evil-doers.18 
There is nothing in the Quran about the accumulation of private property or about 
inequality in terms of wealth and possessions but the practice of hoarding, which could 
harm economic development, is condemned: 
Proclaim a woeful punishment to those that hoard up gold and silver 
and do not spend it in Allah's cause. The day shall surely come 
when their treasures shall be heated in the fire of Hell, and their 
foreheads, sides, and backs branded with them. Their tormentors 
will say to them: "These are the riches which you hoarded. Taste 
then the punishment which is your due."19 
The subject of debts is also covered in the Quran. Both creditors and debtors are 
given direct advice by the Prophet. Those advancing credit are advised to be 
understanding to debtors who get into difficulty with repayments, and to be at least 
lenient with rescheduling:20 
If your debtor be in straits, grant him a delay until he can discharge 
his debt; but if you waive the sum as alms it will be better for you, if 
you but knew it.21 
To protect their own interests, both parties are advised to record the transaction in 
writing before two witnesses: 
Believers, when you contract a debt for a fixed period, put it in 
writing. Let a scribe write it down for you in fairness ... and let the 
debtor dictate, and not diminishing the sum he owes. If the debtor 
be a feeble-minded or ignorant person, or one who cannot dictate, 
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let his guardian dictate for him in fairness. Call in two male 
witnesses from among you ... so that if either of them commit an 
error, the other will remember. Witnesses must not refuse to give 
evidence if called upon to do so.22 
Trade and commerce are also covered in the Traditions.23 Fraudulent practices and 
trade in goods regarded by religion as unclean are forbidden. Trading is not allowed in 
such things as wine, pigs, animals that have died by means other than ritual slaughter 
or in goods that are common to everyone such as grass, water and fire. Speculation in 
food, especially with a view to cornering the market, is prohibited. Above all, it is 
forbidden to sell any commodity where there is an element of uncertainty (gharar). For 
instance, sale by auction, since the seller does not know what price he will get for the 
object being sold, or any sale in which the merchandise is not precisely, numerically 
defmed although the price is expressed in definite terms.24 
From the presence of such a large number of trade terms and references in the 
Quran and in other religious and legal texts it is obvious that Islam has never been 
hostile to fair commercial practices and to economic development. Social justice in all 
aspects of life is fundamental to Islam and it appears that the prevailing principle in 
trade and commerce is not competition but cooperation. The basic tenet of Muslim 
commercial ethics is that the merchant must treat his customer like his brother. 
Religion, which for every Muslim is the main guiding force in all his dealings, adds to 
the feeling of being a member of a community and business must therefore submit to its 
control and cannot adopt an independent position with a morality of its own. 
Development of trade and banking in the Islamic world 
In most Islamic countries there has always been a close relationship between the-
merchant and the .ruler which can be traced back to the beginning of Islam and to the 
establishment of the Islamic community. 
Pre-Islamic sources speak of Mecca as a commercial town where both trade and 
banking activities were undertaken. It appears that an extensive trade was carried out 
between the merchants in Mecca and those in the Byzantine, Abyssinian and Persian 
Empires. From early times, Arabia has been a transit area between the Mediterranean 
countries and the countries in the East. The Meccans were able to increase their capital, 
which took the form of money, through the buying and selling of commodities and 
through the granting of loans at interest. The spice trade which was carried out across 
Arabia brought income to the Meccans and to the nomadic tribes capable of protecting 
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the caravans along the various sections of the trade-routes. The Arabs of the Hijaz 
derived their economic strength from the skillful management of these land caravans 
and from trade with pilgrims. 
Following the Prophet's death, Islam rapidly spread, and the Arab conquests 
created a very powerful zone of economic consumption. The growth of great urban 
centres throughout the area of Islam led to an increased demand for commodities of all 
kinds and this in tum quickened the pace of long-distance trade. 
By the tenth century, it appears that many areas of the world of Islam were totally 
integrated into a structure of distant economic exchange, both as producers and as 
consumers, and that Egypt, the Yemen, Iraq, Oman and parts of Iran possessed local 
economies dependent on the market mechanism. 
Two types of finance developed in Arabia. One type of finance was based on a 
profit- sharing partnership and the other related to lending at a fixed interest. 
Partnership refers to a contractual business relationship between two or more parties. 
One party, the entrepreneur, offers labour and skills, and another party, the investor, 
provides capital. The profit is divided according to a predetermined ratio while any 
losses are borne exclusively by the investor. This kind of arrangement was known as 
"the commenda" or "mudaraba" in Arabic. Although the commenda originated in Arabia 
before Islam, it was later approved by the Prophet and became an acceptable form of 
Islamic business practice. The legitimacy of profit in trade was never seriously 
questioned, so long as certain prohibitions were respected, by the founders of Islam, 
several of whom, starting with the Prophet himself, had been merchants.25 
Whenever a barter system is replaced by a monetary economy, a need for 
financial institutions arises. In pre-Islamic Arabia, trade, which was a prosperous 
economic activity in the Hijaz, gave rise to the need for financial institutions and led to 
the development of institutions known as "moneylenders" and "moneychangers". 
In early Islam, the pilgrimage created a need for a type of brokerage whereby 
pilgrims' monetary instruments could be, .. _ changed for local monetary means. 
Such a process would require expertise and knowledge of these monetary instruments 
and it was often the richer merchants who had made trade journeys who provided these 
moneychanging services. 
Lending was carried out by the moneylenders. The moneylenders were often 
landlords who had enough surplus cash, precious metal, or whatever the monetary 
instruments might be, to carry out moneylending activities. The practice of the 
moneylenders was to lend a sum of money at an increase to be paid with the original 
loan at the maturity date. If the loan was not paid in time, the lender often requested 
additional increases. It was this increase, or riba, that was later forbidden by Islam. 
Often the activities of moneychanging and moneylending were carried out by the same 
people. 
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In Islamic societies, Islamic laws against the practice of rib a or usury in 
moneylending created a social barrier against the profession of bankers; but the Muslim 
encouragement of merchants and trade derived its authority from the Prophet Himself 
and created a paradox. 26 There was a question of how merchants could trade without 
capital, and what was to regulate the supply of capital without interest payments. The 
question of interest charges was settled by Islamic merchants indirectly, either by 
dealings through bankers of another faith or through disguised payments of premiums. 
Although the role of the Muslim moneylender declined, the moneychanger, or 
"sarraf', continued to play an important part in the money market. The market was 
neither highly structured nor subject to any consistent and effective governmental or 
administrative controls or regulations, with all transactions being carried out on a very 
informal basis. One of the most important tasks of the moneychanger was to assess the 
exchange rate between the two main coins in circulation in the Islamic empire, the silver 
dirham and the gold dinar, whose relative values fluctuated with the prices of the metals 
of which they were made and with the demand at any given moment for a particular 
type of coin. 
As trading and commerce expanded in the Islamic world, the demand for a 
reliable and acceptable means of exchange led to the development of a more formal way 
of fmancing trade and to the emergence of credit and banking techniques. There was no 
specialisation and banking activities were closely related to commercial operations and 
were usually subsidiary to the merchant's endeavours in the more traditional aspects of 
trade such as buying, selling, importing and exporting, with the merchants often 
serving as their own bankers. 
In medieval Islam, major trading centres developed and in all the ports and cities 
of the Islamic world there were established conventions in commercial contracts. The 
caravan trade became highly organised and each port or caravan town was able to 
supply various commercial services such as brokers who were able to enter into 
contracts guaranteeing deliveries of trade goods at a future date, markets supplying 
them on the spot, and bankers who smoothed out payments through the mechanism of 
credit and bills of exchange. 27 
When a merchant did not go beyond the limits of the Muslim world or the known 
and established merchant colonies, measures were taken to restrict the carrying of 
money by making arrangements with known correspondents. The letter of credit 
arrangement was used to allow someone to have the necessary sum of money advanced 
to an associate or partner by a third party at some distant place, on a reciprocal basis, a 
procedure which implied the maintenance of regular accounts and correspondence.28 It 
was also possible to contract ordinary loans and make deposits, and private individuals 
and governments alike made wide use of promissory notes to be used for payments. 
Despite this use of banking techniques in financing trade there was still a heavy 
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reliance on the moneychangers who continued to provide exchange services on an 
informal basis which appealed to many merchants. 
The institution of the moneychanger remains in evidence today in many Middle 
Eastern countries and he continues to provide services to complement those of the 
commercial banks. The commenda, developed in pre-Islamic times and subsequently 
sanctioned by the Prophet, is now an important element of Islamic business practice. 
Emergence of Islamic banking 
Although there is no precedent in traditional Islamic society for modern banking 
institutions, there are rules of classical Islamic law which regulate financial 
transactions. But these rules, which were designed with a view to guiding the 
individual believer in carrying out his personal financial affairs in accordance with 
Islamic law and morality, do not constitute a banking law. However, certain principles, 
such as the prohibition of interest charges and the adoption of a profit-sharing model 
for lending operations, have been borrowed from the Islamic law and applied by the 
Islamic banks. 29 
The history of modern Islamic banks originated in 1963 when the Mit Ghamr 
Savings Bank was established in Egypt. The main purpose of this Islamic bank was to 
attract the untapped savings of low-income peasants and labourers and to mobilise them 
for developmental investment. The bank quickly grew and within three years the 1000 
founding depositors had been joined by 59000 more. Loans, which were generally of a 
short term duration, were used for a variety of purposes such as home improvements, 
basic machinery for the textile and handicraft industries and the purchase of farm 
animals. The loans generated welcome income for these borrowers and there is little 
doubt that the bank made a useful contribution to development.3° In 1968, the 
government closed down the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank for political reasons. 
The experience of Islamic banking in Egypt was revived in 1972 when the Nasser 
Social Bank was established. This bank is authorised to operate only under strict 
Islamic principles. It is a social welfare organisation rather than a commercial venture, 
for its basic objective is "qard hasan", an interest-free loan granted to the poor when 
faced with exceptional expenses arising from illness, weddings or funerals.31 
Later, in 1975, the Islamic Development Bank was set up which has as its main 
aims the economic development and the promotion of trade between the Islamic 
countries. Also in this year the first Islamic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, was established 
as a public shareholding company offering traditional banking services in accordance 
with Islamic laws. It was followed within a short time by many other Islamic banks and 
investment companies operating in both the East and the West (Table 4.1). Most 
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Table 4.1 
Islamic Financial Institutions• 
Institution 
AL Bar aka Bank 
AL Bar aka Bank 
AL Bar aka International 
AL Bar aka Investment and Development Co. 
AL Bar aka Islamic Bank 
AL Bar aka Islamic Investment Bank 
AL Baraka Turk Ozel Finans Kurumu 
AL Rajhi Co. for Currency Exchange and Commerce 
AL Rajhi Co. for Islamic Investments 
Amanah Bank 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 
Bahrain Islamic Investment Company 
Bank Islam Malaysia 
Beit Ettamouil Saudi Tunisi 
Dar al-~aal al·Islami 
Dar al-Maal al·Islami 
Dubai Islamic Bank 
Faisal Finans Kurumu 
Faisal Islamic Bank 
Faisal Islamic Bank 
Faisal Islamic Bank 
Faisal Islamic Bank 
Faisal Islamic Bank 
Faisal Islamic Bank 
International Islamic Bank 
Islamic Bank 
Islamic Bank International 
Islamic Bank for Western Sudan 
Islamic Banking System International Holding 
Islamic Development Bank 
Islamic Exchange and Investment Company 
Islamic Finance House 
Islamic International Bank for Investment 
and Development 
Islamic International Company for Real Estate 
Development 
Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf 
Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf 
Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf 
Islamic Investment Company 
Islamic Investment Company 
Islamic Investment Company 
Islamic Investment House 
Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment 
K1br1s Islamic Bank 
Kuwait Finance House 
Nasser Social Bank 
Ostar Islamic Bank 
Saudi - Philippine Isfamic Development Bank 
Shariah Investment Services 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 
Umma Finance Group 
• Excludes Iran and Pakistan 
Country 
Bangladesh 
Sudan 
UK 
S.Arabia 
Mauritania 
Bahrain 
Turkey 
S.Arabia 
UK 
Philippines 
Bahrain 
Bahrain 
Malaysia 
Tunisia 
Bahamas 
Switzerland 
UAE 
Turkey 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Guinea 
Niger 
Senegal 
Sudan 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
Denmark 
Sudan 
Luxembourg 
S.Arabia 
Qatar 
UK 
Egypt 
Egypt 
Egypt 
Qatar 
UAE 
Bahamas 
Switzerland 
UAE 
Jordan 
Jordan 
N.Cyprus 
Kuwait 
Egypt 
Qatar 
S.Arabia 
Switzerland 
Sudan 
Bahamas 
Source: International Association of Islamic Banks 
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Date of 
Foundation 
1982 
1983 
1982 
1985 
1984 
1984 
1965 
1980 
1982 
1979 
1981 
1983 
1984 
1980 
1980 
1975 
1984 
1977 
1984 
1984 
1984 
1977 
1983 
1983 
1983 
1983 
1978 
1975 
1980 
1982 
1981 
1981 
1982 
1979 
1979 
1977 
1981 
1978 
1982 
1977 
1972 
1983 
1982 
1980 
1983 
1987 
Islamic banks operate in a dual economic system and have to compete with "riba" 
banks. Only two states, Iran and Pakistan, have carried out a total Islamisation of their 
economic and banking systems. 
The two largest and more internationally active banks are Dar al-Maal al-Islami, 
established in 1981, and AI Baraka Development and Investment Company, formed in 
1982. Both are largely Saudi-inspired institutions and offer a wide range of banking 
services with emphasis on investment. 
Some Islamic banks are owned solely by one government, such as the Nasser 
Social Bank, or by many governments, such as the Islamic Development Bank. Others 
are owned by private individuals or other Islamic banks. However, whatever their 
ownership structure all Islamic banks share an acceptance of the Islamic law on the 
prohibition on receiving or paying a fixed rate of interest. 
Although there is no single, clear-cut definition of what constitutes an Islamic 
bank, it may be inferred from the aims and objectives of Islamic banks that an Islamic 
bank is a financial, investment, development and social institution that follows Islamic 
principles in all its operations.32 Instead of assuming the bank's traditional role of 
simple intermediary between savers and investors, the Islamic banks share with the 
depositors the risk of their common investment and share in the profits and losses. The 
Islamic banks guarantee to return the initial value of current and savings accounts, but 
on investment deposits the banks are not liable to the account holders for the principal 
of such accounts, except in cases of negligence, conscious wrongdoing or breaches of 
the agreed account conditions. Most Islamic banks have Sharia supervisory boards or 
Sharia consultants who approve their methods of operation to ensure that all financial 
transactions comply with the Sharia. 
Conclusion 
Since its introduction 25 years ago, the concept of Islamic banking has been 
viewed with a certain amount of suspicion and scepticism in conventional banking 
circles. However, the development of Islamic banking has reflected the desire of 
Muslims to deal with financial institutions whose operating methods conform to their 
basic religious belief, which prohibits interest and other business practices which are in 
conflict with the Sharia. Muslim savers and investors throughout the world have been 
attracted to these institutions. The acceptance of Islamic banks as conduits for savings, 
investment and banking services has led, in recent years, to their increased 
capitalisation and number, and this growth and diversification of services seems set to 
continue. 
Of course, the prohibition on interest payments presents considerable problems 
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for the Islamic financial institutions. But this prohibition has led these institutions to 
play a more creative and constructive role in economic development by sharing in the 
success or failure of private and public enterprise. 
The references to trade and commerce in the Quran and other religious texts 
indicates the importance of commercial life for the Muslim. The spread of Islam led to a 
vast increase in trade between nations, and the moneychanger, who helped facilitate this 
trade, still remains an important institution in some Islamic countries. Today, the 
Islamic banks and financial institutions play a vital role in the finance and development 
of trade. 
The rapid expansion of Islamic banks would appear to indicate that Islamic 
banking is now a permanent feature of the world financial scene. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE ORIGINS AND OPERATING METHODS OF 
ISLAMIC BANKS IN TURKEY 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have attempted to explain the major aspects of economic 
and monetary policy as well as the development, trends and problems of the Turkish 
financial system. The banking scene has been radically transformed since 1980 by the 
arrival of many foreign conventional banks and, in 1985, by the establishment of two 
Islamic banks or "Special Finance Houses" as they are called in Turkey. 
Since paying or receiving interest is prohibited in Islam, these finance houses are 
obliged to generate their income from fees for services, profit sharing from equity 
participation, trading in commodities and foreign exchange, the building and 
management of industrial and agricultural businesses, leasing operations and other 
transactions that involve risk and do not violate Islamic principles. Besides having to 
conduct business in an increasingly competitive market and in accordance with Islamic 
business practices, the fmance houses face an additional obstacle of how to operate in a 
secular state. 
Therefore, in order to understand the position of these finance houses, the first 
section of the chapter briefly details the changes introduced in Turkey in the 1920s 
which led to the creation of a secular state, and then deals with the role Islam plays in 
society today. These reforms had far-reaching consequences, changing the course of 
Turkish history and influencing the economic orientation of the country for the next half 
century. 
The second section of the chapter begins with an outline of Turkey's role in the 
Islamic Development Bank and then discusses the origins of Islamic banking in Turkey 
and details some of the rules and regulations governing the establishment and 
operations of the finance houses. 
The third section deals with the investment of funds using the Islamic financial 
instruments of Murabaha, Musharaka, Mudaraba and Ijara. 
The final section covers the types of account and the range of services offered to 
the client. 
Islam and secularism 
The term "secularist" applies to any view that would openly follow an ideology 
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other than Islam in most areas of public life. It is perhaps somewhat misleading to 
speak of secularism as "separation" of religion from public life since secularist 
governments both support and control religious teaching and institutions to a 
considerable extent.! Essentially, secularism has meant state control of religion and 
state effort to use religion in the service of its nationalist and developmental goals. 
The basic conflict in secularism is often between the forces of tradition, which 
tend to promote the domination of religion and sacred law, and the forces of change.2 
In a society governed by a tradition which carries the sanction of the dominant religion, 
as in the case of Turkey, secularisation inevitably involved a major upheaval. In Turkey 
during the 1920s, the tradition which was challenged by the forces of Western 
civilisation and development was Islam. In Islam, there are no concepts of "mosque" 
and "state" as specifically religious and political institutions. Religion and state are 
believed to be fused together, the state is conceived as the embodiment of religion, and 
religion as the essence of the state.3 
For over a millennium, the Turkish speaking peoples and Turks of Anatolia have 
had distinguished and important roles in Islamic history, but in the twentieth century the 
position of Turkey within the Islamic world has undergone fundamental changes, 
caused mainly by the break up of the Ottoman Empire and defeat in the First World 
War. 
Perhaps the greatest change occurred in 1928 when Turkey decided to follow a 
path of complete secularisation, a move almost unique in the Islamic world.4 Even 
today, the government seeks to "separate" religion from politics and other areas of 
public life despite the fact that 99 per cent of Turkey's population is Muslim. Indeed, 
the Constitution of 1982 makes no mention of Islam. Under the heading 
"Characteristics of the Republic", Article 2 states, 
"The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State 
governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public 
peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal 
to the nationalism of Atatiirk, and based on the fundamental tenets 
set forth in the Preamble." 
A part of this preamble states, 
" ... there shall be no interference whatsoever of sacred religious 
feelings in state affairs and politics." 
The Constitution contains other references to religion. Article 24, which deals 
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with religious freedom, makes clear that religion must be kept separate from other 
matters, 
"No-one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious 
feelings, or things held sacred by religion, for the purpose of 
personal or political influence, or even for partially basing the 
fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the State 
on religious tenets." 
Propaganda against the principles of secularism was prohibited by Article 163 of the 
Penal Code adopted in 1926. 
The main reason for the secularisation of Turkey arose from the concern for 
"progress" and national strength. Mustafa Kemal Atattirk, the founder of the Turkish 
Republic, believed that this could only be achieved by following an essentially Western 
model. He officially opted for Europe, or as he preferred to call it, "civilisation", and 
any suggestion that Turkey was not part of Europe was thereafter resented.s 
In an effort to achieve this aim Islam was disestablished, European laws and 
customs were introduced and the Arabic script was replaced by the Latin alphabet. 
Religious institutions such as the Sultanate and the Caliphate which had been an integral 
part of the Ottoman Empire, together with the religious orders, religious schools and 
the religious legal system were all abolished. 
The main consequences for religion in Turkey of the reforms were to break the power 
of institutional Islam completely, and make it directly subject to the secular authorities. 
Atatlirk and his followers emphasised the technology, science and humanism of 
the West, not its Christianity, and ceased to think of a world divided into Muslim and 
infidel. 6 These reformers took nationalism as a substitute for Islam and attempted to 
adopt territorial and linguistic rather than religious nationalism. They thus transformed 
the message of Atattirk into an official ideology. 
However, for the Muslim, in theory, the political loyalty is to the religious 
community of the faithful, the "umma", within which all men are brothers, regardless 
of language, customs, loyalty, ethnic origin or political affiliation.7 Nationalism, 
therefore, would appear to involve a theoretical conflict with Islam and for many the 
official ideology of Kemalism which comprised such principles as republicanism, 
nationalism, popularism, secularism, etatism and reformism could not be a substitute.s 
Since Atatlirk, various governments have made concessions to Islam and in recent 
years the visibility of Islam among the educated appears to have intensified. Several 
factors lie behind these changes. The first is that since 1960 the Westernised elite of 
Turkish society has felt able to co-exist with Islam, and a religious political party,9 
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which has called for a more Islamic way of life, has been allowed to operate. The 
second element which has enabled greater openness in Islam was the re-introduction of 
vocational education of the clergy after 1965, which was later followed by an 
expansion of school religious education. About ten per cent of all secondary education 
and over forty per cent of the highest grade secondary education is conducted in Islamic 
religious schools. The third factor which lies behind the increasing visibility of Islam 
has been the developments in the Middle East. This was not confined solely to the 
developments in Iran, but extended to the Arab oil exporting countries which have been 
fmancing religious activity within Turkey. 
Although the influence of Islam remains especially strong in the rural areas which 
were less affected by the secular reforms there is now increasingly visible evidence of 
Islam in Turkish urban life, among all classes of society. The vast rise in the number of 
European tourists visiting Turkey can only accelerate the spread of Western life-styles 
and habits. As a result of this tourist influx modem Western values are competing with 
Islamic mores. 
Recently, the army has expressed concern at the influence of the "radical" Turkish 
outlook, or "irtica", and the president has even equated the dangers represented by 
Marxism and Islam to the secular traditions of Turkey.lO The president's views seem to 
contradict those held by the prime minister and many of his associates who support 
moderate Islamic traditionalism and thus the re-emergence of Islam in Turkey. 
Turkey does play an active role in both Western and Islamic organisations. It is a 
member of such institutions as NATO, the OECD and the Council of Europe and has 
recently applied for full membership of the EEC . However, to many in Europe, 
Turkey's "European" credentials remain open to question. They cite such features of 
Turkish life such as Islamic dress, the public role of the army, the cult of the founder of 
the Republic and the deep hold of religion on rural society which they believe would 
make economic and political integration extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve. 11 
The prime minister himself certainly appears to hold a somewhat ambivalent 
attitude towards Europe and one faction within the ruling party has been openly critical 
of Turkey's application to join the EEC. This faction would prefer to see Turkey 
playing a greater role in the economic and political organisations of the Islamic world. 
Some have even criticised the monetary authorities for what they perceive as their 
pro-Western attitude in their dealings with the country's creditors. 
Turkey has good relations with most Middle Eastern countries and is a member of 
the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the Islamic Development Bank, despite its 
secular status. Turkey is under some pressure from Islamic states of the region to relax 
further its secular traditions. To emphasise his attachment to Islam, and, some would 
say, to gain the votes of millions of devout Muslims at the coming local elections and to 
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pre-empt the growing challenge to his leadership from the Islamic faction of the party, 
the prime minister made the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in July 1988. He was the first 
prime minister in modem times to do so while in office. 
The transformation of Turkey from a traditional to a secular state has involved 
great religious, political, economic and social changes. Some believe that Turkey has 
only managed to develop a modem economy because it has followed the path of 
secularism. However, others would argue that the social and cultural upheavals which 
resulted from the secularist policies have been too high a price to pay and believe that a 
similar stage of development would have been achieved by an open adherence to 
Islamic ideas and principles. The appearance of Islamic dress in the cities would appear 
to challenge the widely held assumption that as Turkey became more industrial, urban 
and modem, it would also be more secular and Western in its cultural attitudes. 
The question of the role of Islam in Turkey arouses intense political debate and is 
potentially a very divisive issue, and a real divide persists between Westemised Turks 
who have chosen Europe and traditional Turks who still consider themselves as part of 
the Islamic world. 
0 rigins oJf .n:snamic lbanlking irn 'furkey 
Despite being a predominantly Muslim country, the concept of Islamic banking is 
a relatively recent phenomenon in Turkey. While not wishing to see Islamisation of the 
banking system, the authorities recognised that many believers were unhappy with the 
kind of banking facilities offered by the riba commercial banks. There also seems to 
have been external influences and pressures exerted on the authorities to permit the 
establishment of Islamic banks. Following his election in 1983, the prime minister 
pledged specific legislation to allow the entry of Islamic banks into Turkey's financial 
system in an effort to expand and improve economic relations between Turkey and the 
Islamic countries, particularly those in the Middle East. It appears that certain member 
states within the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB) had been pressing Turkey to allow Islamic banks to operate alongside the riba 
banks. Ozal clearly believed that the individual should have a choice of where to bank 
and to his supporters, many of whom are religious, the setting up of Islamic banks 
seemed to be a way of acknowledging their electoral support. However, the 
establishment of the Islamic banks in Turkey was not without controversy and the 
decision to allow their opening was criticised by both the conventional bankers and the 
secularists. 
As mentioned earlier, Turkey already had financial and economic ties with the 
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Islamic world through its membership of the IDB which it joined in 1974. One of the 
main aims of the IDB, stated in its foundation agreement, is that "the bank, based on a 
philosophy of Sharia, aims to strengthen economic development and social 
improvement among Islamic countries." 
Since 1980, Turkey's ties with this bank have been strengthened and Turkey is 
now the fifth largest shareholder, 12 and the largest beneficiary of credit. The (hal 
family are heavily involved with this bank. The prime minister's brother, Korkut, who 
was previously a <:Urector of the Islamic Research and Training Institute, one of the 
main subdivisions of the IDB, is now one of eleven executive directors of the bank. 
This board position was vacated by the prime minister's other brother, Yusuf Bozkurt, 
who is now Minister of State for Economic Affairs. 
Within Turkey, the IDB has an exalted status. Law number 3259 of 11 December 
1986 exempts the IDB from all taxes, duties and fees arising from its assets, incomes, 
profits and share dividends on business transacted in Turkey. It is worth mentioning 
that the IDB holds a 13 per cent stake in one of the two Islamic banks operating in 
Turkey, namely AI Baraka Tiirk Ozel Finans Kurumu. This is the only Islamic bank in 
which the IDB has a shareholding. 
There are strict and detailed rules governing the operations of Islamic banks, or 
"Special Finance Houses" in Turkey, issued by the Council of Ministers, the 
Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade and the Central Bank. Nowhere are 
the words "Islam" or "Sharia" mentioned and this would appear to indicate an attempt 
by the authorities to avoid an open conflict with the aims and principles contained in the 
secular constitution. These rules detail the functions, objectives, management structures 
and capital provisions of the finance houses. 
In the Banks Act, which governs the activities and operations of the conventional 
banks, Article 96 states that the finance houses are not subject to the banking laws 
contained in this Act. It states that the finance houses are regulated by the Council of 
Ministers. 
The decision to allow Islamic banks to operate in Turkey was contained in Decree 
number 83n506 of 16 December 1983 and published in the Official Gazette number 
18256 dated 19 December 1983. This decree was issued by the Council of Ministers 
shortly after the Ozal administration had taken office. It contains 17 articles and deals 
with "the methods and procedures of the founding of the Special Finance Houses, their 
activities and liquidation, under the Protection of the Exchange Value of the Turkish 
Currency Law number 1567 and Decree number 70 regarding banks." 
More comprehensive rules and regulations were formulated by the 
Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade and published in the Official 
Gazette number 18323 of 25 February 1984. There are 35 articles covering "the 
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founding structure, operation and liquidation of the Special Finance Houses". Article 3 
states that the minimum amount of capital needed to set up a finance house is TL 5 
billion and that there must be at least a hundred shareholders. Foreign shareholders are 
required to bring in their capital in foreign exchange. Other regulations stipulate that 
each share certificate shall have a nominal value of TL 100,000 and that the board of 
directors shall consist of seven members. Articles 15 to 24 deal with the two types of 
account that the finance houses may offer to the public: "Current Accounts" and 
"Participation Accounts" (deposit accounts). These articles describe the operating 
methods which the finance houses should follow in administering these accounts and 
give~ examples of how the profits and losses should be calculated. 
The Central Bank of Turkey has also issued rules governing the finance houses. 
These appear in the Official Gazette number 18348 dated 21 March 1984. In all there 
are 18 articles which stipulate "the requirements for the application and issue of licences 
to establish and commence business by the Special Finance Houses", and they give a 
general outline of some of their activities. 
Permission to set up a finance house needs to be obtained from both the Central 
Bank and the Council of Ministers. It appears that the Central Bank firstly scrutinises 
the application and then recommends approval or rejection to the Council of Ministers 
which ultimately issues the operating licence. 
The Central Bank fixes the reserve and liquidity ratios which, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, differ from those of the riba commercial banks. At the present time, a total 
of 10 per cent of all funds collected in current accounts and 1 per cent of funds 
accumulated in profit and loss sharing accounts must be deposited with the Central 
Bank, on which no interest is paid.The finance houses themselves must keep an 
additional 10 per cent of the value of their current accounts in cash. The Central Bank is 
also responsible for the audit of all the accounts and operations of the fmance houses. 
So far two Islamic banks have been established in Turkey. One is called AI 
Baraka Tiirk Ozel Finans Kurumu (Turkish Special Finance House or Institution) with 
the majority shareholder being AI Baraka Investment and Development Corporation, 
Jeddah whose chairman is Sheikh Saleh Kamel. The other is Faisal Finans Kurumu 
whose main shareholder is Prince Muhammed Faisal al-Saud's Dar al-Maal al-Islami 
group. Although largely set up with foreign capital, these finance houses consider 
. themselves to be Turkish banks. However, it appears that like the foreign conventional 
banks they will be limited to only six branches. Each new branch requires permission 
from the authorities and an increase in capital. The extra capital requirements are not 
detailed in the decree or in the other articles butit is known that there is a capital 
requirement of TL 2.5 billion for each full service branch and TL 1 billion for each 
limited service branch. 
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The fmance houses began with a capital of TL 5 billion but this figure has steadily 
been increased to allow the opening of branches. The names of the founding 
shareholders and their contribution to capital are shown in Table 5.1. Both now have an 
authorised capital of TL 10 billion. AI Baraka Tiirk's paid-up capital at the end of June 
1988 was TL 8.75 billion and that of Faisal Finans TL 9.88 billion, and both finance 
houses expect their capital to be fully subscribed by the end of 1988. 
Although it is not possible to give the names of the Turkish shareholders, it is 
known that several former politicians own shares in both finance houses. Yusuf 
Bozkurt Ozal, for example, is a founding member of AI Baraka Tiirk. Two members of 
the now dissolved Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party), Salih Ozcan and 
Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, are founding members of Faisal Finans and both are on the board 
of directors of this finance house. 
Initially, the two finance houses had only the minimum 100 shareholders, as any 
number in excess of this would have led to the affairs of the houses coming under the 
scrutiny of the Capital Market Board, and full disclosure of the shareholders was 
something that both finance houses seemed keen to avoid. However, in 1988, AI 
Baraka Tiirk decided to permit an increase in its number of shareholders and to become 
a public company, subject to the rules and regulations of the Capital Market Board. One 
of the main benefits of becoming a publicly quoted company will be a sharp reduction 
in capital gains and profits tax from around 46 per cent to 30 per cent. As no siG;es 
have yet been traded in the istanbul Stock Exchange, it is not possible to give a current 
share price value. 
AI Baraka Tiirk received its official permit to operate on 21 January 1985 and 
opened to the public on 18 February 1985. Faisal Finans was given a licence on 23 
January 1985 and opened its office on 2 April 1985. Both finance houses have their 
headquarters in istanbul. 
AI Baraka Trirk opened limited service branches in Ankara on 10 September 
1987, in izmir on 6 June 1988 and in Bursa on 15 June 1988. It plans to open another 
branch in the central banking district of istanbul before the end of 1988 and to move its 
head office from its present leasehold premises to a freehold building a short distance 
away. 
Faisal Finans opened a limited service branch in Ankara on 15 December 1987, in 
izmir on 17 December 1987, in Konya on 18 April 1988 and in Bursa on 30 May 
1988. 
These limited service branches are only authorised to collect funds and to conduct 
a very restricted service, with all investment decisions being made in istanbul. Both 
finance houses expect to open their sixth and fmal branch during 1989. 
In order to compensate for their lack of branches, the finance houses have deposit 
collecting agreements with conventional banks, enabling them to attract funds from 
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Table 5.1 
Shareholders and Percentage Distribution of Capital in 
AL Baraka TUrk Ozel Finans Kurumu and Faisal Finans Kurumu 
Founding Shareholders 
TL million Percentage 
AL Baraka Turk 
1. AL Baraka Investment and 
Development Corporation, Jeddah 2,500 50 
2. Islamic Development Bank 650 13 
3. Dubai Islamic Bank 100 2 
4. Qatar Islamic Bank 50 1 
5. Bahrain Islamic Bank 50 
6. Bahrain Islamic Investment Company 25 0.5 
7. Jordan Islamic Bank 25 0.5 
8. Others 1,600 32 
5,000 100 
Faisal Finans 
1. Muhammad Faisal al- Saud 50 
2. Dar al-Maal al-Islami Trust 2,550 51 
3. Faisal Islamic Bank, Egypt 1,250 25 
4. Faisal Islamic Bank, Sudan 400 8 
5. Masraf Faisal al-Islami, Bahrain 250 5 
6. Others 500 10 
5,000 100 
Source: AL Baraka Turk Ozel Finans Kurumu and Faisal Finans 
Kurumu Annual Reports 
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throughout Turkey. Faisal Finans uses Vaklflar Bankas1,13 a state bank with 278 
branches, and AI Baraka Ttirk uses Vaklflar Bankas1, Ttirk Ticaret Bankas1, a private 
bank with 407 branches, and the PTT's14 postal cheque service. Both finance houses 
have extensive networks of correspondent banks in most parts of the world, and 
whenever possible they prefer to use the services of other Islamic banks to those of 
conventional banks. 
The establishment of the finance houses brought considerable media coverage, 
not all of it positive. It appears that some newspaper articles were more interested in 
discussing the political, religious and financial affairs of some of the leading Turkish 
shareholders than in explaining to the public the aims and operating methods of Islamic 
banking. These articles also stressed the "Saudi connection" which gave some of the 
initial depositors the confidence to invest their funds. Some apparently believed that the 
backing of the finance houses by two leading Saudi businessmen would lead to high 
and guaranteed returns. 
In view of the constraints imposed by the constitution, the fmance houses found it 
difficult to publicise their activities. The content of all advertisements is strictly 
regulated and monitored by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade 
which issued detailed guidelines on 22 Apri11986 covering "the principles, terms and 
conditions to be adhered to by the special finance houses in their publicity and 
advertisements." All media advertisements must avoid the use of the words "Islam" or 
"Sharia", and, in an attempt to get their message across the finance houses use the 
phrase "interest-free" and hope that the public will associate this with Islamic banking. 
Most advertisements appear in right-of-centre newspapers and magazines and during 
Muslim religious feasts such as Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Haj there are brief television 
commercials. In the cities where the fmance houses operate, there also advertising signs 
along certain main routes. 
Types of Islamic investment 
The finance houses in Turkey have the right to conduct a complete range of 
conventional banking services, as well as being allowed to provide specifically Islamic 
transactions such as Murabaha, Musharaka, Mudarada and Ijara. These four types of 
Islamic investment are described below. 
Murabaha, or bai maujjal, is a short term method of finance whose method of 
operation is directly related to the documentary letter of credit. It refers to a sale under 
which the price of the item involved is payable on a deferred basis either in a lump sum 
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or in instalments. Under this method of financing,_ the bank purchases the assets on 
behalf of the client, adds a mark-up to the purchase price and sells it to the client. 
Although this method of finance is in conformity with the Sharia because it 
involves a sale contract and avoids any dealing with interest, it has been criticised by 
some Islamic lawyers and economists who believe that the mark-up determined by the 
bank is simply a replacement for interest. However, the banks themselves believe that 
the risks involved in these transactions justify the profit. There is a risk during the 
purchase transaction which could involve such things as physicallosses,unacceptable 
quality or late delivery which lies entirely with the bank, and there is also a risk during 
the collection of the debt from the client, for according to the Sharia, the bank's 
agreement to buy and the execution of the purchase do not impose a legal obligation on 
the customer to buy.15 
The banks undertake all proceedings prior to the purchase to try to ensure the best 
purchase offer. This benefits the client who is freed from a great deal of paperwork 
which he would have to have carried out himself if he had relied on fixed-interest 
finance. 
The mark-up by the banks is variable and depends on such factors as the 
profitability of the commodity and the amount of work involved in the processing of the 
transaction. Generally speaking, imported goods have higher mark-ups than locally 
purchased goods and the higher the profitability of a commodity the higher the 
mark-up. 
The banks do not accept an advance on the purchase but for most clients they do 
require collateral or some other form of guarantee, such as promissory notes. In 
murabaha the bank has title to the goods but seldom handles them physically. The title 
remains with the bank until the client has paid off the debt. Unless the goods are not at 
the required specifications or if there is a significant delay in delivery the client is 
responsible for the acquisition and payment of the goods. In case the client refuses to 
accept the goods without sufficient good reason then the bank has the right to sell them 
in the open market, deduct its dues from the proceeds and refer to the client with the 
difference. 
In Turkey, there is a considerable demand for murabaha finance and to date the 
bulk of all business carried out by the finance houses has been in this field. This would 
seem to indicate that this method of finance is cheaper than trade finance offered by the 
riba banks. 
Musharaka means a profit-sharing joint venture between the bank and the client, a 
"partner", where both contribute capital assets as well as technical and managerial 
expertise in varying proportions, and the client manages the business. It is generally 
used to finance medium and long term projects, though it could also be used in short 
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term operations. The bank does not interfere in the arrangement, but retains the right to 
inspect business operations and to audit the accounts. In effect, the role of the bank is 
that of sleeping partner. 
The realised profit is shared in a ratio agreed upon in advance. The client is 
entitled to a proportion of the actual realised profit for expenses, labour and effort and 
the remaining profit is divided between the bank and the client according to the capital 
contribution ratio. In case of a loss, the Sharia dictates that the loss distribution is 
identical to the capital distribution ratio without any modification. 
The portion of profit that is given to the client for management is not a fixed 
percentage and varies from one musharaka to another and depends upon the amount of 
work involved and the skills required of the client. In most cases, the greater the 
amount of work and the higher the level of expertise, the higher the percentage. 
The proportion of capital supplied by the bank in relation to that supplied by the 
partner varies and depends upon the business history and competence of the client. The 
client with a long and successful business record is expected to contribute less capital 
than that of a client with a short business history. 
The Sharia allows the bank to ask for guarantees and collateral from the client, not 
in the capacity of the client as a participating partner but as a manager of the project, in 
order to assure the bank of honest and efficient management.16 The success of the 
musharaka, therefore, depends on the ability of the bank to choose appropriate clients, 
make a realistic feasibility study of the project and to follow up the progress of the 
project by periodic audit. 
One of the main advantages of musharaka is that the bank participates in the 
success or failure of a business and if expectations of the sale of the commodities or the 
manufactured goods are not fulfilled and more time is needed the bank does not 
pressurise the client on account of added costs. Under conventional riba financing 
methods, the client would probably be required to refinance the operations and to pay 
back all bank loans. In musharaka transactions, the Islamic bank helps in the success of 
the project by exchanging advice with the client about such matters as current market 
prices of the goods and about the timing of a sale of the products. 
In 1987, musharaka projects accounted for only about 5 per cent of total 
placements by the Turkish finance houses but this percentage is increasing steadily. 
Mudaraba, which suits medium and long term operations, is very similar to 
musharaka except that here the client, or partner, does not participate with capital in the 
joint venture. The practice of mudaraba existed in pre-Islamic times and was later 
approved by the Prophet. In mudaraba, the bank provides all the capital and the 
entrepreneurial client provides his work and expertise. 
The profit from mudaraba is divided according to pre-determined proportions, 
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and once again the client's share of the profit depends upon the amount of work 
involved and the level of expertise. Accumulated profits may be distributed during the 
mudaraba or at the end of the contract. Any loss is borne entirely by the bank, but if the 
entrepreneur is negligent, the original sum would have to be repaid to the bank. 
No fixed rate of profit can be guaranteed or specified in advance. Furthermore, 
the customer cannot guarantee the return of the original sum to the bank because the 
financial transaction would then be classified as a loan from the bank to the client. 
Mudaraba is an important instrument in Islamic banking because it is a mechanism 
for economic development in which monetary assets are introduced into the production 
process in order to transform them into real factors of production. As a result, both the 
owner of the assets and the entrepreneur who contributes his labour and managerial 
effort share the outcome of the process. Obviously, the bank will only participate in a 
mudaraba contract if it is satisfied about the client's business history, conduct and 
expertise which are essential requisites for undertaking these operations. However, the 
mudaraba contract does offer an opportunity for collective investment to those who lack 
managerial and technical skills, or the ability to take risks due to the small size of their 
savings. 
Although neither finance house in Turkey has yet arranged any mudaraba 
contracts, it is the hope of both finance houses that such contracts will be set up in the 
near future once suitable clients and projects have been identified. 
Unlike the conventional banks operating in Turkey which cannot offer leasing 
facilities, the finance houses are permitted to engage in leasing transactions. The rules 
and regulations concerning leasing are contained in Law number 3226 dated 10 June 
1985 which was published in the Official Gazette number 18795 of 28 June 1985 and 
number 18882 of 28 September 1985. In all there are 64 articles which deal with the 
financial, legal and administrative matters of leasing. The operations of the leasing 
companies are under the control of the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade. 
Article 3 of the law requires a financial leasing company to have a paid-up capital of at 
least TL 1 billion, a capital sum which must also be met by the finance houses. 
Leasing, or Ijara, is accepted by the Sharia and may take the form of finance 
leasing or operating leasing. It is a medium or long term source of finance available to 
the entrepreneur. In finance leasing the bank (lessor) purchases a capital asset and 
leases it to the beneficiary (lessee) in return for the payment of specified rentals over a 
certain period. The payments are expected to help the lessor recover the cost of the asset 
plus a reasonable return.l7 The operating lease is based on profit-sharing in which the 
bank buys the capital asset and leases it to the client for a limited period of time, at the 
end of which the client will make a final repayment and obtain ownership of the goods 
in question. 
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For the bank, leasing has the advantage of being less risky than other types of 
fmance in that it offers a reasonable profit without having to follow the financial records 
of the entrepreneur. In Turkey, the lessor is obliged to insure the goods for the duration 
of the leasing period. 
Although leasing has been criticised as not conforming to the Sharia since rentals 
are determined in advance and there is no concept of profit and loss sharing, most 
Islamic banks find this method an acceptable form of business transaction. The Islamic 
banks point out that since leasing does not involve interest because its outcome is either 
a sale-purchase type of transaction or a rent transaction it conforms to Islamic 
principles. Of the two finance houses, only AI Baraka Turk has so far arranged any 
leasing transactions. 
Types of accounts and other customer services 
The banking services offered by the Islamic banks, including those operating in 
Turkey, are generally similar to those of the conventional banks except for the granting 
of loans or the acceptance of deposits at fixed or varying rates of interest. Unlike the 
riba banks in Turkey, the finance houses may, as already stated, offer leasing facilities, 
and may also carry out commodity trading. 
The finance houses offer three types of account: Current, Participation and 
Special Investment. The characteristics and operation of these accounts are described 
below. 
Current accounts are payable on demand. They are accepted in Turkish lira or in 
foreign currency, either US dollars or Deutsch Marks. These accounts are operated and 
recorded separately from all other accounts and the finance houses are also required to 
keep funds in local and foreign currency separate. The regulations governing the 
operation of the finance houses stipulate that the finance house must keep 10 per cent of 
funds accumulated in these accaLL_ids in cash and deposit a further 10 per cent with the 
Central Bank. Of the remaining 80 per cent, the regulations state that 40 per cent can be 
placed for a maximum term of one year and the other 40 per cent for a minimum of one 
year. Eighty per cent of these placed funds must consist of fixed obligations to be 
repaid on maturity. The other 20 per cent may be used for profit and loss participation 
investments. 
The finance houses have fixed a minimum opening balance of TL 50,000, or 
foreign currency equivalent, and subject to satisfactory operation of the account in the 
first few months, the client receives a cheque-book. Current account services are 
offered to the client free of charge and no interest or profit is paid to the depositors on 
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these accounts. 
The finance houses also accept deposits in the form of Participation, or Profit and 
Loss Sharing accounts, and invest the deposited funds on behalf of the depositors in 
economic sectors or projects whose operations conform to Islamic principles. These 
accounts can be opened by individuals or businesses who wish to share in the finance 
houses' profits (or losses) for periods of 90 days, 180 days, 360 days or longer. The 
accounts may be held in lira or foreign currency and there is a minimum opening 
balance ofTL 100,000 or equivalent in foreign currency. By far the most popular term 
is 90 days. The finance houses must deposit 1 per cent of all funds collected in these 
accounts with the Central Bank. The Bank pays no interest on either local currency or 
foreign currency funds. 
Although the regulations state that the funds in each group should be administered 
separately, in practice this is not done. The finance houses claim that such a separation 
would make the operations of the fund less economic and more complicated to 
administer. Some Islamic banks, however, do maintain separate pools and usually 
allocate a higher percentage of profit to the investment account if the deposit period is 
longer. 
In Turkey, the funds deposited in lira are placed in one pool, and those in foreign 
currency into another pool. According to the regulations, the finance houses should 
calculate a "unit value" for each pool. This "unit value", which was set at 100 on the 
day the finance houses began to collect funds, is a weighted figure and should be 
announced weekly. It is determined by dividing the total value of assets in each pool of 
profit and loss sharing accounts by the total "account value" of the preceding day, if 
any profit and loss has been recorded. The "account value" is calculated by dividing the 
amount deposited by the investor by the "unit value" prevailing on the day the account 
is opened, and when multiplied together these two figures give the lira or foreign 
currency value of the investment. Examples of the operating procedures are given in 
Table 5.2. 
Al Baraka Tiirk publishes the "unit value" of its lira and foreign currency accounts 
every Tuesday in the right-of-centre newspapers TercUman and Tiirkiye. Faisal Finans 
does not regularly publish its figures in the media, but they are available, on demand, 
from any of its branches. 
At the present time each finance house takes 20 per cent of all profit received on 
all profit and loss investment placements as expenses and the remaining 80 per cent is 
credited to the accounts of the investors. As in the case of the interest rates paid to 
depositors by the riba banks, the profits paid to the investors by the finance houses are 
subject to a 10.4 per cent withholding and defence tax. The tax authorities make no 
distinction between deposit interest and participation account profits. All accounts not 
closed within five working days of maturity are automatically renewed for a similar 
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Table ').2 
Procedures 
A,B,and C deposit 
a total of TLlO.O million. 
The fund profl ts 
TL 6.25 •illion. 201' is 
credited to the House 
(TL1.25al 8~ is credited 
to the accounts or the 
account holders(TL5.0al) 
D deposits TL 3.0 million. 
The fund profits TLJ.O 
million. 2~ is credited 
to the House (TL600,000) 
8~ is credited to the 
accounts of the account 
holders (TL2.4m) 
C withdraws 
TL2.04 •1111on. 
Houae loses TL675,000. 
2~ ia met by the House 
(TL135,000) ~ is debited 
to the accounts or the 
account holders (TL540,000l 
TOTAL 
An example shoving the operations or Profit and Loss 
Participation Accounts 
Total Deposits l•l Post t1on 
Assets or of 
(000 TL) Withdravaisl-1 Individual 
(000 TLI Accounts 
(OOOTL) 
A. 1,0001•1 A. 1,000 
B. 4,950(•1 B. 4,950 
c. 4,050(+) c. 4,050 
!2.t.Q22 10,000(•1 10,000 
A. 1,000 
B. 4,950 
c. 4,050 
15,000 10,000 
A. 1,000 
B. 4,950 
c. 4.050 
D.3,000(+) D. 3,000 
18,000 3,000(+) 13,000 
A. 1,000 
B. 4,950 
c. 4,050 
D. 3,000 
20,400 13,000 
A. A. 1,000 
B. B. 4,950 
c. 2,040(-) c. 2,010 
D. D. 3,000 
18,360 2,040(-) 10,960 
A. 1,000 
B. 4,950 
c. 2,010 
D. 3,000 
17,820 10,960 
Under-secretariat of the Treasury and Foreill:n Trade published in the Official Gazette 
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Account Unit Unit 
Value Value Account 
(ratio) (vei~~:ht) Value 
(000 TLl 
10.0 100 1,000 
49.5 100 4,950 
40.5 100 4,050 
!22.& !22 10,000 
10.0 150 1,')00 
49.5 150 7,425 
40.5 150 6,075 
!22.& ~ 15,000 
10.0 150 1,500 
49.5 150 7,425 
40.5 150 6,075 
20.0 150 3,000 
~ ~ !.!!..!..2QQ 
10.0 170 1,700 
49.5 170 8,415 
40.5 170 6,885 
20.0 170 3,400 
~ !1Q 20,400 
10.0 • 170 1,700 
49.5 170 8,415 
28.5 170 4,845 
20.0 170 3,400 
!2!!.:-Q 0! 18,360 
10.0 165 1,650 
49.5 165 8,167-50 
28.5 165 4, 702-50 
20.0 165 3,300 
108.0 165 17,820 
n...t>er 18323 or 25 FebM1U7 1984 
term. Money may be withdrawn from these accounts prior to the due date by giving 30 
days notice. If the fund is in profit the account holder is entitled to receive the principal 
only, in cases where the fund shows a loss the depositor is obliged to share in the 
losses, which are deducted from the original investment. 
In the rules covering the operations of the finance houses the maximum profit (or 
loss) share for the houses is fixed at 20 per cent and both are seeking Central Bank 
approval to lower this figure to 15 per cent. Such a move would enable the finance 
houses to offer a greater return to the investor and allow the fmance houses to compete 
more effectively with the riba banks whose deposit rates were raised by the Central 
Bank in February 1988. 
Al Baraka Tiirk also operates a Special Investment account. This facility was set 
up in May 1987 and offers investors with a minimum of TL 60 million a higher return. 
The investor receives 90 per cent of all profit and AI Baraka Turk takes 10 per cent as 
management expenses. Funds may be placed for 180 days, 360 days or longer. 
Unlike funds placed at the conventional banks which are insured, the funds held 
in Current Accounts, Participation Accounts and Special Investment Accounts at the 
finance houses are not covered by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. 
In common with most Islamic banks, the finance houses offer services such as 
domestic and international transfers, the collection of bills of exchange, letters of credit, 
travellers' cheques, the purchase and sale of foreign currency in the spot market and 
trustee services. These services are essential for the bank's clients and as they are 
offered for a fee they help to reduce the bank's overhead expenses, and thus increase its 
profits. 
Islamic banks may also offer funds to charities and maintain a "qard hasan" or 
social purpose fund to help the needy. They may also provide facilities for the 
acceptance of Zakat from individuals or organisations and arrange the distribution of 
such funds on their behalf in accordance with the Sharia. However, the finance houses 
in Turkey have so far not provided any individual with a "qard hasan" and neither has a 
Zakat collection and distribution facility. Both have, however, made charitable 
donations and Faisal Finans assists with the payment of certain higher education fees 
for several hundred students. 
Although Islamic banking methods of operating are not uniform, all Islamic banks 
adhere to Islamic principles and seek approval from their own religious supervisory 
boards or advisers attesting that their banking methods and services are in accordance 
with Islam. AI Baraka Tiirk retains the services of a Sharia adviser and Faisal Finans 
has a board of three religious advisers. 
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Col!lldusnol!ll 
Despite Turkey's secular constitution, the government has supported the 
movement of Islamic banking and this support is manifested in the fact that a number of 
founders and members of the boards of directors of the two finance houses have 
occupied, or still occupy, important political positions. 
The introduction of Islamic instruments of finance and the expansion of the 
branch network and the fund collection services offered by certain non-Islamic banks 
now gives the committed Muslim a chance to use his savings profitably and in 
accordance with Islamic business practices. 
By offering a high standard of service and by diversifying their range of products 
currently on offer to the client both finance houses expect to see a substantial increase in 
business over the next few years. 
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CHAPTER6 
Introduction 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SPECIAL 
FINANCE HOUSES 
An assessment of the performance of the two finance houses offers an indication 
of their potential in the future. An analysis of the financial statements is made for the 
purpose of assessing and comparing the financial positions and results of operations of 
the finance houses. However, this task is complicated by the fact that uniformity of 
accounting policies is necessary for meaningful assessment and comparison of the 
financial data. Although both finance houses comply with the reporting regulations set 
by the Central Bank their annual reports do not always appear to give a true and full 
picture of their activities in Turkey, and direct comparisons between the two institutions 
are not always easy to make. 
The first main section of the chapter covers the growth of the special finance 
houses. It begins with an examination of the growth and composition of deposits and 
then goes on to discuss equity and assets growth. 
In the second main section the deployment of funds is analysed, and this is 
followed by smaller sections on the profitability of the finance houses. 
The final section discusses the extent of competition between the special finance 
houses and the riba based conventional banks. 
The major topics are dealt with on the basis of findings in the annual reports, 
articles of association, literature and from other information obtained by the author from 
employees at the two institutions during trips to Turkey in March and August 1988. 
Growth of the special finance houses 
The growth and financial strength of the finance houses are measured in terms of 
the increase in assets financed by funds available from current and profit and loss 
sharing depositors and from shareholders as well as from funds generated from 
operations and retained by the fmance houses. 
Deposit growth 
The two finance houses started from modest deposit bases, as would be expected 
for new, and novel kinds of financial institution. The initial publicity that surrounded 
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the opening of the finance houses brought a considerable response. The deposits of the 
two financial houses include current accounts, profit and loss sharing (PLS) accounts 
and special investment accounts. The funds generated from participation and special 
investment accounts, and up to 20 per cent of funds generated from current accounts, 
are used to finance various profit-earning investment projects. 
As shown in Table 6.1, during 1985 AI Baraka Tiirk Ozel Finans Kurumu (ABT) 
and Faisal Finans Kurumu (FFK) attracted combined deposits of TL 28.9 billion 
despite having been in operation for only 10 months and 9 months respectively. FFK 
had collected around 30.0 per cent more funds than ABT, and its foreign currency PLS 
accounts were almost three times the value of those of ABT. 
During 1986, there was substantial deposit growth at both houses. The deposits 
at FFK increased at a rate of 180.2 per cent while those at ABT grew at a rate of 140.5 
per cent. Both houses recorded a decrease in the value of their local currency current 
accounts as investors switched their funds into relatively high yielding PLS accounts. 
Once again, FFK had far greater foreign currency deposits than ABT and these made 
up 69.7 per cent of its total deposits. ABT's foreign deposits accounted for only 35.4 
per cent of total deposits. 
In 1987, the overall increase in total deposits continued at a slightly lesser rate for 
ABT whose deposits increased by 131.7 per cent, arid at a substantially reduced rate for 
FFK whose deposits only increased by 99.1 per cent. The growth rate of the foreign 
currency deposits is once again interesting. The value of ABT's foreign current 
accounts actually decreased by 26.1 per cent over the 1986 figure but its foreign 
currency PLS accounts increased by a staggering 202.5 per cent. At FFK, there was a 
huge increase of 245.6 per cent in foreign currency current accounts but a much lesser 
increase of 86.5 per cent in its foreign currency PLS accounts. Despite the overall 
increases at ABT, FFK still had more than twice the value of its deposits in foreign 
currency at the end of 1987. ABT has, however, managed to attract more lira deposits 
than FFK in each year of its operations. 
Perhaps the reason for the greater foreign currency accounts at FFK results from 
the activities of its representative office in Frankfurt and its public relations office in 
Jeddah. Both were set up to publicise the services and activities of the finance house 
among the Turkish workers living in those countries and to suggest to them that they 
transfer their foreign currency savings to FFK's branches in Turkey. 
At the end of 1987, the combined total of the finance houses' deposits stood at 
around TL 161.1 billion and represented 1.16 per cent of the total current and savings 
deposits held by the riba commercial banks in Turkey, compared to only 0.83 per cent 
in 1986. 
In the period January to June 1988, the deposit growth at both finance houses has 
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I ab I• 6 .I 
-----
Deposit Growth at Al Baraka TUrk Ozel Finans ~~~~~ 
and Faisal Finans Kuruou 1985-1987 
- i.!.!,_ooo and !'.!~~!~9~~~~-
A81 rrK A81 and HK 
Coobin•d total 
------
~!£~~~~~ 1985 1986 1987 1988
3 1985 1986 1981 1988 3 1985 I 986 1987 1988a 
Current Accounts 
5,206, 746b --------··-- 813,069 1,332,167 1,952,205 1,631,284 3,462,fif4 2,321,691 2,942,160 2,444,353 4,794,781 7,528,437 Turkish I ira 989,955 
:t growth -I I. 81 63.84 -16.44 II 2. ?6 -32.95 -I 6. 92 96. 16 57.01 
Foreign currency 1,011, 754 I, 189, 629 878,5?4 1,687,774 461. 781 855.808 2,958,143 1,189,350 1,473,535 2,045,437 3,836,667 2,877,124 
:t growth 17 0 58 -26. IS 92 .II 85.33 245.65 -59 0 79 38.81 87.57 -25.01 
-----
Total 2 ,001, 709 2. 002.698 2,210,691 6. 894.520 2,413,986 2,487,092 6,420, 757 3. 511.041 4,415,695 4,489,790 8,631,448 10,405,561 
; growth 0.05 10.39 21 I. 87 3.03 I SA. I 6 -45.32 I. 68 92 0 25 20.55 
Profit and loss 
sharing accounts 
-
Turkish lira 6,828, 796 18,724,644 34,850,131 40,309,008 2,972,540 12,23?, 724 ?6,794,210 39,901.790 9,801,336 30,957,368 61,592,341 80,210,798 0 
\j.) ; growth 174 0 20 8f>. I? I 5. 66 31 I. 52 I I 9. 04 48.92 2 I 5. 85 98.96 30.23 
Foreign currency J, 741,297 9,510,462 28,769,618 39,722,683 10,933,741 31,051,234 57.848,630 69,149,486 14,675,038 40,5?5,696 86,618,248 108,872,169 
; growth I 54.20 ?02.50 38 0 07 183 0 66 86.52 I 9. 54 I 76. I 5 II 3. 54 25.69 
---- ------- ---- ------
I otal 10,570,093 28,235,106 63,619,749 80,031,691 13,906,281 43,247,958 84,642,840 109,051,276 24,476,374 71,483,064 l48,210,58g 189,082,967 
:t growth 16 7.12 125 0 32 25.80 21 I. DO 95. 72 28.84 192.05 107 0 34 27 0 58 
Special investment 
accounts 
----
Turkish lira 4,231,350 4,231,350 
Grand total 12,571,802 30,237,804 70,061.790 86,926,21 I 16,320,267 45,730,050 91,063,597 II 2, 562 -;JTi 28.892.069 75,972,854 161,073,387 199,488,528 
:t growth 140.52 13 I. 70 24 0 07 I 80.23 99. I I 23 0 61 162 0 95 I 12. OJ 23 0 85 
Data as at 30 Jun• 
Includes Special lnvest•ent Accounts 
Source: Co11p i I ed fro• Finance Housr Reports 
been rather modest. Although there was an absolute increase in the amount of deposits, 
there was a sharply declining percentage increase. This was mainly due to very high 
inflation, estimated at around 70 per cent in September 1988, which has resulted in 
negative returns and has caused some depositors to switch to other forms of 
investment. The value of accounts at AB T increased by 24.1 per cent and those of FFK 
by 23.6 per cent. At AI Baraka Tiirk the value of its foreign currency deposits increased 
at a faster rate than those denominated in lira but despite this, ABT's foreign currency 
deposits at the end of June were still less than those of FFK which, over the same 
period, recorded greater gains in its lira deposits. 
Table 6.2 shows the number and average balance of the deposit accounts for ABT 
and FFK. It shows that at the end of 1987, FFK had attracted a larger number of 
depositors in all categories of account, except local currency PLS accounts, than ABT. 
Over the three year period, participation accounts have shown the largest numerical and 
percentage increases. At the end of 1985, 1986 and 1987 the total number of 
participation accounts stood at 7400, 24476, and 38351 respectively. Over the same 
period the number of current accounts was 1102, 2333 and 37 40 respectively. 
Both finance houses seem keen to attract a wide deposit base. In 1987, the 
average balance of current accounts at FFK was around TL 2.9 million, almost double 
the average balance at ABT, but both finance houses had roughly similar average 
balances in their PLS accounts. However, the figures for ABT are distorted somewhat 
by the exclusion from the PLS accounts of its special investment accounts. At the end 
of 1987 it had 34 such accounts with an average balance ofTL 124.5 million for each 
account. Taking all accounts into consideration, the average balance of each account at 
ABT and FFK was around TL 3.8 million, an increase of TL 1.0 million over the 1986 
figure. This increase in the average balance may have occurred as a result of the 
confidence and acceptance granted by the deposit customers who feel comfortable in 
dealing with the finance houses because they can relate to them in spiritual, social and 
religious terms. 
The annual percentage rate of growth in the number of accounts at the finance 
houses was less in 1987 than in 1986 which is only to be expected given the very large 
increases in the early months of their operation. 
The composition of the current, participation and special investment accounts of 
both finance houses, as shown in Table 6.3, indicates that there has been a considerable 
shift away from current accounts towards profit sharing accounts. It is reasonable to 
assume that the greater the ratio of participation accounts to current accounts, the greater 
the confidence of the depositors in the ability of the finance houses to generate profits 
on the investment of deposited funds. Conversely, the greater the ratio of current 
accounts to participation accounts, the greater the need of the investors for ready and 
available cash for their personal, business and social transactions. It could also imply 
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1ablt 6.2 
•u•btr and luragt Bohnet (In ll 000) of O~oslt Accounts 
for AI B;-;oko lllrkOul finano Kur~ou--;;;d 
Foiul finano Kuruou 198~- 1987 
ABI FH lSI and ffl 
Coobintd total 
1yp• or account 19BS 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987 1985 1986 1987 
Current accounts 
1urki•h llr1 
llu•btr 299 675 1,010 508 1,0~~ 1,413 807 1,679 2,H3 
Ayrragr balance 3,311 1,301 1,319 3,143 1,5U 2,451 3,646 1.~~6 1,979 
rortign currencr 
llu•btr Ill 775 487 182 379 130 29~ tiS~ I, 317 
Avrragt bohnct 8,95~ ~.326 I, 80~ 2,538 2, 258 3, 56~ ~.995 3, 128 2,913 
lotal •u•bor 412 900 1,497 690 1,433 2,243 1,102 2.333 3, 740 
Awrra9r balanct 4,859 1,21~ I,H7 3.~99 1,736 2,863 4,007 I, 924 1. 308 
-0 Profit and loss sharing 1ccounts VI 
lurkioh lira 
•u•br;. 7,01~ 7 ,fi16 12,274 3,110 ~. 7~l 11,648 5,124 16,399 23,972 
Average balance 3,391 2 .~59 2,839 956 1,393 2,300 1,913 1,888 2. ~~~ 
r ort i gn currtncr 
•u•btr 866 2.~41 ~ ,477 1,~10 5, ~36 9,9~7 2.276 8,011 H,H9 
A~rr•9• boloncl ' ~.320 3,743 ·6,426. 7. 75~ 5,603 5,813 6,448 ~.017 6,003 
-
1otol Nuobtr 2 ,8~0 10,157 16.751 ~.~20 i 4, JIQ 21,600 7,400 24,476 38, J~l 
3,670 2. 780 3, 798 3,077 3,020 3,919 3, 308 2.921 3,165 
Special ln•••t•ent accounts 
lurllith lira 
lluabtr 3~ 34 
A•tragr balance 12~.~~1 124,451 
Coobinrd lotol 3,792 11,0~7 18,212 5,210 15,752 23,8U 8,502 26,809 42,125 
Awtragr bal1nce 3,819 2,735 3,833 3,132 2,903 3,819 3,398 2,8H 3,12~ 
Sourtt: Cooplhd froa finance House Arportl 
1ablr ~.J 
A81 
!Jpe of account I 985 I 986 I 987 
Current accounts 
-~~;kr~ 7.87 2.69 1.90 
fo,.tign currency 8.05 3. 93 1.25 
15.92 6.62 3.15 
~~_!!_!_~!!~~!' sh1r~~ 
lur". ish 1 ira 54.32 61.93 49. 75 
foreign curr~ncy 29. 76 31.45 41.06 
-0 
0\ 64.06 93.38 90.81 
Special inves.t•ent accounts 
--,~.-~~ iSh~iT;;------- 6.04 
--
100.00 100.00 100.00 
-------
Data as at .JO June 
lnclutfes Special lnvtst111ent Accounts 
Snurce: Co•pi led fro• Finance Housr Reports 
Cooposition· of...Q!posit Accounts at AI 8a'lka hJ'k Uzel finans 
---Ku7u-;u and raisal Finans Ku,uou (pe,centage) 
rrK 
1988. 1985 1986 I 987 l988a 
5.99 11.96 3. 57 3.80 2.06 
I. 94 2. 83 I. 87 3.25 1.06 
7.93 14.79 5.44 7.05 3.12 
46. 3 7b 18.21 26.75 29.47 35.45 
45.70 67.00 67.81 63.53 61.43 
92.07 85.21 94.56 92.95 96.88 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
ABI and FFK 
Coobi;;~tal 
~ 1986 1987 19881 
10.18 3.22 2.98 3.78 
5.10 2.69 2.38 1.44 
15.28 5.91 5. 36 5. 22 
33.93 40.75 38.24 40.21 
50.79 53.34 53.77 54.57 
84.72 94.09 92.01 94.78 
2. 63 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
that the institution provides better banking and social services. 
Table 6.3 shows that in the first year of operation the finance houses had 
approximately 15 per cent of the value of their deposits in current accounts but by the 
end of June 1988 this figure had fallen to just over 5 per cent, with the depositors 
having committed a high percentage of their deposits, almost 95 per cent, to profit and 
loss sharing and special investment accounts. 
In 1985, the annualised gross return on PLS lira accounts at ABT was around 59 
per cent, considerably higher than that offered by the conventional banks on term 
deposits. Although the profit distribution decreased to 57.3 per cent in 1986 it remained 
higher than the deposit yields at the riba based banks. The gross rate of return in 1987 
was 54 per cent and up to July of that year this rate was higher than the deposit rates of 
the conventional banks. In July 1987, the authorities freed the 1 year deposit rate and 
the riba banks began offering rates of up to 65 per cent, well above the profit 
distribution rate of ABT and FFK. 
Table 6.4 indicates the gross and net yields of 3 month, 6 month and 1 year profit 
and loss sharing lira accounts which matured on 14 March 1988, 30 June 1988 and 19 
September 1988 at AI Baraka Tiirk. They are compared with the returns on the deposits 
at the conventional Turkish banks. They show that, with the exception of 1 year 
deposits placed at the conventional banks after 3 July 1987, the returns offered to the 
investors on the profit and loss sharing accounts were greater than those offered by the 
riba based banks. On a three month deposit which matured on 19 September 1988, for 
example, the investor received more than 9 percentage points on funds placed at AI 
Baraka Tiirk and on a six month deposit due on the same day the difference was around 
five percentage points. However, on a 1 year deposit the conventional banks paid over 
3 percentage points more than the finance house. Both ABT and FFK are keen to 
increase their profit rates for depositors in order to make their yields more attractive 
vis-a-vis the 1 year deposit rate of the conventional banks. The profits paid to investors 
by the finance houses on foreign currency accounts closely reflected the returns paid by 
the riba based banks. 
The "unit value", described in the previous chapter, was fixed by ABT at 100 on 
29 March 1985, the day it began to collect PLS funds. This weighted figure had risen 
to 383.1823 on 14 March 1988 and so, for example, an investment of TL 100,000 
made on this day would have "bought" 260.9724 units. The "unit value" had risen to 
499.1936 on 19 September and so the investment would then have been worth TL 
130,276. The number of units or "account value" is written into the PLS agreement, 
kept by the client. The finance houses disclose the "unit value" weekly, either in the 
media or upon demand at any of their branches. In effect, the PLS account acts like a 
"unit trust". A client may, therefore, follow the progress of the investment but is 
powerless to do anything should the "unit value" decrease, and must wait until the end 
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Table 6.4 
A Comparison between the Yields of Profit and Loss 
Sharing Accounts at AL Baraka TUrk Ozel Finans Kurumu 
and Deposit Accounts at the Conventional Riba Banks 
Yield on TL 100,000 maturing: 14 March 1988 30 June 1988 
ABT Riba Banks ABT 
Term Amount Annual Amount Annual Amount Annual 
-- % age % age % age 
3 months Gross 11 '760 47.04 8,750 35.00 13,434 53.74 
Net' 10,537 42.15 7,840 31.36 12,037 48.15 
6 months Gross 24,933 49.87 19,000 38.00 27,061 54.12 
Net' 22,340 44.68 17,025 34.05 24,246 48.49 
1 Year Gross 53,337 53.34 43,000 43.00 58,160 58.16 
Net' 47,790 47.79 38,530 38.53 52,111 52.11 
Unit value 
(100 on 29 March 1985) 383.1823 
'Net = Gross less 10.0% withholding tax and 0.4% defence fund tax 
Source: A1 Baraka Turk Ozel Finans Kurumu and Central Bank of 
Turkey Annual Reports 
Riba Banks 
Amount Annual 
% age 
11,250 45.00 
10,080 40.32 
19,000 38.00 
17,025 34.05 
43,000 43.00 
38,530 38.53 
N/A 
19 September 1988 
ABT Riba Banks 
Amount Annual Amount Annual 
% age % age 
13,826 55.30 11,250 45.00 
12,388 49.55 10,080 40.32 
28,988 57.98 26,000 52.00 
25,973 51.95 23,295 46.59 
61,423 61.42 65,000 65.00 
55,035 55.03 58,240 58.24 
499.1936 
of the deposit term to collect the funds. 
The profit distribution on ABT's special investment accounts, which the finance 
house only began to offer in May 1987, showed an annualised gross rate of return of 
around 57.5 per cent in 1987. This return, which is higher than that paid to the PLS 
account holders, is due to the fact that the finance house distributes 90 per cent of its 
investment profits to the investors. 
Although Faisal Finans did not disclose the profit distribution figures to its 
investors in its annual reports, it appears that the returns were very similar to those of 
AI Baraka Tiirk. 
As would be expected in inflationary conditions, most deposits are placed for a 
period of 90 days. At FFK, for example, 90 day term accounts constituted almost 63 
per cent of all PLS accounts and over 71 per cent of all PLS funds at the end of 1987, 
compared to 59 per cent and 69 per cent respectively at the end of 1986. 
Although it is not possible to give any precise figure, the finance houses seem to 
have attracted several thousand customers who had not previously used the services of 
banks. There are also, of course, clients who have no great religious sentiments and 
have simply placed their funds with the finance houses in the expectation of earning 
higher yields than those offered by the conventional banks or by bonds and government 
securities. 
Overall, it appears that the investors with the two fmance houses have fared well 
and have been rewarded adequately with, until recently, relatively high positive real 
returns. With the opening of branches and with greater public awareness that a safe 
alternative to conventional banks exists, it is likely that the number of account holders 
and volume of deposits will continue to grow. 
Equity and assets growth 
The equity of the finance houses consists of paid-up capital, capital reserves, 
undistributed profits and the surplus arising from the revaluation of fixed assets. 
Table 6.5 shows that at the end of June 1988, the paid-up capital of ABT was 
87.5 per cent and that of FFK 98.8 per cent. Both finance houses have doubled the 
amount of their authorised capital since their establishment, mainly to allow for the 
opening of extra branches and to strengthen their ability to meet their objectives. The 
authorised capital of each finance house at the end of June 1988 was TL 10.0 billion. 
The finance houses appropriate a specific percentage of their profits to capital 
reserves. This appropriation, which is a source of internal financing, is mandatory by 
law and is presently set at 5 per cent of annual net profits. Besides this "legal" reserve, 
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Table 6.5 
Authorised capital 
31 Dece•ber 1987 
A81 I 0,000,000 
FFK ID,DOO,OOO 
JO June 1988 
A81 10,000, DOD 
FFK IO,ODO ,ODD 
Source: Co11piled from Finance House Reports 
Capital and Reserves of Al Baraka Hlrk tizel Finans Kuru•u 
and Faisal Finans Kuruou (ll 000) 
Paid-up capital !1: paid-up 
6,250,DOO 62.50 
7,000,000 70.0D 
8, 750,000 87.50 
9,883,906 98.84 
Reserves, revaluation funds and 
undistributed profits 
865,691 
I, 618,671 
N/A 
1,959,836 
~ of reserves, revaluation funds and 
undistributed profits to 
paid-up capital 
14.17 
23.12 
N/A 
19.82 
the finance houses also make voluntary reserves, referred to as "special"reserves. 
These two reserves amount to a substantial sum of money and are considered an 
integral part of the finance houses' capital. 
The amount of undistributed profits, another category of capital composition, is 
not a significant source of financing due to the fact that the finance houses distribute 
most of their profits to shareholders after the payment of dividends to depositors and 
after the appropriation of the reserves. 
Also included in the equity of the finance houses is the surplus arising from the 
revaluation of fixed assets. The amount in this fund at ABT at the end of 1987 was TL 
368.9 million, or 5.2 per cent of total equity. The revaluation fund at FFK was far 
greater, due mainly to increases in the property value of its freehold branches in 
istanbul and Ankara. Its revaluation fund stood at TL 1,303.4 million and represented 
15.1 per cent of its capital at the end of 1987. 
In summary, the total capital of the fmance houses amounted to TL 15.8 billion at 
the end of 1987, 84 per cent of which was derived from paid-up capital, and 16 per 
cent from reserves, undistributed profits and the revaluation fund. 
Total asset growth, especially investments, is an important indication of growth 
for the finance houses. Table 6.6 shows the growth in total assets at ABT and FFK for 
the years 1985-1987. The total assets figure excludes the contra accounts which mainly 
comprise customer liabilities held against letters of credit, guarantees and acceptances 
and do not represent funds available for the institution's own use. 
The assets of ABT grew at a rate of 109.2 per cent in 1986 and 103.6 per cent in 
1987 and reached a total of TL 98.6 billion at the end of 1987. Those of FFK recorded 
growth rates of 135.5 per cent and 98.7 per cent over the same period and at the end of 
1987 stood at TL 120.0 billion. At first glance these increases may appear spectacular 
but several other well-established private Turkish banks and some foreign banks in 
Turkey actually recorded higher asset growth over the same period. However, this rate 
of growth would appear to indicate considerable future potential. 
The return on assets ratio1 provides a broad measure of the ability of management 
to generate earnings from the bank's activities regardless of the source of the funds that 
support these activities. Table 6.6.1 indicates that the return on assets of ABT has been 
consistently higher than that of FFK. In 1987, ABT's return on assets was 5.9 per cent 
compared with FFK's return on assets of 3.4 per cent. The considerable difference 
between the two ratios appears to indicate management difficulties at Faisal Finans 
Kurumu. During the first half of 1988 both the general manager and the assistant 
general manager resigned and the post of general manager remains unfilled. It appears 
that there have been policy differences between the board of directors and the general 
management but there are also suggestions that these two employees left to help found 
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Table 6.6 
Type of asset 
Unpaid capital 
Cash* 
Invest•ents 
fixed assets 
Others 
TOTAL 
:t growth 
I 965 
6,022,021 
14,567,144 
57.310 
2,504,401 
23,150,876 
A6T 
1966 
4,315,385 
40,054,865 
1,208,489 
2,843,184 
48,421,923 
I 09. 16 
Assets of Al Baraka TUrk 'dud F'inans k'uru1111u 
and Faisal Finans Kuruou, 198S=-l98/--l TL 000 and pe~;~t;g;g;:;,;u;--
1987 
3, 750,000 
5,630,646 
79,557,688 
2,002,942. 
7, 621, 6fi I 
98,562,937 
I 03.56 
I 985 
3,445,531 
18.6 70, 151 
2,092,090 
1,437,730 
----
25,640,502 
FFK 
I 966 
.--
6,204,122 
49.299.398 
2. 978. 714 
I, R95, 660 
--·--
60,377,894 
I 35.46 
• Includes deposits with the Central Bank and do111estic and foreign co111•ercial banks 
Source: Co•pi led fro• Finance House Reports 
Table 6.6.1 
ABT 
FFK 
Gross profits 
Total assets 
Return on assets 
Gross profits 
Jotal assets 
Return on assets 
Source: Co•piled fro• finance House Reports 
1985 
1,355,563 
23,150,876 
5. 86 
1,235,616 
25.640.502 
4.82 
Finance Houses: ret~rn on assets, 1966-1967 (ll 000) 
I 986 1967 
4. 629.549 5,847,729 
46,421,923 96,562,937 
9.56 s. 93 
2,638,630 4,073, 728 
60,377,894 II 9, 994,232 
4. 37 3.39 
1987 
3,000,000 
22,774,893 
84.534.086 
6,095,314 
3,589,939 
-----
119,994,232 
98. 74 
another finance house in Turkey. Also, unlike AI Baraka Tiirk, whose balance sheet 
shows no bad debts, Faisal Finans made bad debt provisions of TL 180.4 million in 
1987 and TL 173.5 million in the first half of 1988. These provisions, therefore, may 
also have hastened their departure. 
The structural analysis of deposits, equity and assets involves the consideration of 
two main ratios, the debt (deposits) to equity ratio and the equity to assets, or capital, 
ratio. An analysis of the composition of debt and equity in Islamic banking is important 
due to the restrictions imposed on the use of certain sources, such as current accounts, 
for investment or loan purposes.2 As earlier mentioned, the finance houses, in common 
with all Islamic banks, are not committed to the payment of a fixed rate of interest on 
time deposits or PLS accounts. Instead, they invest the PLS deposits on behalf of the 
depositors and charge what is known as a "management fee",which varies between 
10-20 per cent. The remaining profit from investment is distributed among the 
depositors. For this reason, the principle of trading on the equity, or fmancialleverage, 
which involves the use of debt in the capital structure to increase the return on 
investment to the owners, does not apply in Islamic banking, since time deposits are 
employed in investment projects that could be as profitable as the investments financed 
from funds derived from shareholders equity. The increase in PLS accounts adds 
strength to the finance house and creates a significant advantage for the shareholders 
because the fee charged by the finance house for its role in developing the investment 
projects financed by the PLS depositors is added to the profits distributed to 
shareholders. The deposits and equity may also be combined and invested in large and 
profitable projects that benefit both depositors and shareholders. In other words, there 
are favourable economic externalities for both depositors and shareholders when their 
resources are combined. 
The total amount of debt and equity for the two finance houses, and its ratio, is 
given in Table 6.7. It shows, as would be expected, that the finance houses were 
primarily dependent on capital sources of funds in the early stages of their operations, 
but once the finance houses had gained the confidence of the community through equity 
capital, they were able to attract funds from current and profit and loss sharing account 
holders. 
At the end of 1987, the debt to equity ratio of ABT stood at 9.8 per cent, up from 
5.9 per cent in 1986, and that of FFK was 10.6 per cent in 1987, compared to 7.5 per 
cent in 1986. The higher 1987 ratios reveal depositor and community acceptance of the 
relatively new fmance houses and reflect the confidence placed in the ability of the bank 
management to generate profits on investment. 
In Islamic banking, the impact of the capital to assets ratio reflects changes in a 
bank's capital position. A change in the capital ratio indicates that there is expansion or 
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Table 6.7 
Finance Houses: debt to equity ratio, 1985-1987 (TL 000) 
1985 1986 1987 
ABT 
...... 
Debt 12,571,802 30,237,804 70,061,790 
...... Equity 5,042,675 5,166,470 7,135,691 
.f:o. 
Debt-equity ratio 2.49 5.85 9.82 
FFK 
Debt 16,320,267 45,735,050 91,063,597 
Equity 5,185,840 6,064,810 8,618,671 
Debt-equity ratio 3.15 7.54 10.57 
Source: Compiled from Financi House Reports 
contraction in the invested capital or deposit accounts. Since depositors are not 
guaranteed a fixed rate of return, a higher or lower capital ratio changes the degree of 
risk assumed by depositors. In the event of temporary losses in the joint investment 
operations of the bank, or in the case of liquidation, a relatively high capital ratio 
provides a cushion or safety valve for the depositors. 3 
Table 6.8 shows that each finance house had a very high capital ratio in the first 
year of operation but that this ratio has declined as the finance houses have gained the 
confidence of the depositors. At the end of 1987, each finance house had a capital to 
assets ratio of 7.2 per cent. This figure is slightly less than the capital ratio figures of 
most riba based banks in Turkey, and indicates a higher degree of reliance on fmancing 
the assets through an increase in deposits rather than an increase in equity capital. 
However, this ratio is still relatively high compared to that of most large conventional 
banks in Europe and elsewhere. 
The high capital ratio is an important feature of Islamic banking because it 
indicates to equity borrowers, depositors and shareholders a continuity in investments, 
fmancing and lending policies.4 
Deployment of fullllclls 
The deployment of funds available to the finance houses from all sources in 
financing investment projects is of prime importance, not just for the generation of 
profits, but for the growth of the finance houses themselves. 
Table 6.9 and Chart 6.1 show the total loans and investments outstanding at the 
end of years 1985-1987 at both fmance houses. The table also indicates the cumulative 
total of loans and investments for each year at ABT. The cumulative figures are not 
available from FFI( The table indicates that the .total loans and investments have 
increased substantially since the commencement of operations. At the end of 1987, 
FFK had outstanding loans and investments of TL 84.5 billion, approximately TL 5.0 
billion more than those of ABT. The phenomenal growth recorded in 1986, the first full 
year of operation, slowed considerably in 1987 and looks set to slow further in 1988. 
Indeed, figures released by FFK at the end of June 1988 revealed that outstanding 
loans and investments totalled TL 110.8 billion, only 31 per cent greater than at the end 
of 1987. 
The bulk of the funds at ABT and FFK, well over 90 per cent, are used to finance 
trade, known as murabaha investments. Both finance houses fix a maximum repayment 
period of 12-18 months but most trade finance deals are, in fact, completed within 6 
months. During 1987, ABT provided finance for 1166 trade projects valued at TL 
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Table 6.8 
ABT 
Capital and reserves 
Total assets 
Capital ratio 
FFK 
Capital and reserves 
Total assets 
Capital ratio 
Finance Houses: capital ratio, 1985-1987 (TL 000) 
1985 
5,042,675 
23,150,876 
21.78 
5,185,840 
25,640,502 
20.23 
1986 
5,166,470 
48,421,923 
10.67 
6,064,810 
60,377,894 
10.04 
1987 
7,135,691 
98,562,937 
7.24 
8,618,671 
119,994,232 
7.18 
Source: Compiled from Finance House Reports 
Chan 6.1 
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oucs~anding at !1 :lee 
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1987 
84,534,087 
71.47 
NiA 
110.0 billion, as indicated in Table 6.10. This was more than twice the number of 
projects financed in 1986 and an increase of around 141 per cent in the value of such 
finance. Although FFK does not disclose the cumulative value or number of its 
murabaha transactions, its balance sheet does give the value of murabaha projects 
outstanding at the end of each year. The total at the end of 1987 was TL 82 billion, and 
this would appear to indicate that for the year as a whole the value of its murabaha 
projects would have exceeded that of ABT. 
Murabaha transactions have covered both national and international trade. In 
1987, both finance houses were involved in the syndication of separate murabaha 
facilities of around $ 50 million each for the importation of crude oil by the state 
petroleum company Tlipras. Each finance house had a five per cent stake in the facility 
which was arranged by their Jeddah and Bahrain offices. 
The finance houses are aiming to decrease t~eir involvement in this short term 
fmance and to move towards greater investment in more medium to long term projects. 
From statements which have appeared in their annual reports, it seems clear that the 
fmance houses believe that there is too much emphasis on easy to arrange and relatively 
risk-free murabaha projects. ABT's 1985 annual report states "murabaha transactions 
occupied an overwhelming proportion of Al Baraka Turk's total placements. In the 
years to come, the finance house plans gradually to increase the share of other types of 
investment, such as profit and loss sharing." The 1986 annual report of FFK states 
"profit and loss sharing deals occupied a rather small volume of total financing, due to 
various market problems encountered during this period. It is hoped that such 
deficiencies will be overcome in the near future and the priority of FFK operations will 
shift gradually to PLS projects." 
The word "gradually", used by both finance houses, seems significant. In 1986, 
non-murabaha investments at ABT occupied 6 per cent of total investments and, in 
1987, 9 per cent. At the end of 1987 the percentage value of non-murabaha projects 
outstanding at FFK was 3 per cent, compared to almost 13 per cent in 1986, and 
figures for the end of June 1988 show a further (slight) decrease. 
Non-murabaha projects at Faisal Finans consist entirely of musharaka, or profit 
and loss sharing, projects. Al Baraka Tiirk is also involved in ijara finance. 
Table 6.10 shows that ABT set up 49 profit and loss sharing projects in 1987, 
compared to 14 in 1986 and only 3 in 1985. The total value of PLS projects financed in 
1987 was TL 9.9 billion, an increase of approximately 234 per cent over the 1986 
figure of TL 3.0 billion and representing 8 per cent of total loans and investments. At 
the end of 1987, FFK had musharaka projects valued at TL 2.5 billion outstanding, or 
3 per cent of all loans and investments. In theory, musharaka projects are of a medium 
to long term nature but in Turkey these profit and loss projects are related only to short 
term trade finance. This is evident by a look at the end of year figures for Faisal Finans. 
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Table 6.10 
!!£~-~~~~-~~~~!~~~-and I nv~~~!!~~~~~ 
rUrk (izel finans KuruRu and Faisal finans Kuruou, 1985-1987 
--------l!_l OOQ_!~~j,erc-~-n-ta9e growth_) _______ 
A8T FFK 
!11'! lg85 lg86 lg87 1g85 lg86 lg87 
Value Nu111ber Va I ue Nuli1ber Value Nuaber Value Nuober Va I ue Nuober Value Number 
"urabaha outstanding 18,055,161 - 43,043,224 8l,g87,276 
at 31 Oec 
~ growth - - 138.40 90.48 
Musharaka outstanding 205. g89 6,256,174 2,546,811 
at 31 Oec 
t growth 
-
2,g37.14 
-59.29 
Mudaraha outstanding 
at 31 Oec 
t growth 
Jjara outstanding 
at 31 Oec 
...... 
...... t growth 
\0 
Hurabaha 01 Jan-31 Dec 158 45,583,167 577 IIO,OI0,81g 1166 
t growth 
-
265.19 141. 34 102.08 
Musharaka 01 Jan-31 Dec 3 2,968,447 14 9,go3,490 49 
t growth 
-
366.6 7 233.63 250.00 
Hudaraba 01 Jan-31 Dec 
t growth 
ljara 01 Jan-31 Dec 1,064,561 
t growth 
----------
TOTAl 24. 8gg. 362 161 48,551,614 591 12o,g78,870 1220 18,261,150 
-
4g,299,3g8 84,534,087 
Source: Co111piled froa Finance House Reports 
In 1986 it had musharaka projects valued at TL 6.3 billion whereas the figure at the end 
of 1987 was only TL 2.6 billion, a decrease in one year ofTL 3.7 billion. 
Neither finance house has so far arranged any mudaraba advances. 
Although the annual reports of both finance houses do not disclose full details 
about the types of financing, whether trade or corporate, short or long term, it would 
appear that most investment is made in the short term fmancing of working capital or in 
the short term financing of trade. Medium and longer term financing is provided not on 
the basis of participation but on the basis of ijara or leasing contracts. 
In 1987, AI Baraka Tiirk started to finance medium term projects by means of 
leasing. It arranged 5 leasing projects valued at just over TL 1.0 billion. The projects 
involved the leasing of textile machines, intercity buses, cars and computers. Although 
repayments will be made over a four year period, which is the legal minimum for such 
items, the bulk of the repayments will be made in the first two years of the agreement. 
At the end of the leasing period, the client will make a final repayment and obtain 
ownership of the goods in question. In Turkey, leasing offers certain tax advantages to 
the lessee which, the finance house believes, will make leasing an increasingly popular 
form of fmance. Accordingly, ABT expects the total amount of financial leasing to rise 
considerably in the years ahead. 
The sectoral distribution of funds at ABT and FFK, shown as percentages, 
appears in Table 6.11. The figures reveal a different emphasis on some sectors between 
the two finance houses. In 1985, for example, ABT invested most funds, 40.7 per 
cent, in chemical and petrochemical projects, whereas the sector that received most 
funds from FFK was agriculture. The machinery and equipment sector received most 
funds from ABT and FFK in 1986, a total of 28.2 per cent and 19.7 per cent 
respectively. In 1987, the two finance houses invested most heavily in the chemicals 
and petrochemicals sector, due mainly to murabaha financing of oil imports. The 
textiles and metals sectors were also important recipients of funds over the period 
1985-1987. 
The fund utilisation ratio, which gives an indiCation about the extent of loans and 
investments made from available funds is derived by dividing the total amount of loans 
and investments by the total amount of funds available for such purposes. The latter 
includes all deposits, except current accounts, and total capital and reserves. The 
current accounts are excluded because they can be withdrawn on demand and are not 
entitled to any profit distribution. The higher the ratio the greater the employment of 
funds generated from deposit accounts and capital in investment activities. 
As can be seen in Table 6.12, both finance houses had very high utilisation ratios 
in the period 1985-1987. The two finance houses have generally experienced no 
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Table 6.11 
Sectoral Distribution of Loans and Investments at Al Baraka TUrk bzel Finans 
Kurumu and Faisal Finans Kurumu (percentage) 1985 - 1987 
Sector 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 
Construction 
Foodstuffs 
Machinery and equipment 
Textiles and leather goods 
Pharmaceuticals 
Metals 
Paper and packaging 
Agricultural produce 
1985 
40.7 
2.5 
10.9 
18.3 
11.2 
3.7 
5.5 
7.2 
100.0 
Source: Compiled from Finance House Reports 
ABT 
1986 
20.4 
5.0 
5.8 
28.2 
19.6 
2.2 
11.9 
6.9 
100.0 
1987 
29.4 
4.8 
1.0 
22.8 
24.3 
0.7 
12.5 
4.5 
100.0 
1985 
13.3 
5.9 
11.7 
8.7 
16.6 
14.5 
8.4 
20.9 
100.0 
FFK 
1986 
19.6 
3.8 
9.7 
19.7 
11.5 
11.7 
9.2 
14.8 
100.0 
1987 
24.2 
5.4 
8.2 
15.2 
9.4 
18.3 
6.9 
12.4 
100.0 
....... 
N 
N 
Table 6.12 
Finance Houses: funds utilisation ratio, 1985-1987 (TL 000) 
ABT 
Deposits plus capital and reserves 
Loans and investments 
Utilisation ratio 
FFK 
Deposits plus capital and reserves 
Loans and investments 
Utilisation ratio 
Source: Compiled from Finance House Reports 
1985 
15,612,768 
14,567,144 
93.30 
19,092,121 
18,670,151 
97.79 
1986 
33,401,576 
40,054,865 
119.92 
49,312,768 
49,299,398 
99.97 
1987 
70,755,440 
79,557,688 
112.44 
91,778,531 
84,534,086 
92.10 
problems in utilising their lira or foreign currency funds as there are many opportunities 
for local trade and import and export finance. The ratio of AI Baraka Tiirk exceeded 100 
per cent in 1986 and 1987, implying that the finance house had employed the amounts 
received from its current account depositors in its investment activities. However, there 
is nothing wrong in this, provided that the finance house complies with the 
requirements of Article 17 contained in the rules and regulations issued by the 
Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade, governing the "utilisation of funds 
accumulated in current accounts." 
In addition to providing finance to individuals and businesses for investment 
purposes, Faisal Finans has itself made direct investments. At the end of 1987 it had 
majority shareholding participations in two companies, Faisal Foreign Trade and 
Marketing and Faisal Real Estate Construction and Trading, worth almost TL 1.3 
billion. It also had 11 per cent stakes in Klbns Faisal islam Bankas1 (Faisal Islamic 
Bank of Cyprus) and Kibris Faisal islam Yatmm Sirketi (Faisal Islamic Investment 
Company of Cyprus) valued at TL 120 million. However, during the first half of 1988, 
it sold these stakes, at a profit, in order to concentrate all activities in Turkey. 
To date, the role of the finance houses in Turkey's economic development has 
been confined mainly to trade financing. It is the hope of many, both within the fmance 
houses themselves, and within the Muslim community at large, that as the technical and 
managerial skills of the finance houses develop there will be a move away from trade 
financing activities towards greater investment in more medium and long term projects 
such as musharaka and mudaraba that will contribute more to Turkey's economic and 
social development. 
Profits and factors affecting profitability 
Of the two finance houses, the operations of AI Baraka Tiirk are the more 
profitable, as revealed in Table 6.13 and Chart 6.2. It made a pre-tax profit of TL 5.8 
billion in 1987, a rise of 26.3 per cent over the 1986 figure of TL 4.6 billion. Faisal 
Finans recorded a pre-tax profit of TL 4.1 billion, up by 54.4 per cent over the TL 2.6 
billion it made in 1986. After payment of corporation and other taxes ABT's net profit 
in 1987 was TL 3.3 billion. The annual reports of FFK do not reveal the net profit 
figures. 
Although these nominal increases may, at first glance, appear high it must be 
remembered that inflation in Turkey in 1987 was around 35 per cent, and so, in effect, 
ABT actually recorded a negative rate of increase in its profits. Figures released at the 
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Chart 6.2 
Table 6.13 
Gross ~rofi t 
"' ;srow~~. 
Gross Profits at the Finance Houses 
1L billion 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1985 
Al Baraka Tiirk 
1986 1987 Year 
Gross Annual Profits ~t Al Baraka Turk Ozel Finans 
Kur•Jmu 'l!ld fa1sal finans Kurumu, 1985-1987 
ITL 000 and ~ercentage 5rowthl 
AB7 
1~86 1987 1985 
1,355,583 4,629,549 5,847,729 1,235,516 
241.52 26.31 
Source: Compiled from Finance House Reports 
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1986 
2,638,830 
113.56 
1987 
4,073,728 
54.38 
end of June 1988 show that both finance houses made profits of just under TL 2.0 
billion each in the first half of 1988, a rate of growth which, if continued in the second 
half of 1988, will lead to substantial nominal and real profit decreases over the 1987 
figures. 
The main reason for ABT's higher gross profit and higher return on assets (Table 
6.6.1) is probably due to the composition of its deposits. It has far more lira deposits 
than FFK and it appears that there are greater profitable opportunities for the 
deployment of lira funds than for the placement of foreign currency of which FFK has 
considerably more. The margins earned on lira funds are also generally higher than 
those on foreign currencies. Other possible reasons for ABT's greater profitability 
could be its higher utilisation of funds, its sectoral breakdown of investments, the type 
of business which it finances or simply better management. 
The extensive use of modem technology, including on-line computers to all 
branches, has enabled both finance houses to record substantial gross profits per 
employee figures. Faisal Finans with 132 employees at the end of 1987, had figures of 
around TL 31.0 million per employee, while those of Al Baraka Ttirk, which had just 
over 100 employees, were in excess of TL 55.0 million per employee. 
Once provision for taxation and transfers to reserves have been made the 
remaining profit is distributed to shareholders as dividends. ABT discloses the amount 
of its dividend payments, FFK does not. At AI Baraka Tiirk, dividends as a percentage 
of paid-up capital increased from 12 per cent in 1985 to 40 per cent in 1986 and 1987. 
Earnings per share of TL 100,000 in 1985, 1986 and 1987 were TL 14,262, TL 
52,227 and TL 53,542 respectively. The dividends paid to shareholders are therefore 
less than those paid to PLS depositors. 
Profits made by the two institutions seem to have suffered as a result of increased 
competition for funds within the financial sector which has led to a lowering of 
margins. High inflation has now made the returns on all conventional bank deposits 
and finance house profit and loss sharing accounts negative which has led the public to 
invest in higher yielding government securities, gold and real estate. The profits of the 
finance houses are therefore likely to remain depressed for the foreseeable future. 
Competition within the financial sector 
In Turkey, where a duopolistic financial situation exists, competition is the main 
issue between the two Islamic finance houses and the more than fifty riba based 
conventional banks. The finance houses compete, in varying degrees, both with each 
other and with the riba banks and financial institutions. 
Legislation sets the finance houses apart from other commercial banks. Their 
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methods of operation and the financial products they offer are different from those of 
the riba based banks. Their annual figures are excluded from all Treasury and Central 
Bank reports and statistics covering the financial sector. The various regulatory bodies 
deal discreetly with the finance houses and this rather low profile appears to suit the 
finance houses which do not wish to attract attention or criticism from other financial 
institutions over what some see as their favoured treatment and status. 
Both finance houses offer a similar range of services and it appears that profits 
paid to their profit and loss sharing depositors are also very similar. Strict rules on 
advertising preclude the finance houses from making any religious references or direct 
comparisons with each other or with the conventional riba banks in matters such as 
returns on deposits, efficiency or profitability. Clients, or prospective clients can, 
however, work out for themselves, from the unit values that are announced weekly, the 
rate of return on PLS funds at each finance house but it is unlikely that many do so. A 
comparison could then be made with the rates offered to depositors by the riba banks 
which are fixed by the Central Bank and advertised widely. 
Although both finance houses are competing for the same funds, there does not 
appear to be any overt price competition. When deciding such things as murabaha 
mark-ups, the finance houses take many factors into consideration and so direct 
comparisons between the two are difficult to make. 
The returns on PLS lira deposits of under one year remain higher than the yields 
of deposits of similar terms at the riba based banks but both finance houses are well 
aware that their one year participation deposits now offer less returns than such 
deposits at the conventional banks. The profits distributed on foreign currency 
participation accounts closely reflect the rates of interest paid by riba banks. 
For many Muslims however, the returns offered by the finance houses are of 
secondary importance. The overriding importance of these institutions is that they 
provide an opportunity for conducting financial transactions in conformity with Islamic 
principles by the avoidance of riba. As such, they do not compete directly for existing 
depositors but represent an alternative to conventional riba banks. 
Despite the fact that the market share captured by the finance houses is steadily 
increasing, it appears that this is a result of these institutions offering fmancial products 
which appeal to believers and not as a result of direct competition with riba banks. The 
finance houses are obliged to act prudently to earn goodwill and customer loyalty and to 
maintain their good reputation. Profits can only be increased by the development of 
new products and services and not by trying to increase market share by undercutting 
riba based banks. This would only lead to a further reduction in their already relatively 
low margins and possibly liquidation. 
Overall, the Islamic finance houses have shown that they can operate successfully 
in a very competitive financial sector and that they· complement, rather than compete 
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with, the commercial riba banks. 
CollltcDllllsiollll 
Although the two finance houses have been in operation only since early 1985 the 
growth of their deposits, assets, investments and profits has exceeded most 
expectations. This initial rapid growth has now decreased somewhat and 1988 is likely 
to see a consolidation of their activities. 
Both finance houses have high utilisation of funds ratios but with most of these 
funds being used to finance short term trade this appears to result in little tangible 
benefit for the Turkish economy or its people. This emphasis on trade finance conflicts 
with the ideology and theory of Islamic banking, the main aims of which are to provide 
a fair return to depositors and shareholders and to offer social services to the Islamic 
community. It is the neglect of medium and long term profit and loss financing that 
both special finance houses need to remedy in the near future. 
In Turkey, the finance houses can contribute to the country's economic 
development by attracting the untapped savings of people who at present do not deal 
with banks and the people who have savings accounts at conventional riba banks, in 
conflict with their religious convictions. The real contribution of the finance houses will 
come from their investment activities in development projects on an equity participation 
basis. 
Despite the growing competition in the financial sector, it is likely that the next 
few years will witness an increase in the number of institutions operating along Islamic 
lines in Turkey. Indeed, a third finance house, "Tiirk-Kuveyt Evkaf Finans Kurumu", 
has recently received permission to operate in Turkey and is expected to open by the 
end of 1988. This finance house will have an initial capital of TL 15 billion and its 
major shareholders will be the Islamic Development Bank, the Kuwait Finance House 
and V alaflar Bankas1. 
Islamic banking has thus shown that it can operate side by side with conventional 
banking and appears to have become a permanent force within the Turkish financial 
sector. 
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Footnotes 
1 . For the finance houses this ratio has been calculated using gross profit figures as 
net profit figures are unavailable from Faisal Finans Kurumu. 
2. A.M. Abdeen and D.N. Shook, The Saudi Financial System in the Context of 
Western and Islamic Finance (1984), p. 221. 
3. Ibid., p. 223. 
4. Ibid., p. 225. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ideology of Islamic banking stems from the principles and beliefs in the basic 
values of Islam. A great deal has been written about the theory and practice of Islamic 
banking over recent years. There is no one view about what constitutes Islamic banking 
nor is there an exact definition of what makes a bank "Islamic". However, there is 
unanimous agreement about the prohibition of riba, and that the purpose of Islamic 
banks is not solely economic, but that they exist as instruments for accomplishing the 
spiritual and religious values of mankind. Much of the literature centres on the methods 
of financing involved in Islamic banking and documentation on the actual practice is 
often unpublished. The lack of any concise practical guide to Islamic financial 
instruments or standard reference manual has led to a considerable divergence in 
Islamic fmancial practice between institutions. 
Islamic banks differ in form of ownership and in their emphasis on certain goals 
and operating methods. Other factors such as geographical scope of operations, the size 
and age of the bank and management structure cause these banks to differ in their form 
of organisation. 
The ban on usury in the operations of the Islamic banks places a heavy burden on 
the kinds and methods of investment utilised. In theory, the Islamic banks should look 
for investment opportunities in all sectors of the economy and not just confine 
themselves to sectors that promise high and quick returns. In practice, however, when 
management is faced, in some cases, with high cash balances and delays in investing in 
long term projects, it resorts to other projects and operations that secure adequate return 
and conform to financially and religiously permitted practice. This often means 
murabaha fmance. 
Certainly, in Turkey, there is a heavy concentration on this method offmance and 
to many the mark-up is seen as unsatisfactory. In Turkey, the emphasis on short term 
fmance has brought little benefit to the economy and has attracted considerable criticism 
from people who believe that the two finance houses should begin to move away from 
trade fmance to more medium and longer term equity fmance. Indeed, Islamic literature 
stresses the role Islam should play in economic development. 
Due to the fact that the Islamic banks' depositors assume a greater degree of risk, 
the Islamic banks have to provide their investors with a higher rate of return than the 
rate paid in interest on comparable deposits with conventional riba banks. This is a real 
challenge in Turkey where high inflation currently makes yields on all finan~e house 
participation accounts, and conventional bank deposits, negative in real terms. 
With the increase in the number and capital of the Islamic banks due to their 
acceptance by the people and governments of several Islamic nations, a need for a 
technical advisory body arose. This led to the establishment, in 1977, of the 
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International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB), whose main objective is to 
strengthen relations and cooperation among Islamic banks. However, not all Islamic 
banks are members of this association, the most notable non-member being the AI 
Baraka Group. 
Among Islamic bankers, there is a general feeling that the IAIB, or even the 
Islamic Development Bank, could, and perhaps should, do more to foster relations 
between Islamic banks and to help unify the banks' diverging practices and operating 
methods. It could perhaps introduce an international Islamic accounting standard or 
guidelines although in Turkey the authorities would find this unacceptable, as here the 
finance houses are required to submit audited accounts in a format decided by the 
Central Bank. There have also been suggestions that the IAIB could have its own 
Sharia advisers to audit the member banks but this idea would seem unworkable given 
the fact that the Islamic banks are operating in countries adhering to different branches 
or sects of Islam. 
Turkey does benefit greatly from its membership of the Islamic Development 
Bank, and since joining in 1974 it has received credits of around one billion dollars. 
Turkey's strong links with the IDB are maintained through the Ozal family connections. 
In countries where Muslims form a minority of the population, some conventional 
banks are now catering for the demands of their Muslim clients by offering Islamic 
financial services. In the world's financial centres there are links between Islamic and 
non-Islamic institutions which mainly revolve around the provision of trade finance 
facilities. The western money markets also provide Islamic banks with opportunities for 
diversified portfolio investment which is unavailable in the Islamic world. Several large 
western banks now offer a range of Islamic products and often act as correspondents 
for the Islamic banks, ensuring that their services carried out on behalf of the Islamic 
correspondents avoid riba. Transactions are not undertaken in the forward or futures 
markets nor are there dealings involving such items as government bills and corporate 
bonds. There are, however, difficulties involved by wholly Islamic banks operating in 
a non-Islamic environment. The present banking system and fiscal legislation in 
practice in Western countries are not compatible with the objectives and characteristics 
of Islamic banks, and some arrangement with the banking authorities to permit the 
Islamic banks to function more freely will have to be evolved. Although most 
non-Islamic banks are concerned mainly with m].lrabaha finance, some also offer 
Islamic unit trusts. There are also plans by some riba based banks to provide mortgage 
facilities which avoid the payment of interest and to offer leasing arrangements. 
In Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country with around 54 million inhabitants, 
there are perhaps the best prospects for Islamic banking. Since 1980, Turkey has 
enjoyed a fast economic rate of growth and prospects for further growth look 
promising given the fact that there is an established industrial base, agricultural 
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self-sufficiency, a booming tourist sector and a government committed to private 
enterprise. In recent years it has become a much more open and liberal society with 
more toleration being shown towards Islam. The rapid growth at Al Baraka Tiirk Ozel 
Finans Kurumu and Faisal Finans Kurumu indicates that there is a demand for Islamic 
banking services. As these two finance houses account for just over one per cent of all 
Turkish bank deposits, the scope for expansion is clearly enormous. The finance 
houses have proved that banking growth and profitability do not have to depend on the 
practice of receiving and paying interest. 
The lead taken by the prime minister in enacting legislation to permit the 
establishment of Islamic banks in Turkey appears to have been justified. Although the 
finance houses are subject to a heavy degree of close supervision from the various 
regulatory authorities, the degree of supervision does make investors feel more secure 
and confident in their dealings ~ith the finance houses. The Islamic banks in Turkey 
complement the existing conventional banks and other financial institutions and have 
encouraged banking habits among the Turkish population. 
In areas which benefit the economy, the Turkish finance houses still have much to 
do. They must begin to participate in medium and longer term equity projects. In 
evaluating the viability of projects, banking skills are important and a fully trained staff, 
conversant in Islamic ideology, is essential. 
The continuing success of Islamic banks in Turkey, and indeed the world, will 
depend upon cooperation with one another, the conventional banks and the central 
banking authorities, and on the expansion of Islamic business ventures through the 
development of existing and innovative fmancing schemes. 
Given support by Muslim governments and Muslims throughout the world, the 
Islamic banking movement seems set to continue its growth and influence. 
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